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Elections are a defining part of every democracy. By electing representatives, the
people transfers its power to form a government. Consequently, the requirements
for a democratic election are very high.
The German Federal Constitutional Court ruled in March 2008 that each voter
must be able to verify the correctness of the election result without special skills.
As a consequence of this ruling, the regulation allowing the use of voting ma-
chines for federal elections was deemed unconstitutional—the electoral principle
of publicity was violated since the correctness of the result was no longer pub-
licly verifiable. This made elections using hand counted paper ballots the only
remaining way of conducting political elections in Germany.
Cryptographic voting schemes are evolving into a practical alternative to the
traditional election using paper ballots. They offer not only correctness but indi-
vidual verifiability. The challenge for a cryptographic voting scheme is to provide
verifiability while protecting voter privacy. This is important in order to prevent
vote-buying and coercion.
Bingo Voting is a cryptographic voting scheme proposed by Bohli, Müller-Quade
and Röhrich in 2007. The original version provides verifiable correctness based on
a trusted random number generator. Each voter receives a receipt that enables
the voter to verify that the corresponding vote was counted correctly. But the
receipt does not provide any information about how the voter voted to any third
party.
This work presents the original version of Bingo Voting, describes experience
gained during the first real-world election conducted with Bingo Voting, proposes
several improvements to Bingo Voting addressing several shortcomings and weak-
nesses, and analyses the resulting voting scheme.
The experiences gained during this first election with Bingo Voting and the
analysis presented in this work show that Bingo Voting is a practical alternative





In einer demokratischen Wahl legitimiert das Volk als Souverän die Regierung.
Eine demokratische Wahl muss daher sehr hohen Anforderungen genügen. Dies
hat das Bundesverfassungsgericht in seiner Entscheidung vom 3. März 2009 er-
neut bestätigt. Mit dem Urteil wurde der Einsatz von Wahlmaschinen bei der
Bundestagswahl 2005 für verfassungswidrig erklärt, da die Wähler die korrek-
te Ermittlung des Ergebnisses nicht überprüfen können. Seit dem Urteil wird in
Deutschland nur noch das klassische Papierwahlverfahren für politische Wahlen
eingesetzt.
Kryptographische Wahlverfahren
Es existieren Alternativen zur klassischen Papierwahl, die ebenfalls ein nachvoll-
ziehbar korrektes Ergebnis versprechen. Schon seit einigen Jahren werden verschie-
dene kryptographische Wahlverfahren vorgeschlagen, die den hohen Anforderun-
gen an eine demokratische Wahl genügen und dabei zusätzliche wünschenswerte
Eigenschaften bieten sollen.
Die wichtigste Eigenschaft für ein kryptographisches Wahlverfahren ist die durch-
gehende Verifzierbarkeit (end-to-end verifiability). Der Wähler bekommt die Mög-
lichkeit, sowohl die korrekte Zählung der eigenen Stimme zu überprüfen als auch
die korrekte Ermittlung des Gesamtergebnisses nachzuvollziehen. Im Gegensatz
dazu ist bei einer Papierwahl die korrekte Zählung der eigenen Stimme nur mit-
telbar überprüfbar, indem der Wähler die Wahlurne nach Stimmabgabe genau
beobachtet und die Auszählung komplett mitverfolgt. Gleichzeitig ist es für einen
einzelnen Wähler unmöglich, mehr als ein Wahllokal durchgehend zu überprüfen.
Bingo Voting
Bingo Voting ist ein kryptographisches Wahlverfahren, das von Bohli, Müller-
Quade und Röhrich an der Universität Karlsruhe (TH) entwickelt und 2007 erst-
mals vorgestellt wurde [BMQR07a, BMQR07b]. Das ursprüngliche Verfahren bil-
det die Grundlage für diese Arbeit und wird in Kapitel 3 vorgestellt.
Bingo Voting setzt zwar einen Rechner als Wahlmaschine ein, der Wähler muss
dem Rechner aber nicht vertrauen. Er kann später selbst die Korrektheit des Wahl-
ergebnisses nachprüfen. Dazu bekommt der Wähler einen Beleg, mit dem er die
korrekte Zählung seiner Stimme prüfen kann. Die korrekte Ermittlung des Wahl-
ergebnisses kann mit Hilfe öffentlicher Daten von jedem nachvollzogen werden,
auch von Personen, die nicht an der Wahl teilgenommen haben. Die Korrektheit
des Verfahrens beruht dabei nur auf einem vertrauenswürdigen Zufallszahlengene-
rator, der beispielsweise mechanisch realisiert werden kann. In der ursprüglichen
Veröffentlichung wird ein Bingokäfig als Beispiel angeführt, der dem Verfahren
auch den Namen gibt.
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In seiner ursprünglichen Form besitzt Bingo Voting einige Schwächen. Gelangt
ein Angreifer in den Besitz eines Belegs, kann er die zugehörige Stimme unbe-
merkt manipulieren, da der Beleg nicht mehr kontrolliert wird. Dieses Problem
teilt Bingo Voting mit den meisten anderen kryptographischen Wahlverfahren.
Zum Zeitpunkt der ersten Veröffentlichung von Bingo Voting war auch unklar,
welche Auswirkungen die Bedienbarkeit eines Wahlverfahrens auf die Sicherheit
und das Ergebnis der Wahl hat. Außerdem sind die öffentlichen Daten, die für die
Verifikation des Wahlergebnisses veröffentlich werden müssen, sehr groß.
Praktische Erfahrungen mit Bingo Voting
Im Rahmen der Studierendenparlamentswahl der Universität Karlsruhe (TH)
im Jahre 2008, bei der ein Prototyp von Bingo Voting eingesetzt wurde, konn-
ten wertvolle Erfahrungen mit dem Verfahren gewonnen werden. Diese wurden
in [BHMQ+08] veröffentlicht und werden in Kapitel 4 beschrieben.
Ein wichtiges Resultat ist, dass Wähler bei Bingo Voting erst nach dem Abgeben
der Stimme mit dem Verfahren konfrontiert werden und dass der Verifikations-
prozess optional ist. Es unterscheidet sich damit von Verfahren wie Punchscan,
Scantegrity oder ThreeBallot, die spezielle Stimmzettel benötigen, und MarkPled-
ge sowie dem Verfahren von Moran und Naor, bei denen der Wähler zufällige
Zeichen in die Wahlmaschine eingeben muss, um den Beleg zu generieren.
Ein Nachteil von Bingo Voting, der sich ebenfalls in dieser Wahl gezeigt hat, ist
die Tatsache, dass die Daten, die für die Verifikation veröffentlicht werden müssen,
sehr groß sind.
Verbesserungen für Bingo Voting
Den wesentlichen Schwerpunkt dieser Arbeit bilden die Erweiterungen und Ver-
besserungen von Bingo Voting, die in Kapitel 5 beschrieben werden.
Für die Studierendenparlamentswahl war es nötig, Bingo Voting so zu erwei-
tern, dass sich damit komplexe Wahlen durchführen lassen. Die dafür notwendigen
Änderungen werden ausführlich dargestellt und diskutiert.
Das Problem, dass die öffentlichen Daten sehr groß wurden, wurde ebenfalls
betrachtet. Die Arbeit stellt mehrere Veränderungen vor, die die Größe der öffent-
lichen Daten um etwa den Faktor 100 verringern. Dies ist ein wichtiger Schritt für
die Praktikabilität des Verfahrens.
Für die Sicherheit von Bingo Voting ist es notwendig, dass die Zufallszahlen, die
der vertrauenswürdige Zufallszahlengenerator während des Wahlvorgangs zieht,
nicht vorher schon für eine Füllstimme gezogen wurden. Daher muss die Län-
ge dieser Zufallszahlen so gewählt werden, dass die Wahrscheinlichkeit, dass eine
Zufallszahl mehrfach gezogen wird, ausreichend gering ist. Da der Wähler die
Korrektheit seines Belegs in der Wahlkabine überprüft, indem er die Zufallszahl
auf dem Beleg mit der vom Zufallszahlengenerator angezeigten Zahl vergleicht,
machen längere Zufallszahlen diesen Verifikationsschritt schwieriger. Diese Arbeit
stellt eine Modifikation des Bingo-Voting-Protokolls vor, die die Wahrscheinlich-
keit, dass eine mehrfach gezogene Zufallszahl zu einer unbemerkten Manipulation
der Stimme führt, deutlich verringert. Diese Modifikation erlaubt es, kürzere Zu-
fallszahlen zu verwenden, was den Vergleich der Zufallszahlen in der Wahlkabine
erleichtert und damit Bedienbarkeit und Akzeptanz erhöht.
Diese Arbeit beschreibt außerdem einen Angriff, gegen den die meisten kryp-
tographischen Wahlverfahren nicht ausreichend geschützt sind, da er eine Grun-
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dannahme außer Kraft setzt. Für die Korrektheit der meisten Wahlverfahren ist
es notwendig anzunehmen, dass ein Angreifer nicht weiß, welche Stimmen über-
prüft werden, und er damit bei jeder Manipulation Gefahr läuft, entdeckt zu wer-
den. Gelangt der Angreifer hingegen in Besitz eines Belegs, kann er mit hoher
Wahrscheinlichkeit ausschließen, dass die zugehörige Stimme überprüft wird. Die-
se Arbeit beschreibt eine Gegenmaßnahme gegen diesen Angriff, die sich leicht auf
andere kryptographische Wahlverfahren übertragen lässt, die den Beleg für den
Wähler mit einem Computer generieren.
Analyse und Evaluation
Ein weiterer Schwerpunkt dieser Arbeit ist die Evaluation der vorgeschlagenen
Verbesserungen und die Analyse des resultierenden Verfahrens. Dies geschieht in
Kapitel 6.
Diese Arbeit präsentiert eine ausführliche Liste der Annahmen, die für die Kor-
rektheit und Sicherheit einer Wahl, die mit Bingo Voting durchgeführt wird, not-
wendig sind. Die Zusammenhänge zwischen den einzelnen Annahmen und den
Sicherheitseigenschaften des Verfahren werden diskutiert.
Für die Evaluation wurden drei Szenarien basierend auf drei großen Wahlen
der jüngsten Geschichte verwendet: die Bundestagswahl 2009 in Deutschland, die
Präsidentschaftswahl 2008 in den Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika sowie die Par-
lamentswahl 2009 in Indien.
Die Arbeit gibt eine Formel an, mit der sich die Wahrscheinlichkeit, dass sich ei-
ne Stimme unbemerkt verändert werden kann, für eine Wahl in Abhängigkeit von
der Anzahl der Wähler und der Länge der verwendeten Zufallszahlen berechnen
lässt. Die Analyse ergibt, dass Zufallszahlen mit einer Länge von 30 bit ausreichen,
um die erwartete Anzahl der Stimmen, die sich unbemerkt verändern lassen, auf
unter 1 zu senken. Zufallszahlen mit 30 bit Länge lassen sich durch eine Zeichen-
kette mit sechs Zeichen darstellen, die für die leichtere Vergleichbarkeit in zwei
Dreiergruppen gegliedert sind.
Die Arbeit gibt ebenfalls eine Formel an, mit der sich die Größe der Daten, die
für die Verifikation veröffentlicht werden müssen, in Abhängigkeit von der Anzahl
der Kandidaten und der Anzahl der Wähler berechnen lässt. Für die Parlaments-
wahl 2009 in Indien, die größte demokratischen Wahl in der Geschichte, wären
die öffentlichen Daten 97,3 TB groß, wenn diese Wahl mit Bingo Voting durch-
geführt worden wäre. Für die Bundestagswahl 2009 und die amerikanische Prä-
sidentschaftswahl 2008 ergeben sich Größen von 723 GB beziehungsweise knapp
3 TB. Dabei stellen die Veränderungen am Verfahren im Vergleich zum Original-
verfahren eine Verbesserung um den Faktor 100 dar.
Zusammenfassung und Ausblick
Diese Arbeit bringt Bingo Voting ein großes Stück näher an ein praktisches
Wahlverfahren für politische Wahlen mit den höchsten Anforderungen. Die Si-
cherheit und Verifizierbarkeit, die Bingo Voting bietet, ist nicht geringer als die
von herkömmlichen Wahlen mit Papierstimmzetteln.
Um Bingo Voting allerdings wirklich bei einer realen Wahl einzusetzen, müs-
sen noch einige offene Fragen gelöst werden. Die Sicherheit des Verfahrens beruht
darauf, dass der vertrauenswürdige Zufallszahlengenerator die Zahlen während
des Wahlvorgangs echt zufällig wählt. Eine Realisierung dieses Zufallszahlengene-
rators, die für den Wähler nachvollziehbar ist und dennoch zuverlässig ausreichend
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Zufall produziert, fehlt zur Zeit.
Bingo Voting ist zwar prinzipiell auch bei komplexen Wahlen einsetzbar, aber
der Beleg wird mit der Anzahl der Kandidaten und der Anzahl der Stimmen, die
jeder Wähler verteilen darf, größer. Dies macht vor allem die Überprüfung in der
Wahlkabine bei Wahlen mit vielen Kandidaten und vielen Stimmen pro Wähler
umständlich. Eine Untersuchung, bis zu welcher Komplexität eine Wahl mit Bingo
Voting bedienbar ist, steht noch aus.
Die größte Unbekannte bei der Einschätzung, ob und wann Bingo Voting für
politische Wahlen in Deutschland eingesetzt werden kann, ist die Interpretation
des Urteils des Bundesverfassungsgerichts zum Einsatz von Wahlmaschinen. Bis
jetzt gibt es keine neue, verfassungsgemäße Bundeswahlgeräteverordnung, die als
Maßstab für jedes Wahlverfahren dient.
1. Introduction
Elections are the defining element of a democracy. In a democracy, from the
Greek words d¨moc – people and kratÐa – governance, the people as souvereign
uses its power to form the government through an election. So it is not remarkable
that political elections enjoy the highest importance and also the highest protec-
tion in a democracy and have almost ritual character. The role of elections in
modern democracy is becoming more prominent and important with the trend of
direct democracy or liquid democracy when elections are not only used to elect
representatives but also to involve citizens in the decision making process.
Due to the high importance of elections, the requirements are very strict. Voters
have to be sure that the result of an election is correct and represents the will of the
people. The introduction of the concept of voter privacy, i. e. the fact that single
votes must be kept secret, turned this requirement into a hard problem. This work
presents and discusses some of the many suggestions and different approaches to
solve this problem.
The traditional election with paper ballots uses an elaborate procedure to ensure
correctness of the election and voter privacy at the same time. All important steps
of the election are public, including the hand counting of the votes, allowing each
voter to check the correctness of the tally. The only part that happens in private
is when a voter enters the voting booth to mark the ballot. Many are convinced
that the traditional election is the best implementation for a democratic election.
The introduction of voting machines to aid voters and poll workers in casting
and tallying votes was received with mixed feelings as the complaint that lead to
the ruling of the German Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht)
has shown. Supporters of voting machines claim that the advantages of aided
marking and tallying, namely the faster, less labour intensive and less error-prone
tally and the support for disabled voters, outweighs the disadvantages. Opponents
of voting machines claim that the introduction of mechanical or computerized
devices into the voting process not only deters people from participating in an
election due to fear of the unfamiliar devices but also claim that those devices
make the process opaque for voters and therefore undemocratic. The decision
of the German Federal Constitutional Court [off09] has clarified that the use of
voting machines is not per se undemocratic, but has also set high standards for
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the transparency of such devices.
Cryptographic voting schemes aim to provide a different approach to the prob-
lem of secure elections. Instead of trusting the procedure as with traditional paper
based elections or trusting the manufacturer of a voting machine, cryptographic
voting schemes use cryptographic protocols and proofs to produce a verifiably
correct tally.
Bingo Voting is a cryptographic voting scheme originally developed by Bohli,
Müller-Quade and Röhrich in 2007 [BMQR07a, BMQR07b]. Bingo Voting uses a
voting machine to record the voter’s choice but also issues a receipt to the voter.
This receipt allows the voter to verify that their vote was counted correctly, but
it does not contain information that tells a third party how the voter voted.
This work demonstrates that Bingo Voting is a practical alternative to the
traditional election using paper ballots.
1.1 Contribution of this Work
This works presents several improvements for the original Bingo Voting scheme
by Bohli, Müller-Quade and Röhrich [BMQR07a] and describes the experiences
of a small election conducted with Bingo Voting.
The main contribution of this work is the presentation of several improvements
and extensions for Bingo Voting. It gives a detailed description of the measures
necessary to use Bingo Voting for more complex elections. This includes elections
in which each voter may distribute several votes or larger elections that require
the employment of more than a single voting machine. The improvements also sig-
nificantly decrease the size of the public data required for the verification process
and increase usability by allowing shorter random numbers to be used without a
loss of security.
This work also includes a thorough analysis of the properties of Bingo Voting.
It states the assumptions that are made and how they relate to different security
properties. The analysis also includes a formula to predict the size of the public
data for an election. It also gives the probability of a corrupted voting machine
to change a vote without risking detection depending on the length of the random
numbers used. This allows the voting authority to make an informed decision
about the length of the random numbers required depending on the size of the
election.
1.2 Structure of this Work
Chapter 2 gives a short introduction to elections in general, presents the termi-
nology and notions used in this work, describes requirements for elections, intro-
duces several cryptographic primitives and protocols that are necessary for many
cryptographic voting schemes, presents security notions that are commonly used
in the literature, and gives a description of a number of cryptographic voting
schemes.
Chaper 3 presents the original version of Bingo Voting as described in the
original publications [BMQR07a, BMQR07b].
Bingo Voting was employed in the student parliament elections of the University
of Karlsruhe in 2008. Chapter 4 describes the election, the implementation of
Bingo Voting that was used and the experiences that were gained during the
election.
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Chapter 5 describes several extensions and improvements for the original version
of Bingo Voting. These improvements allow Bingo Voting to be employed in larger
and more complex elections, reduce the size of the public data required for the
verification process, increase usability by reducing the size of the random numbers
that are used to encode the voter’s choice on a receipt, enable the voter to dispute
an election without unveiling the vote, and prevent the receipt stealing attack that
poses a problem for almost all cryptographic voting schemes.
Chapter 6 presents an analysis of the Bingo Voting protocol and evaluates the
improvements proposed in this work.
Chapter 7 summarizes and discusses the results and concludes this work.

2. Preliminaries
The topic of elections is very diverse and encompasses questions of politics, law,
social sciences, and psychology as well as security and, in case of cryptographic
voting schemes, cryptography.
This chapter discusses the necessary preliminaries in detail. Section 2.1 dis-
cusses elections in general. Section 2.2 defines the terminology and notions used
in the remainder of this work. Section 2.3 gives an overview over the security no-
tions and properties present in the literature. Section 2.4 presents cryptographic
primitives that are used in the Bingo Voting scheme. Section 2.5 gives a short
overview over cryptographic voting schemes in the literature.
2.1 About Elections
There are many different election types, systems, schemes and methods. All
of these differ greatly in their functionalities and properties, how the tallies and
results are determined, and how the voters experience the voting process and the
whole election. The details greatly depend on the history and culture of the group
of voters, the purpose of the election and on the means that are available.
This section gives an insight into the diversity of election and on the challenges
that arise for a voting scheme. It also identifies the properties that most or all
elections have in common.
2.1.1 Election Types
An election is essentially a way for a group of individuals (called voters) to reach
a common decision by collecting the preferences of each individual on a clearly
defined subject. This includes choosing one or more representatives, picking one
of several alternatives, or accepting or declining a proposition.
Political elections are not the only occurrences of elections. The democratic
principle has entered many aspects of the day-to-day live and culture of modern
democracies. In this section we briefly discuss different types of elections.
In an election each voter expresses their preference on a set of choices or al-
ternatives. The meaning of these choices and the preferences expressed depend
of the election. As elections are used for many different purposes and on many
occasions this varies a lot. In this section we use the term candidate to denote a
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person that stands in an election. From the next section on we will use the term
candidate more broadly (see Section 2.2).
The most prominent example for an election is the political election in which
the people elect representatives and bestow them with legislative power. In this
case, voters decide on political parties or candidates which best represent the
voters’ political will. Another example in which voters elect a person is to fill an
office, often in judiciary or executive. In this case the choice is again between
candidates but not for representative tasks. In a similar fashion, leading positions
in most groups (non-political like clubs or associations as well as political parties
or unions) are determined by an election. A peculiar case is the election of a board
of directors in public companies, as here the number of votes a single shareholder
possesses depends on their number of shares.
Another function of an election as a decision-making process. In this case,
the voters do not decide on candidates but on actions, for example on a law
proposition. This is an integral part of direct democracy as the citizens vote
directly on policy initiatives. The results of these elections are binding for the
government. Some forms of direct democracy exist in many democratic countries,
especially for the case that the government is abusing its power the possibility
of a motion of no-confidence ensures that the power remains with the people. A
referendum is special form of an election in which the voters are asked to either
accept or reject a particular proposal.
The oldest documented form of elections is the Athenian ostracism (from the
Greek word îstrakon meaning pottery shard). In the annual procedure, the an-
cient Athenians chose one cititzen that was to be expelled from Athens for ten
years. They used pottery shards to record their choice and the citizen with the
most votes had to leave the city.
A weaker form of elections are opinion polls. Such polls are often held by private
organisations for companies, media and the government. From a security point of
view, these are very different from elections. As the result are in no way legally
binding, it may be assumed that the entity conducting them is interested in the
correctness of the result (as opposed to the voters themselves that are interested
in the correctness of the result of an election). This is only partially true, since
manipulated results of an opinion poll may also be used to sway the public opinion,
e. g. by claiming that a certain opinion is less or more widespread than it actually
is or by justifying political decisions.
The scope and impact of the election has the most influence on the security
requirements. A non-binding opinion poll is often done without any security at
all, a political election for the head of a state has very high security requirements.
For the remainder of this work we will only consider elections with high security
requirements and completely abstract from the different possible subjects and
purposes of an election.
2.1.2 Voting Procedure
The simplest form of a voting process is the public showing of hands. To vote
on a certain subject, all eligible voters gather and raise their hand or use a similar
public expression of their preference. One big advantage is that this process is
trivially and obviously secure in the sense that every voter attending can tally
and verify the result. One problem of this procedure is that it does not scale very
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well and thus is unsuited for large groups (although technical aids can push this
limit), especially since all voters have to be present at the same time. The second
problem is that the voting process of each voter is public and everyone learns how
a voter voted.
A public voting process may lead to influence on the voter and is nowadays
uncommon for most political elections in which voters are citizens and not elected
representatives. The secret ballot is a very important part of the modern voting
culture. The origins of the modern secret ballot lies in the 18th and 19th century
when several countries introduced secret ballots to reduce any undue influence on
voters. Before the introduction of the secret ballot, vote buying and coercion were
not uncommon. In most modern democracies this contradicts the requirement
each voter should vote freely without being influenced.
In modern elections an often used medium to record votes is paper. It is com-
mon, easy to obtain and handle, the voter uses a pen to mark the ballot, and
the tally is a manual counting process that often is public after the ballots are
shuffled (and thus made anonymous) using a ballot box. The main disadvantage
of the traditional paper ballot is that the voting process as well as the tally by
hand takes time and is error-prone, especially when the election becomes more
complex.
There have been several attempts to improve and accelerate the manual tally
by introducing machines or computers to the voting process or the tally process.
The least impact on the voting process itself is the use of scanners to electronically
capture paper ballots marked by the voter by traditional means (i. e. a pen). The
first approach to accelerate the tally, however, was made in America by introducing
lever machines for casting and tallying the votes. Introducing devices directly into
the voting process (and thus changing it) offers a wider spectrum of possibilities for
improvements. A detailed discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of using
paper ballots or machines for the voting process or the tally is in Section 2.1.6.
These are two inherently different situations a voter may be in when marking
a ballot. The voter may either go to a polling station and mark the ballot in a
designated area, called a voting booth, that ensures that the voter is unobserved
during the voting process. Or the voter may fill the ballot at home and send the
ballot to the place where it is tallied. The first scenario is called presence voting as
the voter is present at a polling station when casting the vote. The second scenario
is called remote voting. Section 2.1.7 discusses the two scenarios in detail.
2.1.3 Electoral Systems
After looking at the different subjects and purposes of an election and the
different ways a vote may be cast, we now discuss how a voter may express their
preferences. There are several ways of recording the preferences on a ballot and
several ways of obtaining a result from the sum of all ballots cast. We call the
exact method a electoral system, but it is sometimes also called a voting system.
The simplest electoral system is that the voter may choose one of the preferences
and mark it, thus casting their vote for this preference. The choice with the
most votes is declared winner of the election. This is often called a winner-takes-
all election or first-past-the-post voting. There may be additional conditions, for
example a quorum. A change of the German Basic Law, for example, is only
successful if in the referendum at least two-thirds of the votes accept the proposal.
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If there is more than one winner (for example when there are several seats to be
won), the electoral system may either distribute the n seats to the n candidates
with the most votes or distribute the seats according to the proportion of the votes.
This is often case when voters do not elect individual candidates but groups of
candidates, often parties. This system is called proportional representation.
In a different electoral system the voter has several votes instead of just one and
may distribute those among the preferences. If voters are allowed to give more
than one vote to a single preference we call this cumulative voting. This is often
used for elections with proportional representation.
A different group of electoral system require the voter to not only cast one
or several votes but instead rank the possible choices. When there is only one
winner of the election, the resulting voting system is called instant-runoff voting
or alternative voting. To determine the winner, the ballots are sorted by the
candidates that were marked as first choice. If a single candidate has receive
more than half of the votes, he wins the elections. If not, the candidate with
the fewest votes is eliminated and the corresponding ballots are redistributed
according to the candidates marked as second choice. This is repeated until a
single candidate has received more that half of the votes cast in the election.
In an election with more than one winner, the ranking of candidates is used
by the so-called single transferable vote system. In this system, the ballots are
tallied similarly to the instant-runoff system, but candidates are also eliminated
when they received enough votes to win a seat and their ballots are redistributed
accordingly.
All of these electoral systems may or may not allow for write-in candidates
which allow the voter to add a candidate to the ballot and cast a vote for him.
2.1.4 Properties of Elections
Intuitively the requirements for an election are obvious and simple. Each voter
should have the influence on the final result as specified by the voting system.
This implies that only eligible voters may voter and that the final result correctly
represents the will of the voters. It is also highly desireable that the final result is
accepted by the participants. While the general principles are common consensus,
details may vary from election to election and from country to country.
The properties elections have to satisfy are mostly deemed obvious or defined
by regulations or laws. Depending on the importance and scale of the election the
measures taken to ensure the security vary.
The rest of this section is specific for the situation in Germany if not noted
otherwise. Most of these properties are true for other countries.
Article 38 of the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany states the
requirements for the election for the German Bundestag as follows:
Members of the German Bundestag are to be elected in general,
direct, free, equal and secret elections.
While this article only states the requirements for one specific election this has
become the general standard for requirements for all political elections. We will
briefly discuss the meaning of the requirements.
general Each citizen is allowed to cast a vote in the election.
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direct The members of the Bundestag are elected directly by the voters.
free A voter may not be influenced by a third party when casting a vote.
equal All votes count equally.
secret The choice of a single voter must not become known to any third party.
Of these requirements stated by the German Basic Law, three are of special in-
terest for voting schemes as discussed in this work. The requirements of free and
secret elections mean that no information about the voter’s choice may become
known to any third party, as this may influence the voter. The requirement of
equality of all votes includes the requirement that votes must not be omitted from
the tally or altered by any third party.
The German Federal Constitutional Court has strengthened these requirements
in a ruling in 2009 by calling the employment of voting machine in the Bundestag
elections in 2005 unconstitutional. Section 6.4.3 discusses this decision and its
impact on cryptographic voting schemes briefly.
These requirements are fundamental for elections and also the foundation for
the formal definitions of security properties. Section 2.3 gives a detailed and more
formal discussion of the security properties of cryptographic voting schemes.
2.1.5 Attacks on Voting Schemes
There are many ways to influence the results of an elections. Legal ways are,
for example, election campaigns to influence voters. The fact that candidates
and political parties spend large sums shows that there is an interest in a certain
result of an election and a willingness to spend money for this. In addition to
legal methods to influence an election, there are more direct and illegal ways to
either persuade voters to vote in a certain way or to directly influence or change
the result of the election.
Numerous examples have shown that elections pose the temptation of electoral
fraud. Extreme cases are countries that are not truly democratic but try to use
fraudulent elections to gain a semblance of democracy. But also truly democratic
elections are threatened by attacks. This sections briefly presents several attacks
on voting schemes. We will call the entity that attempts to manipulate an election
an conducts the attacks the adversary.
Ballot Stuffing
A simple method of changing the result of an election is allowing voter to vote
more than once. This is called ballot stuffing. In its simplest form this means that
a voter casts more than one ballot, or votes at more than one polling station, but
may also include impersonation of absentees.
Vote Buying
An adversary trying to change the result of an election may not only try to
directly manipulate the result but instead convince voters to vote a certain way. If
the voting scheme enables the adversary to check whether or not the voter behaved
according to a previous arrangement, the adversary may use this to influence the
voter by reward desired behaviour or penalize unwanted behaviour.
This attack is called vote buying or coercion. Breaking voter privacy auto-
matically enables the adversary to buy votes and thus allows him to take undue
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influence on the result of the elections. But it may also be possible for the ad-
versary to be able to only break the secrecy of votes cast by coerced voters. An
example for an election using paper ballots would be that coerced voters mark
their ballots inconspicuously, e. g. by using ink that is only visible under UV light
or by marking their choice using a + or χ instead of the normal ×.
Vote buying is considered to be the stronger attack as the voter is motivated to
deviate from the voting protocol if this increases the chance of receiving payment.
A special form of an coercion attack is the forced abstention and the forced
randomization. If the voter is able to recognize a randomized ballot, i. e. a ballot
that was marked at random and not according to the preferences of the voter, or a
ballot that denotes an abstention, the voter may be coerced to cast an abstention
or a randomized ballot. This also allows the adversary to influence the election,
even though the influence is subtle and those attacks are often disregarded.
Chain Voting
A voting scheme that uses paper ballots and hands each voter only a single
ballot is often vulnerable to the following attack: The adversary obtains a single
ballot, marks it according to his choice and hands it to a voter. The voter is now
coerced (i. e. paid or threatened) to take the blank ballot the voter receives at the
polling station, cast the filled ballot received from the adversary instead and bring
back the blank ballot to the adversary. The adversary may now fill out the new
blank ballot and coerce another voter to continue the attack. This attack is called
chain voting.
The obvious countermeasure is allowing all voters free access to blank ballots.
This is easy for simple paper ballots but may not be very practical for crypto-
graphic voting schemes that use intricate (and expensive) ballots.
Psychological Aspects
For coercion attacks it is not necessary that the adversary is actually able to
gain information about how the voter voted. It is sufficient that the voter believes
that the adversary is able to detect if the voter deviates from the adversary’s
instructions.
The only way to face this problem seems to be voter education.
2.1.6 Paper vs. Machine
The introduction of mechanical and electronical devices into elections with the
intention of making the voting process or the tallying process easier has sparked
a debate of the benefits as well as costs and risks of these devices. The question
whether elections should utilize computers for the voting process at all is disputed.
In this section we will briefly discuss the properties of paper based voting system
as well as voting systems employing voting machines or computers. We will also
consider devices only used to help in tallying the ballots but concentrate on the
those that have an impact on the voting experience.
2.1.6.1 Paper Ballots
Paper ballots are a wide-spread, well-understood, well-accepted and user-friendly
form to record votes. Paper ballots are easy and cheap to print, and a variety of
pens may be used to mark a paper ballot. Every voter that is able to read and
write is probably used to pen and paper and therefore has little problem marking
a paper ballot.
2.1. About Elections 25
The main disadvantage of paper ballots is that the tallying process is typically
done by hand and as such long and error-prone. This is one of the main arguments
for the use of voting devices.
The verification process for an election using paper ballot that are counted by
hand is very straightforward. The auditor checks that the ballot box is empty at
the beginning of the voting phase, and only eligible voter cast votes and each voter
casts at most one vote during the voting phase. For the tally, the auditor verifies
that the ballots are counted correctly. The problem of this verification process is
that a single auditor is able to audit one polling station at most.
Another disadvantage is that paper ballots offer no feedback to the voter. In a
complex election in which the voter may distribute a large number of votes, the
voter may accidentally distribute too many or too few votes. A paper ballot does
not give a warning when a voter is marking the ballot as invalid, for example by
overvoting.
Paper ballots also are problematic for visually impaired and blind people. This
may be solved using the Braille system to print the ballots.
2.1.6.2 Optical Scan Voting System
One major problem of elections using the traditional paper ballots is that the
tally is time consuming and error-prone, especially for complex election. A seem-
ingly simple way of alleviating this problem without any major changes to the
voting process is the use of optical scan voting systems like scanners, digital pens
or similar electronic devices that electronically record the voter’s choice. These
systems are common in the United States of America [Sal88]. In Germany, there
was a single attempt to use digital pens in 2007 in Hamburg [AMBS07]. This plan
was abandoned shortly before the election [Vol09].
The advantage of these devices is that the tallying process is much faster than
counting by hand. However, the question of the security and reliability of these
devices is fundamental to asses their usefulness. The security of the tallying
process also greatly relies on the question whether these devices are used to obtain
the final tally or to get a projection before tallying by hand. In the first case any
security problems of the devices used jeopardize the integrity and correctness of
the election. In the second case the biggest advantage of the devices is nullified.
If the devices are monitored by recounting a small sample, there still remain open
questions: If ballots are recounted, is the tally of the optical scan system or the
result of the recount binding, how are these samples chosen, and under which
conditions is a recount permitted or even required.
Optical scan voting systems seem to be a good compromise between paper
ballots and voting devices. But without additional security measures they do not
offer sufficient protection against manipulation. Saltman [Sal88] describes several
cases in which computerized tallying may have lead to inaccurate results or even
manipulations in elections.
2.1.6.3 Voting Machines
Direct recording electronic machines (DREs) offer an alternative way for voters
to cast their votes. Instead of marking their choice on a paper ballot, a voter
interacts with a computer that records the voter’s choice. Tomz and Houweling
offer a good overview over voting machines used in the USA in [TH03].
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There are two major arguments that support the use of DREs. Since the voting
machines record the ballots in digital form, the tally is very fast. The other
argument is that that the voting machine interacts with the voter and is able to
assist them during the voting process. Examples for this are the possibility of
offering the voter a choice of different languages or assistance in complex elections
by warning a voter when the ballot becomes invalid. They may also assist disabled
voter, for example by offering an audio interface.
One big problem of voting machines is that the usability of the device depends
on the familiarity of voters with computers in general. This may exclude especially
elderly people from the election.
The biggest problem is, however, that without additional means of verifying the
result the voting machine outputs at the end of the voting phase, voters and voting
authority have no way of checking the correctness of the tally. In America, this
has lead to the requirement that in addition to the electronic ballot there must
be a physical copy of each voter’s choice. The most common implementation is
the voter verified paper audit trail (VVPAT) [GB07]. As for optical scan voting
schemes, the question arises whether the physical copy or the result of the voting
machine are binding and how test samples and recounts are handled.
After the employment of DREs for the Bundestag election 2005 in Germany,
the German Federal Constitutional Court has found the use of voting machines
unconstitutional if they do not allow every voter to verify the correctness of the
election. See Section 6.4.3 for discussion of the decision of the German Federal
Constitutional Court.
2.1.7 Presence vs. Remote Voting
In many elections, voters are not only able to cast their vote at a polling station
but may alternatively mark their ballots at home and send them to the voting
authority for the tally. This allows voters who are not able to visit a polling station
during the voting phase to participate in the election. This is called remote voting
in contrast to casting a vote in a polling station which is called presence voting.
Traditionally the ballots are sent using the postal system. This variant of remote
voting is called postal voting. Sending ballots in electronic form over the Internet
offers another alternative called Internet voting. This section briefly discusses the
differences of both presence voting and remote voting.
Presence voting means that voters cast their votes inside a polling station. They
are required to enter a voting booth provided by the voting authority to mark the
ballot. This offers the voter the ability to mark their ballot without any third
party learning their choice which is an crucial prerequisite for the anonymity of
the ballot and therefore of a free election.
When a voter uses remote voting, the voting authority does not know under
which circumstances the ballot is marked or if it is even marked by the voter.
Because of this, remote voting makes vote buying an coercion attacks simple. This
weakness is accepted as remote voting allows voters to participate in the election
even if they are unable or unwilling to cast their votes at a polling station. Remote
voting also requires the voter to authenticate themselves when sending the ballot.
The methods used differ greatly for postal voting and Internet voting and are also
often vulnerable to attacks.
For the remainder of this work we will only consider presence voting schemes
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which require the voter to enter a voting booth to mark the ballot or interact with
a voting machine.
2.2 Terminology and Notions
For the more formal discussion of the properties of an election we require un-
ambiguous notions. This section introduces the terminology and notions used in
the remainder of this work.
2.2.1 Roles in an Election
In an election there are different roles that have to be fulfilled. This includes
candidates, voters, poll workers and members of the Electoral Commission. To
make analysis feasible we will abstract from several practical necessities and con-
centrate on the essential parts of an election.
We will consider an election as a protocol with a set of rules and a number
of participants called parties. In the remainder of this work, the term ‘party’ is
not used for a political party but unless otherwise noted stands for a participant
in a protocol. We will treat an election as a protocol with three sets of parties:
the set of voting authorities, the set of voters, and the set of auditors. A voting
authority is a group of individuals entrusted with the organization of the election
and related tasks. It is often convenient to treat the complete group as a single
entity, but sometimes it is important to distinguish between several independent
voting authorities and members with different tasks, for example poll workers. The
set of voters encompasses all individuals that are eligible to vote in the election.
The set of auditors consists of all individuals that observe the compliance with
the electoral laws and verify the correctness of an election. In most cases every
voter may also be an auditor, often even parties that are not voters may be in
this group.
Elections are used for many purposes so the choices of the voter may be persons,
political parties, approval for a suggestion or any other choice. In this work
we will call the different choices candidate independently from whether they are
individuals, political parties, different options or simply ‘yes’ and ‘no’. While
candidates play no role in the election protocol, individuals that are candidates
may of course also be voters or auditors.
In addition to the legitimate roles, we have to consider an entity that attacks
and attempts to disrupt or manipulate the election. We will call this entity the
adversary. The adversary may corrupt any party participating in the election,
taking complete control over their actions. The adversary may also coerce a voter.
In this case the adversary does not take control of the actions of the voter but
instead gives a set of instructions to the voter and receives a transcript of the
voter’s actions inside the polling station include any receipts the voter received.
Intuitively, we will say that a cryptographic voting scheme satisfies a security
property if no adversary that does not break the underlying assumptions is able
to break the security property.
2.2.2 Phases of an Election
To describe the process of an election, we distinguish three phases that are
strictly sequential. The voting phase is the middle phase during which the voters
cast their votes. Before the voting phase the voting authority prepares the election.
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After the voting phase, the voting authority tallies all votes and publishes the
result.
Preparation Phase
Before voters cast their votes, the voting authority prepares everything that is
required to conduct an election during the preparation phase. This includes the
publication of the candidate list and any other information about the election
that is required to be public, establishing the list of eligible voters (depending
on the election this list may also be published), and organizing the poll workers
and polling stations. It also includes anything specific to the voting scheme used.
For the traditional election that uses paper ballot these must be printed and
distributed, for most cryptographic voting schemes this means the publication of
data that is later used for the verification of the result.
The preparation phase may start at an arbitrary point in time before the voting
phase and lasts until the start of the voting phase. There may be practical and le-
gal requirements for the length of time that must lay between certain preparations
and the voting phase (e. g. the candidate list must be published well in advance
so that voters are able to inform themselves).
Voting Phase
The voting phase is the phase in which each voter has the opportunity to cast a
vote. From a theoretical point of view this phase lasts until every voter has either
cast a vote or decided to not participate in the election. For practical reasons this
phase lasts a predefined time, often one day or one week. It is assumed that all
voters that choose to participate in the election have the opportunity to cast a
vote within this predefined voting phase.
We call the process of the vote casting the voting process of a single voter. This
encompasses everything a single voter does inside the polling station that is elec-
tion specific, most prominently marking and casting a ballot or the interaction
with a voting machine. This includes the poll workers verifying the eligibility
of the voter, but since this procedure is depending more on the legal and prac-
tical requirements of the election than on the voting scheme used, this is often
disregarded in the rest of this work.
Tally Phase
When all voters have cast their votes and the voting phase ends, the tally phase
starts. During the tally phase, the votes are tallied and the data required for the
verification process is published.
2.2.3 Tally and Result
This work will distinguish between the tally and the result of an election. For
this work the tally is the sum of all votes cast by eligible voters during the voting
phase. From this the result of the election is generated using a public and before-
hand agreed upon algorithm that translates the sum of all ballots into the result
of the election. This algorithm is part of the voting system but not part of the
voting scheme.
For many elections this is simple if there is only one winner. When there are
more than one winner, for example in an election in which a parliament with a
number of seats is elected, this becomes more complicated. The tally algorithm
2.3. Security Notions 29
for the STV voting system mentioned in Section 2.1.3, for example, is rather
sophisticated.
While the computation of the result and the algorithm that is used are important
parts of an election it is mostly irrelevant for this work. The goal of all voting
schemes discussed in this work is to collect and cumulate the votes of all voters
and present a verifiably correct result. Nevertheless, the voting schemes have
to support the voting system, especially voting systems that require ballots on
which the candidates are ranked. For Bingo Voting this is non-trivial as shown in
Section 5.1.3.
2.3 Security Notions
The requirements for a democratic elections are very high. Intuitively, these
requirements are simple. The result of the election should be correct and no
information about the choice of any voter should leak. For the assessment of
cryptographic voting schemes a list of security properties and notions is used to
denote the quality of a cryptographic voting scheme.
It is not trivial to decide whether a protocol is secure. One big problem is to
specify what ‘secure’ means. The first notions of security were defined as being
protected against specific attacks. A similar approach is defining security as a
collection of specific security properties. The latest approach is simulation based
security for protocols.
This section presents commonly used security properties and also discussed
simulation based security definitions.
2.3.1 Correctness
It is essential that a cryptographic voting scheme outputs the correct tally which
is the sum of all ballots cast. In addition, is also important that the auditors are
able to verify that the tally is correct. If the output is not the correct tally, the
verification process should indicate this.
It may be considered tolerable if the adversary changes a small number of votes.
For many voting schemes it is impossible to guarantee that the tally is perfectly
correct, since this often requires the assumption that every voter checks the correct
inclusion of their vote (see Section 6.2.3). Also the counting of paper ballots by
hand has always been error-prone. This is no problem as long as the error does
not change the result of the election. These reasons make it tolerable that the
adversary may be able to slightly change the tally, as long as the chance of being
caught is large for large manipulations that change the result of the election.
It is important to note at this point that even the paper system makes no
promises about the absolute correctness of the result as the counting process by
hand produces errors. It is assumed that these counting errors are small and
random. Supporters of traditional paper ballots correctly point out that paper
ballots may be recounted to correct errors. However, this requires that the ballots
are stored in a secure way to preclude manipulation between the first counting
and the recount.
2.3.1.1 Software Independence
Rivest first defined the term software independence as in [Riv08] as follows:
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A voting system is software-independent if an undetected change or
error in its software cannot cause an undete ctable change or error in
an election outcome.
This notion is often considered to be implied by verifiable correctness or end-to-
end security as defined in the next section. Software independence is a useful
notion for voting schemes that use voting machines but no cryptography (such as
voting machines with voter verified paper audit trails) as they often do not satisfy
end-to-end security but still provide the possibility of detecting an error.
2.3.1.2 End-to-end Security
The requirement that a cryptographic voting scheme provides verifiability is an
important part of the correctness. Most cryptographic voting schemes provide
each voter with a receipt of their choice that allows the voter to verify that the
corresponding ballot was correctly included in the final tally. This is called indi-
vidual verification. The voting authority also publishes proofs that convince the
auditors that the tally is indeed the congregation of all ballots cast. This is called
universal verification. If the tally is not correct, at least one of the two verification
steps should fail with high probability.
The notion that describes voting schemes that provide both individual and
universal verification is end-to-end security, often abbreviated as E2E security or
E2E verifiability. This term was originally used for voting schemes to describe an
unbroken chain of custody for the ballots [Jon05] so that the voter was sure that
the ballots that were tallied were the unaltered votes that were cast.
Küsters, Truderung and Vogt have schown in [KTV11] that individual and
universal verification are not sufficient to guarantee the correctness of the tally if
the universal verification does not include a proof that every ballot is well-formed.
If only the voter is able to check that the ballot corresponding to their receipt is
well-formed, a corrupted voter may be able to cast a ballot with negative votes as
shown in [KTV11] on the example of ThreeBallot (cf. Section 2.5.7).
The notion of individual verifiability is often divided into two properties. The
voter should be able to verify that the vote was cast as intended. In most cases this
means convincing the voter that the receipt correctly encodes the voter’s choice.
This is typically done during the voting process inside the voting booth. Due to
the additional requirement of receipt-freeness and coercion resistance this proof
must not be transferable (see Section 2.3.2 for further details). After the voting
phase, the voter should be able to verify that the ballot was counted as cast. This
often requires the voter to check that a copy of their receipt was published by the
voting authority.
2.3.2 Ballot Secrecy
Most electoral laws require a political election to be secret. The reason for
this is that every voter should be able to decide freely, without risk of political
persecution or undue influence from a third party. This requirement is called voter
privacy or ballot secrecy.
From a theoretical point of view, a perfectly secure voting scheme without
secrecy is trivial. Each voter marks a ballot with a unique id and receives a copy
as receipt. After the voting phase, each ballot is published. This allows each voter
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to verify that their ballots was published correctly and each auditor to reproduce
the tally.
The requirement of ballot secrecy prevents this solution for modern elections.
This makes the use of more elaborate voting schemes necessary that are able to
provide both verifiable correctness and ballot secrecy.
The question whether correctness or ballot secrecy is more important has no
easy answer. Correctness is surely very important in the short term, but privacy
is more important in the long term. For an election, the correctness of the tally
is important until the end of the tally phase and the announcement of the result.
If the adversary is able to manipulate the election after the result was already
implemented it is too late.
In [vdG09], van de Graaf gives two very compelling reasons for unconditional
privacy:
Already a decade ago it has been argued in the context of creden-
tial mechanism [Cha86] that privacy should be unconditional, since
individuals cannot be expected to assess the strength of cryptographic
mechanisms. In addition, since storage is becoming cheaper every day,
we must assume that the data on the bulletin board will be stored
forever. This means that the moment the cryptographic assumption
on which the privacy of the ballots was based is broken, it will be
possible to derive who voted for whom. In other words, with compu-
tational privacy we can almost be sure that 30 or 300 years from now
we can know who voter for who. This could raise the possibility for
some nasty scenarios, for instance a dictator who has come to power
goes after people who have voted against him (or his father) several
decades ago.
On the other hand, voter privacy is broken when the adversary observes the mark-
ing process or the interaction of the voter with the voting machine. This demon-
strates that voter privacy is harder to ensure than correctness.
In the case of Bingo Voting, ballot secrecy is guaranteed under stronger as-
sumptions than correctness, but if ballot secrecy is achieved it is unconditional
and therefore everlasting. This is discussed in detail in Section 6.3.1.
2.3.2.1 Receipt Freeness
The term receipt freeness [BT94, Oka98, MN06] describes the fact that the
voter receives no evidence that may be used to prove any third party how the
voter voted. Cryptographic voting schemes often issue receipts for the individual
verification process. This does not contradict the notion of receipt freeness if the
receipt does not convince any third party of the voter’s choice.
2.3.2.2 Coercion Resistance
An adversary that attempts to buy a vote or coerces a voter may request the
voter to deviate from the voting process to obtain a receipt with additional infor-
mation about the voter’s choice. A voting scheme that does not give any informa-
tion about the voter’s choice even if the voter deviates from the intended voting
process is called coercion resistant. This property was first defined in [JCJ05] as
a notion that is strictly stronger than receipt freeness.
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Küsters, Truderung and Vogt gave a game-based definition in [KTV09] and used
it to prove that Bingo Voting is as coercion resistant as an ideal voting system
which means that the voter is able to prove the participation in the election but
nothing more.
Unruh and Müller-Quade proposed a general model of incoerbility [UMQ10]
based on the UC framework by Canetti [Can00, Can01]. Unfortunately, the UC
framework makes very strong statements about security of a protocol and currently
no generally accepted formalism for a voting scheme exists in the UC framework.
2.3.3 Practical Requirements
In addition to the security requirements for correctness and privacy of an elec-
tion, there are several practical requirements that are important or at least ad-
vantageous for a voting scheme.
2.3.3.1 Dispute Freeness
A verifiable election schemes guarantees that a voter is able to notice if their
vote was not included correctly into the tally or if the tally is not correct. This is,
however, often not sufficient. In addition to being able to notice manipulations,
the voter should be able to convince the voting authority that the tally was indeed
manipulated. On the other hand it should not be possible to claim that the tally
is incorrect if this is not the case.
This property is often called dispute freeness as an voting scheme with this
property allows a voter to prove a valid allegation. This means that if a suspicion
is not proven it is invalid. Consequently, the voting authority is able to resolve all
disputes.
An additional challenge is obtaining this property without threatening or weak-
ening the voter’s privacy. In many cases the voter notices if their vote was altered
but has to unveil how they voted to prove the manipulation. A common suggestion
to solve this problem is the use of trusted neutral arbiters that resolve the dispute
but do not report the content of the disputed vote. While this is an unsatisfying
solution as it requires the assumption that a sufficient number of such arbiters
exists and that all arbiter are trustworthy to keep the content of disputed votes
secret, this appears to be the only practical solution for many election schemes.
Section 5.4 proposes a dispute resolution procedure for Bingo Voting that allows
the voter to dispute an election without divulging their choice.
2.3.3.2 Robustness
An election should not fail if a single corrupted voter deviates from the protocol
or if a single member of the voting authority refuses to participate in the tallying
process. A voting scheme that is able to tolerate a number of misbehaving parties
is called robust. This property is important for real-world elections but hard to
formalize.
2.3.4 Computational & Unconditional Security
One important kind of assumption are so-called computational assumptions.
They say intuitively that it is not impossible but infeasible to solve a certain
problem. Computational assumptions are quite common and very important for
cryptography in general.
2.4. Cryptography 33
Encryption schemes are a prominent example for cryptographic schemes that
rely on computational assumptions. In general, encryption schemes are only com-
putationally secure as the adversary is always able to decrypt by guessing the
correct key or just trying all keys until finding the correct one.
One notable exception the one-time pad which is an encryption scheme for which
the security is not depending on a computational assumption. If the key is as long
as the message and truly random, the adversary is unable to learn anything about
a plaintext encrypted with a one-time pad except the length. This is independent
of the computing power of the adversary and so we call schemes with this property
unconditionally secure, statistically secure or perfectly secure.
For protocols we use the terms equivalently. The security property of a protocol
is called computational if it relies on a computational assumption. If the property
is independent of any assumptions, the protocol is said to have this property
unconditionally.
Any system based on computational assumptions may be broken with sufficient
computing power and enough time, or by new developments in algorithms or even
computing paradigms. A protocol that is unconditionally secure is sometimes also
said to offer everlasting security as it is impossible to break the security at any
time in the future.
2.4 Cryptography
Most cryptographic voting schemes make heavy use of cryptography and cryp-
tographic primitives. This section introduces the most common cryptographic
primitives and concepts.
2.4.1 Bulletin Board
A bulletin board is a cryptographic building block used by many cryptographic
voting schemes. It was formally described by Benaloh (né Cohen) and Fisher
in [CF85], but the underlying principle is much older as actually even traditional
voting systems rely on this primitive. The idea behind a bulletin board is that
it is a secure asynchronous broadcast from one party, the voting authority, to
all auditors. The bulletin board often includes a mechanism that automatically
time-stamps each message that is posted. An additional property is that once
something is posted onto the bulletin board it may not be erased or modified at
a later point in time.
Traditional media like newspapers, radio and television have helped implement-
ing this idea for elections by making all information about an election public. To-
day the implementation of this primitive is easier as the Internet has proven that
once something of interest is published there it is very hard to remove it.
2.4.2 Commitments
A commitment scheme is a cryptographic two-party protocol with two phases.
In the first phase, a sender commits to a value by sending a commitment to a
receiver. At a later time the sender is able to open the commitment to the value
by sending opening information to the receiver. This is called opening, revealing or
unveiling the commitment. The receiver is able to verify that the commitment and
the opening information, which also contains the value the sender was committed
to, are consistent.
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A commitment scheme has two important properties. The binding property
ensures that the sender is able to open a commitment to only one value. This
convinces the receiver that the value was fixed when the commitment was sent.
The hiding properties guarantees that the receiver does not learn any information
about the value contained in the commitment before receive the opening informa-
tion.
If a commitment scheme is non-interactive, meaning that messages are only sent
from the sender to the receiver of the commitment, it is easy to turn this com-
mitment scheme from a two-party protocol into a protocol in which the receiver
is the public (for example by using a bulletin board to publish all messages from
the sender).
Bingo Voting uses unconditionally hiding discrete logarithm commitments (UHDLCs),
often called Pedersen commitments. This commitment scheme is described in de-
tail in the next section.
2.4.2.1 UHDLCs
Unconditionally hiding discrete logarithm commitments were first described by
Chaum, Damgård and van de Graaf in [CDvdG87]. They are also called Peder-
sen commitments after the description by Pedersen in [Ped92]. The commitment
scheme is unconditionally hiding. The binding property is based on the assump-
tion that the discrete logarithm is hard to compute in a finite group (hence the
name). The commitment scheme has the additional expedient property that it is
rerandomizable.
A good candidate for G are the subgroup of quadratic residues of Z×p with p
being a safe prime, which means that p = 2 · q + 1 and p, q prime. The imple-
mentation of Bingo Voting described in [BHMQ+08] used such a group with p
approximately 1000 bits long. Another possibility is the use of an elliptic curve of
prime order q as described in Section 5.5.1.
The public input of the sender and the receiver are a cyclic group G of order q
in which the dlog-problem is hard, and two generators g, h of G chosen at random
so that the discrete logarithm of g to the base h is unknown. To commit to a
value m ∈ {1, . . . , q}, the sender chooses a random value r ∈ {1, . . . , q}, computes
the commitment
c = gmhr
and sends c to the receiver. To open the commitment c, the sender simply sends
the pair (m, r) and the receiver checks whether c = gmhr.
While UHDLCs are computationally binding, the binding property is reducible
to the assumption that the discrete logarithm of g to base h, δ = dlogh g, is
unknown. Assume the sender is able to open a commitment c to two different
contents, which means he is able to produce (m1, r1) and (m2, r2) with
c = gm1hr1 = gm2hr2 (2.1)
and m1 6= m2. With this unveil information the sender is able to express the
discrete logarithm δ as
dlogh c = δ ·m1 + r1 (2.2)
dlogh c = δ ·m2 + r2 (2.3)
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and from this he gets
δ = r1 − r2
m1 −m2
, (2.4)
which contradicts the assumptions that δ is unknown to the sender.
The hiding property of UHDLCs is information theoretical as for any given
commitment c and arbitrary m′ there exists an r′ such that c = gm′hr′ . This
means that even a computationally unbounded receiver is unable to determine
what the content of a given commitment c is, unless m or r is revealed.
For Bingo Voting this property is essential to provide everlasting ballot secrecy.
2.4.2.2 Rerandomization
We say the commitment c to value m contains the randomness r if c = gmhr.
With UHDLCs it is possible to change the randomness of a given commitment c
and prove that both the old and the new, rerandomized commitment contain the
same value m, even without knowing m.
To change the randomness, one multiplies the commitment c with hr̂ where r̂
is fresh randomness. The new commitment
ĉ = c · hr̂ = gmhr+r̂ (2.5)
now contains the randomness r + r̂ if it contained the randomness r before. We
call ĉ the rerandomization of c and define the Rerand-function with
Rerand(c, r̂) = c · hr̂ = gmhr+r̂ (2.6)
for the rerandomization of c with the new randomness r̂.
It is possible to convince any third party that two commitments c and ĉ are
commitments to the same value m by simply announcing the discrete logarithm
r̂ of ĉ
c








opens ĉ to the same value m.
The zero-knowledge proofs described in Section 2.4.4 use this special property
of UHDLCs.
2.4.3 Zero-knowledge Proofs
An interactive proof system is a two-party protocol in which a prover P interacts
with a verifier V in order to prove that a certain statement is correct.
Zero-knowledge proofs are interactive proof system with three properties which
will be briefly described here.
Completeness If the statement is true, a verifier that adheres to the protocol is
convinced and accepts the proof.
Soundness If the statement is false, there is no prover that is able to convince an
honest verifier except with very small probability.
Zero-Knowledge For each verifier there exists a polynomially bounded simulator
that is able to generate a transcript of an interaction of the verifier with an
honest prover that is indistinguishable from a real interaction.
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Intuitively, the zero-knowledge property means two things. First, no verifier learns
anything during the interaction with an honest prover except that the statement
is true, as any additional information could be used to distinguish between a real
transcript and a simulated transcript. Second, the verifier is unable to convince
any third party that the statement is true, as such a transcript could have been
created by a simulator without interaction with the prover.
For a detailed introduction to zero-knowledge proofs see [Gol01].
2.4.3.1 Interactive Zero-knowledge Proofs
Zero-knowledge proofs are normally interactive and non-transferable. Since a
transcript of a real interaction between a prover and a verifier is indistinguishable
from a transcript created by a simulator that does not know whether the statement
is true or not, such a transcript is not convincing to any third party.
This is an essential property for coercion resistance. A zero-knowledge proof
is often used the following way for a coercion resistant voting scheme: The voter
casts the vote and receives a zero-knowledge proof from the voting authority that
his vote was recorded correctly. The zero-knowledge proof is not transferable
and the voter is able to simulate a transcript of such a proof for any candidate.
The coercer is unable to distinguish the real proof from the simulated ones and
therefore learns nothing about which candidate the voter voted for. The voting
scheme by Moran and Naor [MN06] uses zero-knowledge proofs this way to provide
coercion resistance and verifiable correctness (see Section 2.5.6).
2.4.3.2 Non-interactive Zero-knowledge Proofs
In an election, the voting authority proves correctness of certain statements
to the public. Zero-knowledge proofs are often used for their property that they
leak no information other than the fact that the statement that is proven is true.
Interactive zero-knowledge proofs are not practical for this as they would require
each auditor to interact with the voting authority separately.
Fiat and Shamir proposed a method in [FS87] to turn an interactive zero-
knowledge proof into a non-interactive zero knowledge proof. The idea is that the
verifier does not choose the message he sends to the prover using true randomness
but instead uses pseudorandomness generated by using a hash function with all
messages received so far from the prover as input. The resulting proof is no longer
depending on any random input of the verifier, so the prover is able to create the
complete proof by himself. The proof is still convincing if the pseudorandomness
used is large enough.
2.4.4 Proof of a Shuffle of Known Content
Bingo Voting uses zero-knowledge proofs at several points as parts of the proof
of the correctness of the tally while protecting voter privacy. Section 3.4 describes
in detail at which points of the verification process the proofs are employed. All
of these proofs are proofs of a shuffle of known content.
A prover P proves to a verifier V that a certain set of commitments contains a
certain list of plaintexts without showing which commitment has which content.
For Bingo Voting it is important that the verifier is able to check that if a plaintexts

























Figure 2.1: An example of a zero-knowledge proof using randomized partial check-
ing showing that the set of commitments C = {c1, c2, c3} contains the
plaintextsM = (m1,m2,m3). The public input of prover P and verifier
V is C and M . P generates c′1, c′2, c′3, c′′1, c′′2, c′′3 and sends it to V as well
as the unveil information for c′′i (which is mi, rπ′−1(i) +r′π′−1(i) +r′′π′′−1(i))
for i = 1, 2, 3. V chooses a bit b and sends it to P . If b = 0, P sends
π′ and r′1, r′2, r′3, otherwise P sends π′ and r′′1 , r′′2 , r′′3 .
The original version of Bingo Voting uses randomized partial checking, the
improved version uses a proof style proposed by Groth in [Gro02, Gro10]. Both
proofs are described in this section.
2.4.4.1 Randomized Partial Checking
The public input of P and V is a set C of commitments and a list M of plain-
texts in addition to the group G and the two generators g and h used for the
commitment scheme. A single plaintext may be contained in M more than once.
P wants to convince V that for each plaintext mi ∈ M there exists exactly one
commitment cj ∈ C such that that mi is the content of cj. One simple proof
concept for this is the randomized partial checking (RPC) that was used in the
original Bingo Voting scheme and is explained in this section.
Randomized partial checking makes use of the rerandomization property of
UHDLCs (see Section 2.4.2.2). The public input of prover and verifier is the set
of commitments C = {c1, . . . , cn} and the list of plaintexts M = (m1, . . . ,mn).
The secret input of the prover is the set of random values R = {r1, . . . , rn} and a
permutation π such that
(mπ(i), rπ(i)) opens ci (2.8)
which is equivalent to saying that mπ(i) is the content of commitment ci with
randomness rπ(i).
The prover now chooses two new random permutations π′ and π′′ such that
π′′◦π′ = π, and two sets of random values R′ = {r′1, . . . , r′n} and R′′ = {r′′1 , . . . , r′′n}.
With this P computes
C ′ = {c′1, . . . , c′n} where c′π′(i) = Rerand(ci, r′i) (2.9)
and
C ′′ = {c′′1, . . . , c′′n} where c′′π′′(i) = Rerand(c′i, r′′i ) (2.10)
and sends these two sets of rerandomized commitments to V .
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The verifier now chooses a bit b at random and sends it back to the prover as
challenge. If b = 0, the prover sends π′ and R′ back to the verifier, otherwise
the prover sends π′′ and R′′. The verifier now checks whether Equation 2.9 or
Equation 2.10 holds (depending on the choice of b).
It is easy to see that a cheating prover is caught with probability 12 . If the proof
is repeated k times, the level of confidence is (1− 2−k).
A proof using randomized partial checking is an interactive zero-knowledge
proof. To turn this into a non-interactive proof, the original paper suggests using
the Fiat-Shamir method [FS87] (see Section 2.4.3). The main disadvantage of this
type of proof is the size of the public data. For a confidence of (1−2−80) the proof
has to be repeated 80 times. Section 5.5 proposes a different proof system that
results in much smaller proofs. Section 6.4.2 gives a comparison of the size of the
public data with RPC style proofs and with the new proof system.
2.4.4.2 Efficient Proof of a Shuffle of Known Content by Groth
Groth has proposed a more efficient proof of a shuffle of known content which
helps reducing the size of the public data of an election employing Bingo Voting
as described in Section 5.5.2. The proof described by Groth in [Gro02, Gro10] is
a generalized proof for homomorphic encryption schemes and is described here for
UHDLCs.
The resulting proof technique is an interactive protocol between prover P and
verifier V . Both have a set of commitments C and a list of plaintexts M as
common input. P will prove that for each commitment ci ∈ C there is one
plaintext mj ∈ M that is the content of ci, and that for each plaintext ms ∈ M
there is a commitment ct ∈ C for which it is the content of. This is done without
V learning anything more than this fact, in particular not which plaintext is the
content of which commitment.
This protocol utilizes the fact that the message space Zq is an integral domain
and that a polynomial of degree n has at most n roots. The intuition behind the





with m1, . . . ,mn ∈ M is identical to a polynomial Q derived from the commit-
ments so that is contains the same roots mi but in permuted order if and only if
C is a shuffle of the content of M . To prove that both polynomials are identical,
V chooses a point of evaluation x and then P uses a three-move multiplication
proof of knowledge [DJ01] that the content of
c1
Commit (x) , . . . ,
c1
Commit (x) (2.12)
is the same as
n∏
i=1
mi − x. (2.13)
Protocol
This protocol provides a proof of a shuffle of known contents as described by
Groth in [Gro02].
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Common input commitments c1, . . . , cn ∈ G and plaintexts m1, . . . ,mn ∈ Zq





for all i = 1, . . . , n.
Initial Challenge P receives x ∈ Zq chosen at random by V , both set c̃i := ci ·g−x







and cpi := Commit (pi, rpi) with rpi chosen at
random except for rpn which is set to 0 (so cpn := Commit (pn, 0)).
2. For each i = 2, . . . , n P chooses ai at random and sends cpi , cai :=







3. V sends yi chosen at random.
4. P sends si := pi−1·yi+ai, rsi := rpi−1·yi+rai and di := ri (pi−1 · yi + ai)−
rpi · yi − rbi .




and whether cpn = g
∏
(mi−x).
2.5 Cryptographic Voting Schemes
The methods for conducting elections and tallying the voters’ choices has changed
over the long history of elections. The traditional election using paper ballots and
ballot boxes has become the most used method since voter privacy was made
mandatory for most elections.
The goal of most cryptographic voting schemes is to provide voters and auditors
with the means to verify the tally of an election. There are many approaches to
provide the necessary information without impairing voter privacy. They greatly
differ in terms of the technology they use and their properties.
In addition to cryptographic voting schemes that require the voter to vote at
a polling station there are also many schemes for secure voting over the internet.
These schemes may use similar technologies and methods, and aim for the same
goal, namely verifiably correct elections with voter privacy, but the situation is
different. The differences between presence voting and remote voting are discussed
in Section 1, in this chapter we will only consider cryptographic voting schemes
for presence voting.
2.5.1 Farnel and Twin
Most cryptographic voting schemes issue a receipt to the voter that encodes
the voter’s choice. The difficulty is that the voter must be convinced that their
choice was encoded correctly, and at the same time the receipt must not give
any information about the voter’s choice to a third party. Cryptographic voting
schemes use a variety of methods to ensure both at the same time.
The Farnel schemes use a different approach. Instead of handing the voter a
receipt of their own vote for verification, each voter verifies the vote of another
voter or other voters. This solves the problem of receipt-freeness without using
cryptography.
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The name originates from the Portuguese word for basket and denotes the con-
cept of a special ballot box introduced by Custódio [Cus01]. The exact properties
of a Farnel ballot box differ for different schemes using such a Farnel ballot box.
The most important property that is common to all version is that the Farnel
ballot box is able to receive a ballot, shuffle its content and hand out one or more
ballots or copies of ballots that were cast previously. It is also prepared with votes
before the voting phase which are then subtracted during the tally phase.
In the original description of the Farnel voting scheme [ADC02], the Farnel
ballot box receives the plaintext ballot of a voter, shuffles and returns a random
ballot that was cast previously. The voter then signs the ballot and casts it into
a second ballot box. After the voting phase the remaining ballots in the Farnel
ballot box are signed by the voting authority and also included in the second
ballot box. For the tally, the second ballot box is opened, all ballots are published
and counted. To form the final tally the votes of the ballots used to initialize the
Farnel ballot box are subtracted. Each voter is able to verify that all ballots are
signed either by an eligible voter or by the voting authority. This scheme does not
offer verifiability of the result, this still depends on an honestly behaving voting
authority.
Rivest and Smith proposed a similar technique in [RS07] to obtain Twin, a sim-
ple protocol with its security and receipt-freeness essentially based on a Farnel-like
ballot box. The ballot is a simple paper ballot without any additional information
except a unique ID hidden under a scratch-off coating. The voter marks the ballot
and casts it into the ballot box. The ballot box removes the scratch-off coating
and issues a previously cast ballot as a so-called floating receipt to the voter.
Araújo, Custódio and van de Graaf have proposed a voter-verifiable scheme
based on the Farnel idea in [ACvdG07, ACvdG10]. The ballots of the improved
scheme consist of two parts. One part contains the marking area with the can-
didates and a unique ID covered by a scratch-off coating, the other part only
contains the same ID also covered by a scratch-off coating. Both parts are sep-
arated by a perforation that allows easy detachment. During the voting process
the voter receives a ballot, removes the scratch-off coating to verify that both
IDs are identical and marks the ballot. Then the voter separates the two parts
of the ballot, casts the part containing the marking area into one ballot box and
the second one into a Farnel box. Then the voter receives copies of several other
slips containing IDs from the Farnel box. The voter is now able to verify that the
ballots corresponding to those slips are published by checking the IDs.
Araújo and Ryan published another cryptographic voting scheme in [AR08b,
AR08a] that combines a Prêt à Voter style receipt with a Farnel ballot box.
2.5.2 Votegrity
Chaum proposed the use of visual cryptography in [Cha02, Cha04] for the gen-
eration of receipts. The resulting cryptographic voting scheme, Votegrity, was the
first scheme that offered human-verifiable correctness. The idea of Votegrity is to
print a receipt onto two layers so that both layers together contain the information
that allows the voter to verify that it contains the correct vote. When the voter
leaves the voting booth the two layers are separated and one is shredded while
the other is cast and a copy is given to the voter as receipt.
Chaum suggests using visual cryptography described by Naor and Shamir in [NS95]
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to construct a two-layer receipt. This method is similar to the secret sharing
scheme using a one-time pad. Each layer of the receipt contains a share of the
information of how the voter voted. The information is printed onto the two trans-
parent layers so that when overlaying both the information becomes readable to
the voter. When one of the two layers is destroyed, the information of how the
voter voted is no longer visible. But the remaining layer, a copy of which the voter
receives as a receipt, also contains information the voting authority uses to recon-
struct the vote during the tally phase. To prevent any single party from directly
breaking voter privacy, the decryption process is spread among several trustees.
Each trustee takes the output of the last trustee as input (the first one taking
the receipts as input) and performs one step of the decryption process. Then the
trustee shuffles all receipt before handing them to the next trustee. If at least one
trustee is honest, the connection between the receipt and the unencrypted vote is
hidden. When the last trustee decrypted all receipts, the content of each vote is
readable and the tally becomes obvious.
For the verification the voter checks the correctly formed receipt during the
voting phase. This is easy due to the use of visual cryptography. After the voting
phase each voter is able to check that their receipt was published correctly. For
the tally each trustee provides a proof that the encryption and shuffling step was
conducted correctly. For this each trustee shows for a portion of the input receipts
how they were mixed and that for those the partial decryption was conducted
correctly.
2.5.3 MarkPledge
Neff described the cryptographic voting scheme MarkPledge in [Nef04] that uses
a voting machine to record the voter’s choice and generate a receipt. The receipt
contains a ciphertext for each candidate so that the ciphertext for the elected
candidate is an encryption of 1, the other ciphertexts all are encryptions of 0s. The
voting machine includes a zero-knowledge proof that the ciphertext of the elected
candidate is an encryption of 1 as well as equivalent simulated proofs for the other
ciphertexts. The difference between the proof for the elected candidate and the
other candidates is that the voter saw a pledge for the ciphertext representing the
vote for the elected candidate before entering the challenge.
MarkPledge uses a special form of encryption to encrypt single bits. An encryp-
tion for 0 consists of k pairs of encryptions [Enc (u1)], [Enc (v1)], . . . , [Enc (uk)], [Enc (vk)]
with ui, vi ∈ {0, 1} and ui ⊕ vi = 1. This means that each pair consists of one
encrypted 0 and one encrypted 1. The encryption for 1 consists of k pairs of
ciphertexts as well, but for those ui⊕ vi = 0 for all i. This means that either both
ciphertexts of a pair contain 0 or both contain 1. MarkPledge uses the fact that
there exists a simple 3-round zero-knowledge proof that an encryption contains a
1.
For the proof that the encryption c = [Enc (u1)], [Enc (v1)], . . . , [Enc (uk)], [Enc (vk)]
contains 1, prover P first sends the string s = u1, . . . , uk to verifier V . V sends
a k-bit string b = b1, . . . , bk as challenge. P now sends the randomness used for
the ith sub-ciphertext, if bi is 0 the randomness used to encrypt ui and if bi is
1 the randomness used to encrypt vi. This way V is able to check whether the
sub-ciphertext contains ui. If the encryption contains 1, ui = vi for all i, so the






Figure 2.2: A ballot for an election employing Prêt à Voter. The ballot consists
of two parts, separated by a perforation. The three candidates are
printed in permuted order on the left part. The voter marks the ballot
on the right part.
bit of s. If the encryption contains 0, ui = v̄i for all i, so the verification fails
approximately half of the time.
This is zero-knowledge proof so a simulator S exists that is able to simulate
an authentic looking transcript of a protocol run in which V accepts. The con-
struction of S is straightforward: S first chooses the challenge string b and then
constructs s accordingly so that si = ui if bi = ui and si = vi if bi = 1.
Adida and Neff describe an enhancement for the original version in [AN06]. In
2009, Adida and Neff published MarkPledge2 in [AN09] as a version of MarkPledge
that is resistant to covert channels in the randomness used for the encryptions.
2.5.4 Prêt à Voter
Chaum, Ryan and Schneider described Prêt à Voter, a cryptographic voting
scheme using paper ballots in [CRS04, CRS05]. The name translates to “ready to
vote”. Prêt à Voter uses special paper ballots that consist of two parts separated
by a perforation that allows easy separation as shown in Figure 2.2. The left part
of the ballot contains the candidate list in permuted order. This permutation
is different for each ballot. The right part contains the marking areas for each
candidate as well as a string called onion that contains the information about the
permutation in encrypted form.
During the voting process the voter marks the ballot on the marking area on
the right part of the ballot. Before casting the vote, the left part of the ballot
containing the permuted candidate list is detached and destroyed. Without this
permutation the voter’s choice is no longer discernible. The remaining part of the
ballot is copied, the copy is handed to the voter as receipt, and then cast into
the ballot box. After the voting phase all ballots are shuffled and decrypted. The
shuffling and decryption is conducted by several trustees (called tellers) that one
after another take the encrypted ballots, remove one layer of encryption, shuffle
the resulting ballots and hand it to the next teller.
For the verification the voter first checks that the onion correctly contains the
permutation on the left part of the ballot. This is done using a simple cut-and-
choose protocol: The voter receives two ballots and may challenge one. For the
challenged ballot the correctness of the onion is then shown and the voter may
use the other ballot for the voting process. After the voting phase, the voter is
able to check that their receipt was published correctly. The correct decryption










Figure 2.3: A Punchscan ballot for an election with three candidates. The ballot
consists of two parts, the top part (white) has holes through which
the bottom part (yellow) is visible. The ballot is marked for candidate
‘Bob’.
of the ballots by the tellers is proven by randomized partial checking.
2.5.5 Punchscan
Chaum developed Punchscan, a cryptographic voting scheme using two-layer
paper ballots, and described by Popoveniuc and Hosp in [PH06a, PH06b, PH10].
Similiar to Prêt à Voter, Punchscan uses a paper ballot and a permutation of the
candidates to encrypt the voter’s choice. The ballot consists of to layers, the top
layer has several holes through which the bottom layer is visible (see Figure 2.3).
Both layers also contain an identical ID. The top layer contains the candidates in
arbitrary order (i. e. the order may be identical for all ballots in contrast to Prêt à
Voter) and a letter next to each candidate. There is one hole in the top layer for
each candidate and in each area of the bottom layer visible through such a hole
there is one letter printed. To mark a ballot for a certain candidate, the voter
looks at the letter standing next to the candidate and finds the corresponding
area on the bottom layer visible through a hole in the top layer. The voter now
marks both the area of the bottom layer with the correct letter as well as the area
of the top layer around the hole through which the letter is visible. This may be
done using a Bingo dauber. The voter now separates both layers and chooses one
as receipt. This layer is copied, the copy handed to the voter as receipt and the
original cast into the ballot box. The other layer is destroyed.
The ID on the remaining layer contains sufficient information to construct the
voter’s choice. Similar to Prêt à Voter this is done by tellers that decrypt and
shuffle the ballots to form the tally. For verification, each voter may check that
their receipt was published correctly and that the proofs for the shuffles and
decryption steps are correct.
2.5.6 Voting Scheme by Moran and Naor
Moran and Naor presented the first universally verifiable voting scheme [MN06]
with its security based on the assumption that a non-interactive commitment
scheme exists. It uses a voting machine to receive the voter’s choice and generate
a receipt. The underlying idea is that the voting machine prints a commitment
to the candidate of the voter’s choice and then proves that the content of the
commitment is the name of the candidate the voter voted for. For this the scheme
uses a zero knowledge proof (cf. Section 2.4.3).
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One big advantage of the voting scheme by Moran and Naor is that it requires
almost no specific preparation. The voting authority has to input the candidate list
into the voting machine and the public information required for the commitment
scheme used. Moran and Naor describe their voting scheme using UHDLCs, so
the voting machine requires a description of the group (G, ·) and two generators
g and h of G.
When a voter chooses a candidate at the voting machine, the machine prints a
commitment to the candidate on the receipt. Then the voter is asked to enter ran-
dom strings for all candidates but the one the voter voted for. The voting machine
generates challenges from these strings using a hash function and generates new
commitments for all candidates. These new commitments are then printed onto
the receipt without showing them to the voter (the part of the receipt containing
the commitments is covered with an opaque shield). The voter must be able to
verify that the commitments were printed (for correctness) but not able to see
them (for receipt-freeness).
After the commitments were printed, the voter enters a random string for the
candidate the voter voted for. The voting machine then prints proofs that the new
commitments are either commitments for the corresponding candidate or that they
are a rerandomization of the first commitment (containing the voter’s choice). The
challenges entered by the voter determine what is proven. Since the challenges for
the candidates the voter did not vote for were entered before the commitments
were printed, the voting machine prepared these new commitments accordingly.
But as the challenges for the candidate the voter voted for was entered after the
new commitments were printed, this gives a zero-knowledge proof that the first
commitment indeed contains the voter’s choice.
For the tally the voting authority takes the first commitment of each receipt
and uses a shuffle of known content to prove that the tally corresponds to the
content of these commitments without giving any additional information about
the choice of a single voter.
Bohli, Müller-Quade and Röhrich described an attack on the voting scheme by
Moran and Naor that precludes coercion resistance in [BMQR07a]. For this so-
called babble attack, the coerced voter receives instructions from the adversary
inside the voting booth while interacting with the voting machine.
2.5.7 ThreeBallot
ThreeBallot was first described by Rivest in [Riv06] as an end-to-end-verifiable
voting scheme without cryptography. The ThreeBallot scheme uses special paper
ballots, each of which is divided into three identical parts (see Figure 2.4). Each
part contains a complete list of all candidates and a marking area. The three
parts are connected with a perforation that allows the voter to easily separate the
three parts. All three parts carry a unique ID, the IDs are chosen independently
for each part so it is not recognizable which parts belong together once the three
parts are separated.
To cast a vote, the voter marks each candidate on one of the three parts and the
candidate of their choice on a second part. After the voting process, the ballot
must be presented to a checker machine. The checker machine ensures that a
ballot is marked correctly. The three parts are separated, one is copied and given
to the voter as receipt. As every part may contain a mark for every candidate,















Figure 2.4: A ballot for an election employing ThreeBallot. The ballot consists of
three parts that are separated by a perforation. Each part contains a
complete list of candidates and a marking area as well as unique ID.
This ballot is marked for candidate ‘Alice’.
whether or not the voter voted for him, the voter is unable to use the receipt to
prove how they voted. Only the the checker machine is able to detect undervoting
or overvoting during the voting process, once the three parts are separated this is
impossible (as their association must be kept secret for ballot secrecy).
After the voting phase, all ballot parts are published. Each voter checks whether
their receipt is published. Under the assumption that the adversary does not know
which part of a ballot the voter chose as receipt, the manipulation of a vote is
detectable with probability 13 , as the manipulation changes at least one ballot part
which is chosen as receipt with probability 13 .
Küsters, Truderung and Vogt have identified a severe weakness of ThreeBallot
in [KTV11]. If the checker machine that enforces that only well-formed ballots are
cast is corrupted, a corrupted voter is able to cast a negative vote for a candidate
by simply not marking this candidate any of the three parts.
2.5.8 Scantegrity and Scantegrity II
Scantegrity is a cryptographic voting scheme proposed by Chaum et al. in [CEC+08].
It uses paper ballots that include a unique ID and a short code (typically three
characters) for each candidate. The voting process for an election using Scant-
egrity is almost identical to an election with traditional paper ballots. The only
difference is that the voter, after marking their choice, records the code associated
with the selected candidate. This code forms the receipt together with the ID of
the ballot. After the voting phase the voting authority publishes for each ballot
the code of the elected candidate. To verify the correct inclusion of their vote into
the tally the voter simply checks that the correct code was published.
Scantegrity Invisible Ink (or Scantegrity II) is an improvement of the Scantegrity
scheme. It uses invisible ink to conceal the codes for each candidate. During the
voting process the voter marks the candidate of their choice by filling out a bubble
next to the candidate with a special pen. This pen contains activation ink that
reacts with the invisible ink printed in the bubble. There are two different inks,
a reactive ink that turns black when coming in contact with activation ink, and
a dummy ink that stays the same. These two inks are used to print the codes for
each candidate inside the bubbles the voter fills to vote for the candidate. This
way the voter only learns the code for the candidate the voter voted for. As with
Scantegrity, the voter records this code on a paper slip that also contains the ID
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of the ballot. This acts as a receipt and enables the voter to check that the correct
code is published for their ballot. If this is not the case, the knowledge of a valid
code acts as proof that the vote of the voter was manipulated.
In [EHH11], Essex, Henrich and Hengartner proposed to create the ballots in a
shared way, so that no single party knows the connection between a code and a
candidate.
3. Bingo Voting
Bingo Voting is a cryptographic voting scheme that was developed by Bohli,
Müller-Quade and Röhrich and first described in [BMQR07a]. It employs a voting
machine (with arbitrary user interface, see Section 6.4.1) and a trusted random
number generator. The original scheme claims end-to-end security (cf. Section 2.3)
with the correctness relying only on the security of the trusted random number
generator (see Section 6.3 for details about the relations between security prop-
erties and the required assumptions). The voter receives a receipt after casting
their vote. The scheme uses random numbers to encode the vote on the receipt so
that no third party learns what vote the receipt stands for (making Bingo Voting
receipt-free). The voter is able to verify that the receipt correctly encodes their
vote during the voting process (cast-as-intended). After the voting phase copies
of all receipts issued are published, allowing the voter to verify that their vote was
included in the tally correctly (counted-as-cast).
This chapter describes the original version of Bingo Voting as described in [BMQR07a,
BMQR07b]. For this explanation we will consider a simple election with one vo-
ting machine and n candidates of which the voter elects one (one vote per voter),
i. e. a 1-out-of-n election. Section 5.1 discusses the changes necessary to use Bingo
Voting for a more complex election. Section 3.1 presents the central idea of Bingo
Voting as well as several important concepts, notions and primitives used by the
original scheme. Many of these concepts and primitives are used by the advanced
scheme (described in Chapter 5) as well. Section 3.2 gives a short overview of
Bingo Voting and illustrates the basic idea as well as the voting and verification
procedure on a conceptual level. Section 3.3 describes the voting process in detail
and gives an in-depth explanation of the processes happening during the different
phases of the election. Section 3.4 explains the verification process for each voter
as well as the public (i. e. individual and global verification). While this chapter
describes the original scheme, we employ the same terminology for the improved
version presented in Chapter 5.
3.1 Important Concepts
The central idea of Bingo Voting is that the voting machine encodes the voter’s
choice in their receipt using random numbers. Each receipt in this election contains
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Figure 3.1: A Bingo Voting receipt in a simple election with the three candidates
(Alice, Bob, and Carol) and one vote per voter. The random numbers
printed next to each candidate encode the voter’s choice.
each candidate and one random number assigned to it (e. g. simply written next
to the candidate). Figure 3.1 shows an example of a receipt for an election with
three candidates and one vote per voter.
There are two types of random numbers, dummy random numbers generated
before the voting phase and fresh random numbers that are generated during the
voting process by the trusted random number generator. The random number used
to denote the voter’s choice is the fresh random number generated and displayed by
the trusted random number generator inside the voting booth. All other random
numbers on the receipt are dummy random numbers.
To turn this idea into a verifiable voting scheme we require several additional
mechanics. The remainder of this section will describe the necessary primitives
and concepts and introduces several notions specific to Bingo Voting.
3.1.1 Trusted Random Number Generator
Bingo Voting requires a trusted random number generator to convincingly gen-
erate fresh random numbers during the voting process in front of the eyes of the
voter, display it in a human readable form and send it to the voting machine.
The trusted random number generator is the anchor of confidence. Section 6.3
discusses the assumptions required for the different security properties in detail.
The quintessence is that the correctness of Bingo Voting is based on the unpre-
dictability of the trusted random number generator and the binding property of
the commitments (see Section 3.1.2) used. The receipt-freeness is based on the
indistinguishability between dummy random numbers and fresh random numbers
as well as on the isolation assumption of the voting booth (including the voting
machine the voters use to cast their votes).
The original work on Bingo Voting [BMQR07a] proposes using randomness
from a mechanical source, for example a bingo cage, to generate the random
numbers necessary for the voting scheme. Section 4.3 describes the trusted random
number generator employed in the real-world election using Bingo Voting. This
trusted random number generator was not mechanical but used a random number
generator on a signature card. Section 6.2.4 discusses different forms of random
number generators and their impact on the security and usability of Bingo Voting.
3.1. Important Concepts 49
3.1.2 Commitments for Bingo Voting
The security of Bingo Voting relies on the distinction between fresh random
numbers, generated during the voting process (see Section 3.1.1), and dummy
random numbers (see Section 3.1.3). For correctness, the dummy random numbers
must be verifiably fixed before the voting phase starts. For receipt-freeness, the
fact which random number on a receipt was fresh and which was generated before
the voting phase must be kept secret.
To ensure both properties, Bingo Voting employs a commitment scheme (see
Section 2.4.2 for an introduction to commitments) called unconditionally hiding
discrete logarithm commitment (UHDLC) that was first described in [CDvdG87]
but is often referred to as Pedersen Commitments [Ped92]. UHDLCs are un-
conditionally hiding. The binding property is based on the discrete logarithm
assumption.
During the preparation phase, the voting authority publishes dummy votes
consisting of a pair of commitments, one to a dummy random number and one to
the corresponding candidate (see Section 3.1.3 for details). The hiding property
of the commitment scheme prevents the adversary A from learning the dummy
random number as well as from gaining any information about which candidate
the dummy vote is for. The binding property guarantees that the voting authority
may not change the dummy random number or the candidate of the dummy vote.
See Section 6.3 for a detailed discussion of the security properties of Bingo Voting
and which assumptions they are based on.
In addition to these two security properties Bingo Voting makes heavy use of a
third property of UHDLCs. At several points the voting authority has to prove
that a set of plaintexts is indeed the content of a set of commitments without
divulging any further information about which commitment contains which plain-
text. This is called a proof of a shuffle with known content. The use of UHDLCs
allows the employment of randomized partial checking (RPC). RPC proofs are
zero-knowledge proofs (cf. Section 2.4.3) that utilize the fact that UHDLCs are
rerandomizable.
Section 2.4.2.1 gives a detailed explanation of UHDLCs. Section 2.4.2.2 explains
how a UHDLC is rerandomized. Section 2.4.4.1 describes the zero-knowledge proof
used in the original Bingo Voting scheme that utilizes this property to verifiably
prove the correctness of an election without compromising voter privacy.
3.1.3 Dummy Votes
Bingo Voting uses dummy votes as the central concept to keep track of the votes
cast. Each dummy vote consists of a pair of commitments (cf. Section 2.4.2), one
to a random number r and one to a candidate Cand. We call this pair
(Commit (r) ,Commit (Cand)) =
(
gr · hrr , gCand · hrCand
)
(3.1)
a dummy vote for candidate Cand with dummy random number r.
Each dummy vote represents a potential vote. During the preparation phase,
the voting authority generates v dummy votes for each candidate where v is the
number of voters in the election. For the correctness of the election it is essential
that the number of dummy votes generated is the same for each candidate. The
voting authority proves this using a zero-knowledge proof that does not reveal the
dummy random numbers at all nor which dummy vote belongs to which candidate.
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This is important to ensure the receipt-freeness of Bingo Voting. Section 6.3
discusses this in detail.
It is also important for correctness that all random numbers are unique (or that
there are only very few collisions). Since each collision means a potentially changed
vote, the number of collisions that is acceptable is determined by the number of
votes that may be changed without changing in the result of the election. As
all dummy random numbers become visible during the tally phase this is easy to
verify (see Section 3.4.2). Section 6.3.5 discusses the consequences of collisions
in detail. Section 5.2 proposes a change that makes collisions less likely without
increasing the length of random numbers (which affects usability, cf. Section 6.4.1).
The role of dummy votes in Bingo Voting is described briefly in Section 3.2 and
in detail in Section 3.3.
3.2 Bingo Voting in a Nutshell
This section gives a short overview over the Bingo Voting protocol and points
out the central mechanisms that ensure Security considerations and details are
only sketched or omitted completely in this section to concentrate on the central
idea. In this section we will look at a simple election with v voters, n candidates
and one vote per voter (1-out-of-n election).
As mentioned in Section 3.1.3, Bingo Voting is based on the idea of dummy
votes representing potential votes. In the preparation phase, the same number of
dummy votes is allotted to each candidate. During the voting phase, whenever a
voter votes for candidate Cand, each candidate except Cand loses a dummy vote.
This means that candidate Cand now has one dummy vote more compared to all
other candidates. For this reason the number of dummy votes remaining for each
candidate directly results in the tally if at the beginning each candidate had as
many dummy votes as there were voters that cast their votes during the voting
phase.
For the correctness, we have to ensure two things. The first thing the voting
authority has to prove is that each candidate has initially received the same num-
ber of dummy votes. This number is typically identical to the number of voters
expected to vote during the voting phase. The fact that normally this number is
bigger than the number of voters that actually cast a vote is not an issue. For
the final tally one simply subtracts the difference between the number of votes
cast and the number of dummy votes per candidate issued during the preparation
phase. The second thing to prove is that whenever a voter casts a vote for a
candidate, each other candidate loses exactly one dummy vote.
To prove that each candidate has received the same number of dummy votes
the voting authority publishes the dummy votes of all candidates together with
a proof. The proof shows that the content of the second part of each dummy
vote (containing the commitment to the candidate) is equal to a list of candidate
names on which each candidate name appears equally often. The proof that for
each voter casting a vote every candidate except the one elected loses a vote takes
several steps. To generate the receipt the voting machine takes the dummy random
number of each dummy vote lost and prints it next to the corresponding candidate.
The random number printed next to the candidate the voter cast their vote for
is the random number generated by the trusted random number generator. The
voter is able to check that the receipt correctly encodes their choice by comparing
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the display of the trusted random number generator with the random number
printed next to their candidate. The second step in the proof is that the voting
authority proves that each but one random number on the receipt is a dummy
random number. The voter knows that the random number for the candidate they
voted for is highly unlikely to be a dummy random number as it was generated by
the trusted random number generator during the voting phase. The conclusion is
that all other candidates must have lost one dummy vote.
Section 3.3 describes the voting process with Bingo Voting in detail. Section 3.4
presents the verification process and explains how each voter is able to check the
two things mentioned above and therefore the correctness of the election.
3.3 Bingo Voting Protocol
This section describes in detail how the Bingo Voting election scheme as pre-
sented in [BMQR07a] is used in an election. In this description we concentrate on
details specific to Bingo Voting and will mention generic steps in an election only
when relevant to Bingo Voting. Section 3.3.1 presents the preparations necessary
for the election and everything that has to be done before the actual voting phase.
Section 3.3.2 describes the voting phase, how a voter actually casts their vote and
the first part of the individual verification process. Section 3.3.3 explains how the
tally is generated and what is published after the voting phase for the second part
of the individual and the global verification.
For the explanation in this section we assume that each voter only has one vote
and that the election uses only a single voting machine. See Section 5.1 on how
to expand Bingo Voting for larger and more complex elections.
Bingo Voting employs a voting machine to manage the dummy votes, receive the
vote cast by the voter and generate the receipt. The original paper suggests that
the voting machine also generates the dummy votes. While this is not essential
(as we will see in Section 4.2.4), we adopt this concept for the explanation in
this section. How the voting machine interacts with the voter exactly is not
fundamental for Bingo Voting as long as the voter is able to enter their choice
unambiguously (cf. Section 6.4.1). For this explanation we will that assume the
voting machine has an appropriate input device on which the voter marks the
candidate of their choice. See Section 4.1.4 on how a prototype of a Bingo Voting
voting machine was built.
3.3.1 Preparation Phase
Before the voting phase, the election authority publishes the required parame-
ters of the election. This includes the list of candidates. For an election employ-
ing Bingo Voting, the voting authority also has to generate and publish the set
of dummy votes. The original paper [BMQR07a] assumes that the voting ma-
chine itself generates the dummy votes using the same trusted random number
generator that is also used during the election. The voting authority enters the
candidate list and the number of voters into the voting machine, the voting ma-
chine generates one dummy random number for each candidate and each voter,
saves the sets of dummy random numbers for each candidate together with the
randomness used for the commitments (this is required to generate receipts and
proofs of correctness before and after the voting phase) and finally generates and
outputs the dummy votes.
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In addition to the set of dummy votes the voting machine generates a proof
using randomized partial checking to show that each candidate has received the
same number of dummy votes. This proof takes the second commitment of each
dummy vote (containing the candidate) and proves that the content of this set of
commitments is equal to a list of candidates on which each candidate appears the
same number of times. The details of this proof are presented in Section 3.4.1.
Once the voting authority has informed all eligible voters about the election
and published all necessary data, the preparation phase ends. Only after the
preparation phase has ended the voting phase may start.
3.3.2 Voting Phase
During the voting process, each voter casts their vote and receives a receipt.
The receipt is generated by the voting machine directly after the vote was cast.
With this receipt a voter is able to verify that their vote was counted correctly.
This section describes the voting process in detail.
Before the actual voting process, the voting authority has to ensure that the
voter is indeed eligible to vote. This procedure is independent of the voting
scheme used and out of scope of this work. The authenticated voter enters the
voting booth. The voting booth guarantees privacy during the voting process,
independently of the voting scheme used. See Section 6.2 for a detailed discussion
on the necessary properties of a voting booth.
As mentioned above, Bingo Voting only requires that the vote must be input into
the voting machine during the voting process. In addition to the voting machine
(including the input device), two more things are necessary for Bingo Voting: a
printer and the trusted random number generator with a display, connected to
the voting machine and inactive before the voter has cast their vote. Only after
the voting machine has received the vote, the voter is actually confronted with
anything that is specific to Bingo Voting (as argued in Section 6.4.1).
After the vote was cast the voting machine generates a receipt. For this the
trusted random number generator generates one fresh random number. The com-
puter forms the receipt by printing every candidate together with a random num-
ber. The random numbers printed next to candidate Candi is either the random
number drawn by the trusted random number generator (if the voter voted for
Candi) or a dummy random number from an unused dummy vote for Candi (if the
voter did not vote for Candi). The dummy votes used for the other candidates are
marked on the list as ‘used’ and are not used for any other receipt.
The receipt is printed and handed to the voter. The voter may then check
whether the receipt encodes their choice correctly by comparing the random num-
ber next to the candidate of their choice with the display of the trusted random
number generator. See Figure 3.2 for an example of the view of a voter checking
the receipt in the voting booth. If satisfied, the voter leaves the voting booth and
ends the voting process. The original paper does not include means for dispute
resolution, see Section 5.4 for a discussion about this.
The voting phase ends when each eligible voter has cast a vote or chosen to
abstain. After the voting phase ends the tally phase begins.
3.3.3 Tally Phase
After the voting phase the voting authority determines and publishes the tally
and the result of the election together with the proofs required for the verification
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of the tally. Please note that for this explanation we will only consider the tally as
we assume that the election result is determined by a deterministic process from
the tally.
For an election employing Bingo Voting the voting authority publishes three
sets of data during the tally phase:
• The voting authority publishes a digital copy of each receipt issued during
the voting phase. Each voter is able to check that their receipt was published
correctly.
• The voting authority proves for each receipt published that it contains the
correct number of dummy random numbers, i. e. that all but one random
number on the receipt is a dummy random number. Each such proof is
a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof using randomized partial checking
that shows additionally that each dummy random number on the receipt is
associated with the correct candidate (the same candidate the dummy vote
it originates from belongs to).
• The voting authority opens all dummy votes that were not used during
the voting process to form a receipt. We call these unused dummy votes
remaining dummy votes for the candidate indicated by the (now opened)
second commitment of the dummy vote.
The number of the remaining dummy votes for each candidate directly corresponds
to the number of votes this candidate received during the voting phase (and thus
the tally).
To calculate the tally from the number of remaining dummy votes the voting
authority simply has to subtract the number of non-voters, i. e. the difference
between the number of voters the voting authority prepared dummy votes for and
the number of voters that actually have cast a vote. These numbers are directly
computable from the number of published dummy votes in the preparation phase
(which is equal to the number of voters times the number of candidates) and the
number of published receipts (which is equal to the number of votes cast).
3.4 Verification
One very prominent feature of cryptographic voting schemes is that each voter
is able to verify that the tally is correct. For Bingo Voting this verification consists
of two parts: The first part, in which the voter checks that their vote was included
in the tally, we call the individual verification and discuss in Section 3.4.1. The
second part, for which any auditor checks that the tally is indeed the sum of all
votes cast, we call global verification and discuss in Section 3.4.2.
For the verification of an election using Bingo Voting the voting authority has
to prove two things:
• Each candidate had the same number of dummy votes before the voting
phase.
• For each voter who voted, each candidate who did not receive their vote lost
one dummy vote.
These two things are part of the individual as well as the global verification process.
This section describes both parts of the verification process in detail.










Figure 3.2: After casting their vote using the voting machine (right) the voter
receives a receipt (left). The voter is now able to verify that the re-
ceipt correctly encodes their choice by comparing the random number
displayed by the trusted random number generator (middle) with the
random number corresponding to their choice on the receipt. In this
example the receipt correctly encodes the vote for Alice.
3.4.1 Individual Verification
For the individual verification, each voter verifies that their vote was included
in the tally correctly. The individual verification consists of two steps. During the
voting process, the voter verifies that the receipt correctly encodes their choice.
For this, the voter compares the receipt with the display of the trusted random
number generator and checks that the random number next to the candidate
the voter voted for is the same as on the display (see Figure 3.2). This is done
inside the voting booth directly after the voter has cast their vote at the only
moment of the whole election during which the receipt is readable (without the
secret knowledge of the voting machine). This is also the only step the voter
is required to do themselves. If the fresh random number is associated correctly
with the candidate the voter intended to vote for, the voting machine has correctly
received and recorded the vote. We say the vote was cast-as-intended. This step
is a simple comparison of two random numbers and the only step which requires
knowledge of the choice the receipt represents.
After the voting phase, the voter checks that their receipt is correctly published.
If the receipt issued during the voting process is identical to the receipt published
afterwards by the voting authority, the vote was included in the tally correctly.
We say the vote is counted-as-cast.
The second step, ensuring that the vote was counted as cast, the voter may
delegate by handing their receipt (or just a copy of the receipt) to one or several
auditors. Those might be family members, representatives of political parties or
external auditors. To ensure that the vote corresponding to a certain receipt was
included in the tally correctly it is only necessary to check that the published
receipt is identical to the hardcopy issued during the voting phase. It is not
necessary to know which candidate the vote was cast for.
While it is not necessary to know what vote the receipt encodes in order to check
the correct publication by the voting authority, it is necessary to possess the receipt
(or at least an identical copy) since the assumption that a human voter is able to
remember the complete content of receipt is unrealistic. The assumption that the
correct publication of each receipt is checked is a very strong assumption. It is also
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unnecessary if the adversary is unable to predict which receipts are checked and if
a significant percentage is checked. If this is the case the adversary risks detection
with each altered vote, making an undetected manipulation of a large number of
votes unlikely. Section 5.6 describes the receipt stealing attack which makes the
assumption that adversary does not know which receipt is checked invalid and
presents a countermeasure.
Both steps of the individual verification process are comparisons. The first
step inside the voting booth is a simple comparison of two random numbers.
The second comparison is more involved as it requires the comparison of a whole
receipt, but it may be delegated to an arbitrary number of auditors by issuing
copies of the receipt.
3.4.2 Global Verification
The individual verification ensures that the vote of each voter was cast as in-
tended and counted as cast. For this, however, we have to assume that each voter
checked (directly or indirectly) the steps described in Section 3.4.1 or that the
adversary is unable to predict which receipts are checked. Section 6.3 discusses
these assumptions in detail.
Bingo Voting uses dummy votes to internally track the votes cast and to produce
a verifiable tally. At the beginning each candidate has the same number of dummy
votes and during each voter’s voting process each candidate, except the one the
voter voted for, loses a dummy vote. Therefore the number of remaining dummy
votes directly translates to the tally (see Section 3.3.3). The individual verification
convinces the voter that the candidate they voted for has not lost a dummy vote
and that the vote was included in the tally.
For the global verification the voting authority has to show four things:
• Each candidate had the same number of dummy votes in the beginning.
• Each receipt is well-formed and contains not more than one dummy vote of
each candidate. This is equivalent to proving that each candidate lost at
most one dummy vote for each voter.
• Each dummy vote was either used, i. e. written on a receipt, or not used,
i. e. opened and published as part of the tally.
• There are only statistically insignificant few collisions, i. e. identical (dummy)
random numbers for different candidates.
To verify these four things it is not necessary to be an eligible voter or having par-
ticipated in the election at all. The public data published by the voting authority
is sufficient.
The first proof showing that each candidate has received the same number of
dummy votes before the voting phase is a simple proof of a shuffle of known
content for a set of commitments (see Section 2.4.4.1). The voting authority acts
as prover P , the public input is the list of all commitments to candidates that are
part of dummy votes
CCand = {cCand | d = (cr, cCand) is a dummy vote} (3.2)
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and the list M containing each candidate v times with v being the number of
voters. The proof uses randomized partial checking to show that the content of
the commitments in CCand is identical toM . Please note that it is actually possible
to do this after the voting phase as shown in Section 5.5, reducing the size of the
proof.
The second proof published by the voting authority shows that each receipt is
well-formed. For this the voting authority takes for each receipt every dummy
vote used on this receipt together with a new pair of commitments. This new pair
contains the random number generated by the trusted random number generator
during the voting process and the candidate the voter voted for. The voting
authority then shows that the content of these commitments (the dummy votes
and the new commitment) is identical to the content of the receipt. Using these
pairs of commitments for a proof of a shuffle of known content the voting authority
proves that all but one random number on the receipt are dummy random numbers
and that each dummy random number is associated with the correct candidate.
The third thing is to show that each dummy vote was either used on a receipt
or remained unused and contributed to the tally. This is actually quite easy to
verify as each dummy vote published during the preparation phase must be either
used for a proof that a receipt was well-formed or opened if it was unused on a
receipt. It is also easy to check that each dummy vote was used on at most one
receipt and not used on a receipt and marked as unused and opened.
The last thing missing is to verify that there are not more collisions than ex-
pected if all random numbers were drawn uniformly from the set of all possible
random numbers. This is easy as all random numbers are public, either as part of
a receipt or as opened dummy random numbers from unused dummy votes. We
discuss the consequences of a collision in detail in Section 6.3.5. The quintessence
is that a corrupted voting machine may be able to change a single vote when a
collision occurs. The original description of Bingo Voting claims that collisions are
negligible as they are effectively prevented by choosing longer random numbers.
Unfortunately, longer random numbers make the comparison of the receipt with
the trusted random number generator in the voting booth more demanding for
the voter. Section 5.2 presents a change to the protocol that effectively reduces
the occurrences of collisions that allow for an undetected manipulation of a vote.
Please note that the verification of the eligibility of each voter and that each
voter only casts at most one vote is not part of the Bingo Voting voting scheme.
While this an integral part for verifiable correctness, it is not part of most cryp-
tographic voting schemes and is usually ensured by procedural measures. See
Section 6.2.1 for a detailed discussion.
4. Real-World Experiences with
Bingo Voting
There are many cryptographic voting schemes aiming at implementing a secure
election (cf. Chapter 2.5). Unfortunately, only a few of those have demonstrated
that they are employable in a real-world election [ECCP07, CCC+10]. Bingo
Voting was employed in a small but complex election for a student parliament,
demonstrating that it is indeed usable for real elections. This chapter presents
the experiences from the deployment of Bingo Voting in the student parliament
elections of the University of Karlsruhe in 2008. The results described here are
published in [BHMQ+08].
Most elections, especially political elections, have to ensure accessibility to all
voters. This important property, implied by the equality of all voters (so no
voter may be discriminated against in terms of access to the election), is often
considered afterwards when designing a cryptographic voting scheme. The main
reason for this probably is that the exact criteria for accessibility of an election
are hard to grasp and change over time (as new technology becomes widely-used
and common). Another reason might be that most research in cryptography and
cryptographic voting schemes model each party in a cryptographic protocol (in
this case each voter participating in the election) as a Turing machine. Currently,
good models for human behaviour in cryptographic protocols are still lacking.
There are attempts to include specifics of human behaviour in the design of cryp-
tographic voting schemes [Cha02, BLS+03, BHMQ+08, WH09], but approving
a cryptographic voting scheme for use in public elections is an interdisciplinary
effort that requires research after the security of the scheme has been shown.
The central goal of a cryptographic voting scheme must be to form a consensus
among voters that the election result represents the will of all voters. A crypto-
graphic voting scheme that is perfectly secure in theory may still be useless due
to practical restrictions, usability issues or simply because it is not understood or
accepted by voters. This makes demonstrations in real elections necessary for any
cryptographic voting scheme to realistically assess the quality of a scheme. Many
issues only arise when the theoretical scheme meets reality and real voters. There-
fore, testing cryptographic voting schemes in real-world scenarios is fundamental
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to prove their capability.
The student parliament elections of the University of Karlsruhe (now Karls-
ruhe Institute of Technology) in 2008 employed Bingo Voting as one possibility
for voters to cast their votes. We implemented a prototype that was specifically
constructed to meet the requirements of this election (which were changed slightly
to allow for electronic voting machines as described in Section 4.1.3). The elec-
tion and its requirements were complex and diverse. This made implementation
difficult but at the same time showed that Bingo Voting is indeed practical for
more intricate elections.
This chapter gives a detailed recount of the deployment of a Bingo Voting
prototype at the student parliament election 2008 at the University of Karlsruhe.
Section 4.1 describes the details of the election, especially the election mode that
allowed voters to distribute up to five of their nine votes on a single candidate.
The changes that were made to the original Bingo Voting protocol are explained
in detail in Section 5.1. Section 4.2 presents the observations and experiences
made during the election. Section 4.3 briefly describes the latest prototype that
evolved from the voting machine used for this election. The work presented in
this chapter was published in [BHMQ+08].
4.1 Election Details
The election of the student parliament of the Karlsruhe University (now Karls-
ruhe Institute of Technology) is an annual election for the representatives forming
the student representative body. At the same time of the election of the student
parliament there are elections for the women’s representative and the representa-
tive of foreign students as well as for the student council for each faculty.
The elections took place concurrently on five consecutive days (Monday, Jan-
uary 14 2008 to Friday, January 18 2008). The voting machine had to manage
fifteen different elections. A single voter was eligible for at least two and up to
four elections. Each student was eligible to vote in the election for the student
parliament (which was internally modelled as two distinct elections) and one out
of eleven faculty student councils. Female and foreign students were eligible to
additionally elect representatives of women and foreign students respectively.
Only a small part of the voters voted using the Bingo Voting prototype. The
majority of the voters used traditional paper ballots. Potential reasons for this
are discussed in Section 4.2.4.
The candidates for the student parliament were organized in lists and each voter
has one vote for electing a list as well as several votes to distribute among the
candidates to determine the candidate order within a list. The nature of this elec-
tion made the voting process slightly complicated and consequently posed several
challenges for the implementation of Bingo Voting used in the election. The other
elections for the women’s representative, the representative for foreign students
and for the student council of each faculty were simple in comparison. For this rea-
son we look at the details of the election for the student parliament in Section 4.1.1
and only briefly present the details of the other three elections in Section 4.1.2.
Section 4.1.3 gives the details of the formal requirements for these elections and
the changes made to the election regulations by the student parliament before
the election to allow for electronic voting machines. Section 4.1.4 describes the
implementation of the voting machine used for the election.
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4.1.1 Student Parliament Election
The election for the student parliament was actually split into two distinct
races that had to be handled as two different elections by the Bingo Voting voting
machine. The voter first selected one of the nine lists and then had nine additional
votes that they were allowed to distribute among the 72 candidates on the lists
with a maximum of five votes per candidate. The first race was realized as a
simple election with eleven candidates (the nine different lists plus ‘abstention’
and ‘invalid’, cf. Section 5.1.1) and one vote per voter. The second was realized
as a distinct election with 74 candidates (72 candidates plus ‘abstention’ and
‘invalid’) and nine votes per voter, up to five of which a voter was allowed to cast
for a single candidate.
These two races belonged together, there was in fact only a single paper ballot
in the original election for both choices. For this reason the voting machine had
to ensure that a voter did not vote in only one of the two races. See Section 4.1.4
for details.
4.1.2 Other Elections
The two elections for the representatives for women and foreign students were
both simple elections with two (for the women’s representative) and three (for the
foreign student’s representative) candidates respectively and one vote per voter.
The elections for the faculty student councils were different for each faculty.
Each student was eligible for the election of their faculties student council and
had to choose from five to ten candidates. Each voter had as many votes as there
were candidates and allowed to freely distribute those votes among all candidates.
4.1.3 Formal Requirements
The members of the student parliament acted as voting authority. The student
parliament had to change the election regulations, as the original version only
considered elections with pen and paper and the wording was quite specific to
only allow paper ballots. One example was that a voter, after the eligibility was
confirmed, received a paper ballot to fill out, or that the paper ballot had to be
folded before casting it into the ballot box. The changes required to allow casting
a vote at a voting machine were minor and mostly generalized the wording of the
election regulation to include electronic voting machines.
One important requirement was that the Bingo Voting scheme had to be able to
allow everything that was possible with a paper ballot. This included partial and
full abstention, casting invalid ballots and voting in different elections on different
days.
The Bingo Voting election was treated as an additional ballot box. The regula-
tions stipulated the publication of the result of each ballot box separately which
made it possible to publish the information required for the verification process.
Making the tally of the Bingo Voting election public is an integral part of the
verification process (see Section 3.4), so if this was not allowed by the election
regulations employing Bingo Voting would not have been possible.
4.1.4 Implementation of the Voting Machine
Michael Bär and Carmen Kempka (née Stüber) implemented the prototype,
writing approximately 8000 lines of code in Java 1.6. For Michael Bär this was part
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of his diploma thesis [Bär08]. The platform was a standard personal computer
with Linux (SuSE 3.2) as operating system, 2 GB of RAM and an AMD dual
core Opteron with 2.2 GHz CPU clock rate. We equipped the computer with
an external chip card reader by ReinerSCT, a computer mouse as input device
and a laser printer. The trustworthy random number generator was realised by
ReinerSCT by modifying an external chip card reader with a display. For security
reasons the computer was not equipped with a keyboard nor connected to any
network during the election. During the voting process, the monitor of the voting
machine as well as the trusted random number generator together with the input
devices were separated by a screen, but the computer itself was visible. This made
connecting anything to the computer without being detected by poll workers was
impossible. The only input devices for the voter were the mouse and the chip card
reader, the output devices were the monitor, the printer and the display of the
trusted random number generator (the modified chip card reader).
To generate random numbers, the random number generator of a certified signa-
ture smart card from Siemens was used. The signature card was fixed and sealed
inside a smart card reader with display and keypad. ReinerSCT had inserted the
signature card and removed the protruding part of the card to prevent easy re-
moval. The firmware of this special smart card reader was modified to request a
random number from the random number generator of the signature card, display
the random number and send it to the computer. The display was limited and
consisted of two lines with 23 characters each. As the election required displaying
more than two random numbers the arrow keys of the keypad were used to scroll
through all random numbers. The smart card reader was also programmed to
blank the display after 20 seconds without user action to prevent a voter from
observing the trusted random number generator displaying the random numbers
of a previous voter.
To unlock the voting machine, the voting authority handed out simple chip cards
with small persistent memory on which the information about the eligibility of a
voter was saved. The chip cards did not contain the name of the voter but instead
contained a unique ID that was not associated with the voter. Each student was
eligible for at least two and up to four out of fifteen different elections. Having
a poll worker unlock the voting machine for each voter would have been error-
prone and unnecessarily time-consuming. Using memory cards helped us enabling
voters to do different elections on different days because the chip cards carried
the information in which races a voter had voted after the voter had finished
their voting process and returned the chip card. The voting authority already
possessed a software and database infrastructure for the voters and the elections
they were eligible for and used this not only for the Bingo Voting election but for
the complete election. For each voter the voting authority saved which races they
had cast a vote in the database. This allowed voters to cast votes for different
races on different days and at different polling stations.
Using chip cards to unlock the Bingo Voting voting machine required additional
security considerations. The voting authority had to prevent voters from forging
valid chip cards, voting twice with the same chip card or cloning valid chip cards
to vote multiple times. To prevent voters from voting with (copies of) the same
chip card at different voting machines, each chip card was assigned to exactly
one voting machine. This decision was made before it was decided to use only
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one computer as voting machine during the voting process and keep a second
computer as backup ready. Each chip card got a random number as a unique ID
which was recorded and accepted only once by the voting machine. This prevented
voters from voting multiple times by cloning a chip card. To prevent forgery and
to ensure the chip card’s integrity, the contents of the chip cards were digitally
signed with every write access.
The voter’s eligibility information was available on the chip card as one flag for
each race. Each time a voter finished voting for a race, a completion flag was set
on the chip card indicating this. The chip card reader used did not prevent the
voter from removing the chip card at any time during the voting process. Because
of this, a voter was able to remove the card after starting the voting process for a
race but before the completion flag was set. Therefore each chip card contained
an additional status bit for each race denoting if a voter had started voting for
a race. This also enabled the poll workers to reconstruct during which part of
the voting process the card was removed. If the status bits were in a wrong state
during the voting process, the voting machine was locked.
4.2 Experiences
This section describes the experiences of the student parliament election. Sec-
tion 4.2.1 describes the details of the preparation phase, Section 4.2.2 outlines the
observations made during the voting phase and Section 4.2.3 describes the details
of the tally phase. Section 4.2.4 summarises the observations and conclusions from
the student parliament election.
4.2.1 Preparation Phase
The set-up of the election was done several days before the voting phase started
on computers owned by the university and the dummy votes were later moved to
the voting machine.
For the student parliament 72 candidates were nominated and each voter had
nine votes to cast, with a maximum of five votes per candidate. So for this race we
had to create (5 · 72 + 9 · 2 =) 378 dummy votes for each eligible voter (including
the additional dummy votes for the abstention and invalid ballot candidates, cf.
Section 5.1.1).
The other races were a bit smaller with two to ten candidates and between one
and ten votes per voter. We considered about 4000 eligible voters for the election of
the student parliament and 1000 to 2000 eligible voters for each student body and
the women’s and foreign student’s representative. These numbers were generous
estimations for the number of voters of an election running for five days assuming
that there were voters constantly voting each day from the opening of the polling
station at 9 am till closing time at 6 pm. Generating the appropriate number of
dummy votes took about ten hours on two servers with twelve AMD dual core
Opterons with 1.8 GHz CPU clock rate each.
Since the elections were independent from each other, it was possible to do
their set-up computations in parallel. Furthermore, the set-up computations for
the student parliament’s election were split into several parts without considerable
loss of security. With optimal parallelization (i. e. by using more computers) the
whole preparation phase probably could have been done within less than two
hours.
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For the proofs of correctness the election authorities tossed several coins and
the outcome was used as challenge. Using Fiat-Shamir heuristics was impractical
as the proof for the largest race was (4 000 voters · 378 dummy votes per voter
· 1024 bits per commitment · 3 for the original commitments and the two new
sets of commitments) approximately 580 MB for one instance just for the proof
of equal distribution of dummy votes.
4.2.2 Voting Phase
Before entering the polling booth, the voter’s eligibility was checked by a poll
worker using the electoral register. This procedure was identical for the election
with paper ballots and for the Bingo Voting election. When the eligibility was
confirmed, the poll worker coded a chip card with a fresh ID and the information
for which elections the voter was eligible and handed it to the voter.
Inside the voting booth the voter inserted the chip card into the chip card
reader. The voting machine accepted a chip card if and only if the signature on
the chip card was valid, its ID had not been used yet, its status bits were in a
valid initial state and it contained the right machine name. If one of these four
conditions was not fulfilled, the voting machine displayed a message telling the
voter that the chip card was invalid. In that case the voting machine returned to
a normal state after a few seconds, waiting for a valid chip card to be inserted.
The voting machine only locked if an error occurred during a voting process.
After registering successfully at the voting machine and unlocking it, the voter
chose with which race to start. The computer then displayed the corresponding
ballot where the voter could distribute their votes. When the voter was satisfied
with their choice, they clicked on a button to continue. Remaining votes were
automatically given to the ‘abstention’ candidate. The ‘invalid’ candidate either
got all or no votes since a ballot is either invalid or not. The voter was then
presented a confirmation screen displaying their current ballot in order for them
to double-check their distribution of votes. Then they could either return to the
previous screen to change their choice, or confirm, and therewith cast, the ballot.
With the confirmation the votes were counted and the status bits on the chip
card were set to a race completed state. Then the random number generator gen-
erated one fresh random number for each vote cast. The receipt was generated
and printed and the voter was asked to compare the corresponding random num-
bers on their receipt with those on the random number generator’s display. To
support the voter a scheme of the receipt was displayed, indicating the positions of
the fresh random numbers on the receipt. After checking the correctness of their
receipt, the voter could go on with another race or end the voting process. The
display of the random number generator was cleared automatically after a preset
time, preventing the subsequent voter from learning the fresh random number(s)
encoding the vote(s) of the previous voter.
Voters were allowed to vote in different elections at different days and at different
polling stations. Therefore the poll workers noted in the electoral register in which
races each voter had already cast their votes. This had to be done after each voter’s
voting process since the voter was allowed to decide to postpone their voting for
certain races inside the polling booth. After leaving the polling booth the voter
returned their chip card to the poll workers who checked the completion flag for




After the election the tally for each ballot box was calculated and published
separately. As the voting machine was treated as one ballot box among others,
it was unproblematic to tally and publish the tally of those votes cast at the
Bingo Voting voting machine. In a different scenario, in which the ballot boxes
were thrown together and tallied all at once, it would have been impossible to
include the results of the Bingo Voting prototype in the total tally due to the
cryptographic proofs giving the tally just for the voting machine.
The computing time for the tally was about five minutes. For the post-election
proofs again the Fiat-Shamir heuristic was too cumbersome and we chose the
necessary challenges in cooperation with the election authorities. The challenge
was taken as a certain bit of the hash of a public document. As only a single bit
was chosen, this method did not actually increase security. The computing time
for the post-election proofs was about three hours on the same computer used for
the pre-election proofs and successfully showed the correctness of the election.
4.2.4 Conclusions from the Student Parliament Election
The application of Bingo Voting in the election of the student parliament showed
us that it is not sufficient to design a voting scheme that is good in theory. When
used in practice, several additional difficulties come into play.
This early prototype used a mouse as user input device which was familiar to
probably all voters. The computer affinity of the voters alleviated this problem
but several mentioned that a touchscreen would have been preferred.
The main complaint of several voters was that the voting process took up to
fifteen minutes. In addition to the complex election and the unusual user interface,
several factors contributed to this. The main problem of the voting machine was a
rather slow receipt printer that took several seconds to warm up and print a single
page. This delay was perceived as too long after a long-winded voting process so
that probably very few voters actually checked their receipts. The second problem
contributing to the length of the voting process was the number of necessary write
accesses to the chip card and the slow chip card reader.
The length of the voting process together with the size of the receipt, the largest
using up two sides of a single sheet of paper and containing 378 random numbers,
deterred many voters from checking the correctness of their receipt. This is accept-
able since it is sufficient for the correctness of the voting system that only some
voters verify their receipt, as long as the voting machine is unable to anticipate
who is going to do so (see Section 6.2).
Some voters removed their chip card after the vote was cast but before the
‘finished’ flag was written, so it had an erroneous state. In all those cases the
poll workers were able to retrace what happened without compromising secrecy
or correctness of the election. Using a chip card reader that locks in the chip card
would have solved this problem. It also would have sped up the voting process
because most write accesses for changing the status bits could have been omitted.
Many voters expressed their missing trust in the random number generator
used. To them the random number generator was just a black box. The fact that
it was recognized as a modified chip card reader did not worsened the impression.
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The conclusion of the experience with the student parliament election is that
Bingo Voting is capable of handling elections up to a certain size and complexity
without considerable loss of usability. For the acceptance, however, there is a big
difference between being able to handle it and being able to vote comfortably.
Several students decided to use the voting machine even though they could have
used paper ballots, and most of them had no problems to cast their ballots. How-
ever, for a more representative evaluation of the usability and acceptance of the
scheme, further studies should be made with a broader target group, including
mature voters and people who are not used to using a computer.
The main problem limiting the size of elections for which the employment of
Bingo Voting is practical is the size of the published data. Section 5 describes
several methods to reduce the size of the published data. The limiting factors in
this election on how fast a single voter could cast their vote were the chip card
reader and the many read and write operations necessary for the reasons described
above. The second problem was that a consumer-grade laser printer was used that
took quite long to print a single receipt. The largest receipt used a complete DIN
A4 page (two-sided). While it was still practical to check this receipt, it was not
convenient.
4.3 Latest Prototype
For presentations and demonstrations the prototype for the student parliament
election (see Section 4.1.4) is unsuited. Especially the activation with a chip card
was unnecessary as it was no longer required to restrict each voter to only one
voting process. This eliminated one big factor for the slow performance of the
first prototype. The second reason for long waiting times, the printer, has been
replaced as well. Instead of a laser printer with A4 paper, a cash register printer
with thermal paper is used. It is much faster and the receipts are smaller. This
would have been a problem for an election as large as the student parliament
election but for a small mock-up election with only two votes per voter this is
perfect.
To improve usability in addition to the reduction of the waiting time we have
abandoned the mouse as input device and use a computer with a touchscreen
instead. The latest prototype runs on a Beetle/iPOS system by Wincor Nixdorf.
This computer was designed as a point of sale system and runs on a SuSE Linux.
This prototype was successfully used to present Bingo Voting at the CeBIT 2009
and Messe Hannover 2009.
5. Improvements for Bingo
Voting
The original description of Bingo Voting [BMQR07a, BMQR07b] provides a full-
fledged protocol for a cryptographic voting scheme. The preparations for the
student parliament election (described in Chapter 4) revealed several missing de-
tails and features that are often omitted in the description of a theoretical protocol
but are essential for a real-world election. The first real-world application of Bingo
Voting also made several extensions to the original protocol necessary to comply
with the formal and practical requirements of the election. The election has shown
that Bingo Voting is able to handle complex elections but also made clear that
limitations exist due to usability and receipt size.
This chapter presents several extensions and improvements to the original Bingo
Voting protocol. Section 5.1 presents several extensions necessary to use Bingo Vo-
ting in complex elections and points out possibilities and limitations of the voting
scheme. Section 5.3 describes a presentation of random numbers and the limita-
tions that usability requirements impose on the length of random numbers. While
shorter random numbers make the verification process easier and thereby improve
usability, they decrease the security as described in Section 6.3.5. Section 5.2 ex-
plains how changes of the voting scheme alleviates the problem of random numbers
being drawn more than once during an election. Section 5.4 discusses the dispute
resolution procedure of Bingo Voting. Section 5.5 discusses several ways to reduce
the size of Bingo Voting proofs that are the biggest part of the data published (cf.
Section 6.4.2). The hash chain presented in Section 5.6 tackles a problem that
actually most cryptographic voting schemes possess: If an adversary gets hold of a
receipt, the assumption that he does not know which votes are verified is violated.
5.1 Bingo Voting for Complex Elections
The original description of Bingo Voting in [BMQR07a] as well as the description
in Chapter 3 present a Bingo Voting scheme for a simple election with only one
vote per voter and a single voting machine. This section details the necessary
changes to the basic Bingo Voting scheme for a complex election with more than
one vote per voter and several voting machines.
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Before discussing the details for complex elections, we look at the special cases
of abstentions and invalid votes. The special proofs for the verification process of
Bingo Voting require that each receipt and therefore each ballot contains the same
number of marks (represented by fresh random numbers). This makes it impos-
sible to accept a ballot with no or too few marks (which would be an abstention
or a partial abstention respectively in an election with traditional paper ballots),
or too many marks (which would be an invalid ballot). For this reason, Bingo
Voting has to introduce the choice of abstention and invalid votes as additional
candidates as described in Section 5.1.1.
Section 5.1.2 gives the details of the required changes to accommodate for more
than one vote per voter. Section 5.1.3 argues why Bingo Voting is not suited for
an election using single transferable vote (STV). Section 5.1.4 describes how to
run a large election with several voting machines using Bingo Voting.
5.1.1 Abstention and Invalid Votes
The changes described in this section were developed for the election described
in Chapter 4 and were published in [BHMQ+08].
For the description of the integration of abstention and invalid votes we will
consider an election with a single vote per voter. It is easy to expand this for
more votes per voter using the method described in Section 5.1.2.
As mentioned above, Bingo Voting does not allow a voter to cast a vote with
less or more choices marked than intended by the electoral system. The reason
for this is the form of the proofs that each receipt is well-formed and contains the
correct number of dummy random numbers (cf. Section 3.4.2). For the proof of
each receipt, the voting authority makes a proof of a shuffle with known content.
The input of this proof are the dummy votes used for the receipt together with
the new commitment for the fresh random number representing the voter’s choice
together with a commitment to the corresponding candidate. If there was no
fresh random number on the receipt, the proof would require only dummy votes
as input, immediately marking the ballot as an abstention and therefore breaking
voter privacy. If the receipt contained more than one fresh random number, the
proof would have more fresh commitments as input accordingly. This would not
only break voter privacy but force the voting authority to open the dummy votes
used on the receipt in order to correctly and verifiably count the corresponding
ballot as invalid, since some candidates did not lose dummy votes for the receipt
despite not being elected (since the ballot was invalid).
The method chosen for the election described in Chapter 4 was to integrate
abstention and invalid votes as separate candidates. This method makes handling
those particular choices easy as they are treated almost like all other candidates in
the verification process. It also accounts for the goal of electronic voting machines
that casting an invalid ballot should be a deliberate choice and not an accident.
This method is not specific for Bingo Voting and usable for many other crypto-
graphic voting schemes. The method is necessary for any cryptographic voting
scheme that require well-formed ballots to be cast by the voter.
Treating ‘abstention’ and ‘invalid’ as additional candidates works well with the
extension described in Section 5.1.2. It allows for partial and full abstention by
giving some or all votes to the ‘abstention’ candidate. There is only one small
problem: In a normal election the ballot is either invalid or not but never partially




Abstention 4485 3185 2976
Invalid 8471 8268 4964
Figure 5.1: Receipt for an election with n = 3 candidates, s = 3 votes per voter
and a maximum of vmax = 2 votes that each voter is allowed to cast
for one candidate. This election allows the voter to abstain or cast an
invalid vote using the method described in Section 5.1.1.
invalid. This means that either all votes are given to the ‘invalid’ candidate, or
none. Unfortunately the proof that each receipt is well-formed does currently
not check this. The correct distribution of votes to the ‘invalid’ candidate must
therefore be asserted by the voting machine. This means that a corrupted voting
machine may allow a voter to vote partially invalid by distributing only some votes
to the ‘invalid’ candidate. This problem is discussed in Section 6.3.
5.1.2 Multiple Votes per Voter
The changes described in this section were developed for the election described
in Chapter 4 and were published in [BHMQ+08].
The description of Bingo Voting in Chapter 3 is for a simple election with only
one vote per voter. While this type of election is actually quite common, there
are many elections that are more complex. In Germany, smaller political elections
often allow the voter to make more in-depth decisions than just choosing one
candidate. The election described in Chapter 4 is a good example for a more
complex election. As the original publication [BMQR07a] states, it is actually
rather straightforward how to expand Bingo Voting to allow for more complex
elections.
In this section, we consider an election with n candidates plus invalid and ab-
stention (cf. Section 5.1.1) in which each voter has s votes and may distribute
them among the candidates up to a maximum of vmax votes per candidate.
In the basic scheme, a Bingo Voting receipt contains one random number asso-
ciated with one candidate, representing a possible choice of the voter. During the
verification process there is a proof for each receipt that all random numbers but
one are dummy random numbers (see Section 3.4). In an election in which each
voter has more than one vote and may give a candidate more than one, several
changes to this system are necessary.
It is not very complicated to model an election with multiple votes per voter.
The basic idea is to give each voter one receipt for each vote the voter casts. But
instead of printing s distinct receipts those are combined onto a single receipt by
simply printing additional random numbers next to each candidate name. Fig-
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ure 5.1 shows an example of a receipt of an election with three candidates, in
which each voter has three votes and is allowed to cast up to two votes for a single
candidate.
In an election with n candidates, s votes per voter and a maximum of vmax votes
per candidate each receipt contains vmax random numbers next to each candidate
name plus s random numbers next to the ‘abstention’ and ‘invalid’ candidate.
The reason for this simply is that not more than vmax fresh random numbers
(corresponding to actual votes by the voter) may be given to any candidate. The
‘abstention’ and ‘invalid’ candidate are special in this regard, as a voter may choose
to abstain completely, so all their votes are counted as cast for ‘abstention’. The
‘invalid’ candidate is similar except that a voter may only cast a valid ballot (with
no votes given to the ‘invalid’ candidate) or cast an invalid ballot which contains
only votes for the ‘invalid’ candidate.
This changes not only the receipts but consequently also the proof that each
receipt is well formed. This change, too, is straightforward: The proof has the
set of dummy votes and commitments for the fresh random numbers as input
and shows that the content of these commitments accord with the receipt. It is
important to note, however, that the proof does not show that either none or all
votes are cast for the ‘invalid’ candidate. See Section 6.3 for a discussion of this.
5.1.3 Ranking Candidates
An election using instant run-off, single transferable vote (STV) or any other
voting system that asks the voter to rank candidates (see Section 2.1.1) requires a
voting scheme that accounts for ballots with votes of different qualities (“ranked
votes”) that are linked in the tally. When a candidate is eliminated for having the
fewest votes during the tally for an instant run-off election, the voting authority
must be able to distribute the corresponding ballots according to the second vote
on the ballot.
This differs in two ways from the principles of Bingo Voting: In a Bingo Voting
election there is only one type of vote, and a Bingo Voting tally only publishes
the sum of all votes for each candidate and no further information about single
ballots. This increases voter privacy and makes pattern voting impossible (see
Section 6.3.1), but unfortunately makes ranking candidates impossible with an
unmodified Bingo Voting scheme.
There is a way, however, to change the Bingo Voting protocol so that it is
possible to reconstruct ballots. For this the dummy votes are expanded so that
each not only contains a commitment to a candidate and one to a dummy random
number but also a commitment to a ballot id. The dummy votes used for one
ballot are also published together, similar to the suggestion of prearranged dummy
votes described in Section 5.2. In addition to that, the voting authority prepares
dummy votes for n2 candidates, instead of the n original candidates of the election.
These candidates are called Candi|rank, where Candi is the ith candidate and rank
goes from 1 to n for each candidate.
The changes to the proofs are as follows. Before the election, the voting author-
ity proves that for each ballot there is exactly one dummy vote for each combina-
tion of candidate and rank, and that all have the same ballot id. This proof must
employ randomized partial checking, as this allows the voting authority to prove
that the shuffle keeps all dummy votes of a ballot together. These proofs show
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only the content of the commitments to the candidates and the ballot ids but not
the content of the commitments containing the dummy random numbers. The
generation of the receipt is similar to the receipt generation process in an election
using sliced clusters (cf. Figure 5.2). The positions of the fresh random numbers
on the receipt give the ranks the voter assigned to the candidates. After the elec-
tion phase, the voting authority opens all unused dummy votes using a shuffle of
known content. This may be done using the more efficient proof style described
in Section 5.5.2. Since the dummy votes all carry a distinct ballot id, the voting
authority is able to reconstruct each ballot. The voting authority also proofs for
each ballot that it is well-formed. This proof opens the dummy votes used for the
receipt together with new commitments for the fresh random numbers, but does
not open the parts of the dummy votes containing the ballot ids. These proofs
may also use the more efficient proof style described in Section 5.5.2.
The receipts for an election with ranking become very large as there are n2
random numbers on a receipt for an election with n candidates. Also the public
data is larger since several of the improvements presented in Section 5.5 are not
applicable. Nevertheless, the changes to Bingo Voting presented here make an
election with Bingo Voting that require the voter to rank the candidates possible.
5.1.4 Multiple Voting Machine
The presentation of Bingo Voting in Chapter 3 assumes that there is only a
single voting machine used for the election. For most elections, a single voting
machine is not sufficient to conduct an election.
The intuitive way to expand Bingo Voting for use in larger elections is to treat
each voting machine as an individual election and later simply add the tallies.
This is actually not different from the method used by many real-world elections
using paper ballots. In many countries, for example in Germany, each ballot box is
tallied separately and later the tallies are added for the final tally of the complete
election.
This may pose a problem when only very few people cast their vote into a specific
ballot box. For this reason some elections, for example elections in Ireland, require
a centralized tally. This means that ballot boxes are not tallied separately but all
ballot boxes are taken to a central counting place, and the ballots of all ballot boxes
are mixed and tallied as a whole. This means that there are no intermediate results
for single ballot boxes. The goal is to leak as little information as possible about
single votes, even when a ballot box contains only a few or even a single vote.
It is possible to obtain a similar level of voter privacy with Bingo Voting. There
are two ways to accomplish a centralized tally in an election using Bingo Voting.
The first way is that instead of treating each voting machine as a single election
the voting authority only prepares a single set of dummy votes and distributes
this among all voting machines used while keeping the information which dummy
vote was allocated to which voting machine secret. The final proof then contains
no more information about the intermediate results of single voting machines than
the final tally.
The second way is using the method of prearranging dummy votes as described
in Section 5.2 in order to not only decrease the probability of collisions but also
increase voter privacy. This methods requires that unused dummy votes are not
opened directly for the tally but instead they are opened using a proof of a shuffle
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with known content (cf. Section 2.4.4). If all unused dummy votes of an election
are opened this way together without showing which candidate originates from
which dummy vote, this only divulges the final tally and not any intermediate
results.
5.2 Reducing the Length of Random Numbers
Bingo Voting uses random numbers to represent potential and actual votes in
an election and on a receipt. The security of Bingo Voting is based on the as-
sumption that a random number is not drawn more than once within an election.
If this happens, we call this a collision. The original description of Bingo Vo-
ting [BMQR07a] assumes that the random numbers are long enough such that no
collisions occur or that at least their number is small enough to be ignored. If a
collision occurs, however, a corrupted voting machine may change a single vote.
Section 6.3.5 discusses the consequences of collisions in detail.
The length of the random numbers used in a Bingo Voting election has to
be chosen so that collisions are sufficiently improbable. This is easily done by
choosing very long random numbers. This poses another problem, however. The
only time a voter is confronted with details specific to Bingo Voting during the
voting process is when checking the correctness of the receipt by comparing the
random numbers (cf. Section 3.3.2 and Section 6.4.1). This leads to a second,
conflicting requirement: Random numbers must not only be long enough to avoid
collisions, their comparison has to be manageable by every voter as well. Even
though the comparison is voluntary it should be made as convenient as possible
for the voter in order to increase acceptance and, by making the comparison more
likely, also security. This makes the length as well as the presentation of random
numbers in Bingo Voting important. The presentation of random numbers is
discussed in Section 5.3.
This section describes a change to the original Bingo Voting protocol that makes
the occurrence of collisions that allow a corrupted voting machine to change a vote
less likely. Prearranging dummy votes and determining beforehand which dummy
votes are to be used for which receipt prevent a voting machine from capitalizing
on a collision occurring during the voting phase.
The problem of a collision during the voting phases arises when the freshly
drawn random number is identical to a dummy random number for the elected
candidate that is valid for use on the receipt for the current voter. The original
Bingo Voting protocol does not specify how the voting machine chooses the dummy
votes that are to be used for a receipt. That means that a corrupted voting
machine is able to choose from all dummy votes that were not used before. At
the beginning of the voting phase, the voting machine is able to choose from all
dummy votes for a candidate, making the risk of being cheated by a corrupted
voting machine larger at the beginning of the voting phase than at the end. It
also means that if the voting authority prepares more dummy votes this risk is
increased further.
The consequence of this observation is to limit the voting machine’s choice by
prearranging dummy votes in clusters and determining the order in which the
clusters are to be used during the preparation phase. Each cluster consists of as
many dummy votes for each candidate as there are random numbers on a receipt
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for this candidate. In a simple election with one vote per voter this means one
dummy vote for each candidate.
The simplest method is that the voting authority publishes the clusters of
dummy votes in the same order in which the voting machines uses them for the
receipts. This is best complemented by the use of hash chains (see Section 5.6)
that also make the order in which the voting machine issues receipts apparent.
This way an auditor is able to verify that the clusters were used in the correct
order determined by the voting authority before the election. For this the auditor
simply has to check that the proof that the receipt is well-formed uses the dummy
votes of the corresponding cluster (minus the unused dummy votes).
The effect of this method is that the voting machine is able to change a vote
only if the fresh random number is identical to the dummy random number of
the elected candidate that is in the cluster the voting machine has to use for the
receipt of this specific voter. This reduces the chance of such a collision occurring
drastically and allows for shorter random numbers. Section 6.4.1 analyses and
compares the length of random numbers required for an election using Bingo
Voting with and without prearranged dummy votes.
The main disadvantage of prearranging dummy votes is that voter privacy is
broken if unused dummy votes are simply opened after the election. Since it is
obvious which cluster an unused dummy vote belongs to (since this is published
and required to verify that the voting machine used the correct cluster), the unused
dummy votes of a cluster directly give the voter’s choices. To prevent this the
voting authority has to open unused dummy votes using a shuffle of known content
(see Section 2.4.4) to show the content of these dummy votes without showing
which dummy vote has which content. This increases the size of the public data,
however.
Another disadvantage is that for the verification process of the correct order of
use of the clusters the order in which the receipts were issued becomes apparent.
This may or may not be acceptable for an election depending on the requirements.
A solution similar to the propositions for hash chains that do not reveal the order
of the receipts (see Section 5.6.3) seems possible, but currently there is no durable
suggestion for this.
For complex elections in which a voter has more than one vote there are two
different variants of how to prearrange dummy votes and implement clusters. The
first variant uses clusters as described above with one dummy vote for each random
number on the receipt. The voting machine is able to freely arrange the random
numbers on the receipt (as long as each dummy vote is correctly associated to
its candidate). This means that fresh random numbers may be written first next
to a candidate, followed by dummy random numbers if applicable. This way of
arranging random numbers makes it easier for the voter to find the fresh random
numbers for the comparison during the first verification step in the voting booth.
But at the same time the chance of a collision is increased since there is not only
one but several dummy random numbers a fresh random number may be identical
to. To prevent this, the voting authority may specify the order in which the
dummy votes within the cluster are to be used. For this, the voting authority
further divides the cluster into slices, each slice containing one dummy vote for
each candidate. This variant is called sliced clustering in contrast to the first
variant that is called unsliced clustering. The voting machine has to use the slices











Figure 5.2: A comparison of Bingo Voting receipts in an election with three can-
didates and two votes per voter. Fresh random numbers are indicated
in red. The receipt on the left is from an election using unsliced clus-
ters, so fresh random numbers are written first next to a candidate,
dummy random numbers afterwards. The receipt on the right is from
an election using sliced clusters so the first random number is written
in the first column, the second random number in the second column.
A C E F G H J K L M N P Q R S T
U V W X Y Z 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0
Figure 5.3: Alphabet with 32 easily distinguishable characters for the presentation
of random numbers
in the correct order, for each slice only one fresh random number is to be used
(otherwise information about the voter’s choice, namely how many votes were
distributed to the same candidate, is leaked). The consequence is that on the
receipt each column of random numbers (corresponding to the slices) contains
one random number, making finding fresh random numbers on the receipt for
the individual verification process in the voting booth more cumbersome. Sliced
clustering is also unsuitable for elections in which voters have more votes than
they are allowed to cumulate on a single candidate. The reason is that a cluster
for such an election would contain slices containing only the dummy votes for the
two special candidates ‘invalid’ and ‘abstention’.
5.3 Presentation of Random Numbers
In an election employing Bingo Voting, the first step in the individual veri-
fication process happens during the voting process inside the voting booth (cf.
Section 3.4.1). After having cast their vote, a voter receives a receipt and is able
to check that it correctly encodes their choice. For this, the voter has to compare
two strings and reliably decide whether or not both are identical. One string is
displayed by the trusted random number generator, the other is printed on the
receipt next to the elected candidate. It is desirable to make this comparison as
easy and convenient as possible. It not only increases the chance with which a
manipulation attempt is caught and thereby increases security but also helps with
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acceptance.
Making the random numbers shorter makes the comparison simpler but also in-
creases the probability with which a collision occurs. Section 6.3.5 gives a detailed
explanation of how a corrupted voting machine is able to change a vote when a
collision occurs. Section 5.2 describes how to change Bingo Voting in order to alle-
viate the problem of collisions. In a practical employment Bingo Voting will have
to use random numbers long enough to make collisions sufficiently improbable. In
order to improve usability despite this constraint determined by the number of
dummy votes in total we now look at the presentation of the random numbers.
Using numbers and uppercase letters from the English alphabet we have 36
different familiar characters. Some of these are too similar to be reliably distin-
guished, the most prominent example being the uppercase letter O and the number
0. Eliminating those characters we obtain a set of 32 distinguishable characters
as presented in Figure 5.3.
As implied by [Rya69] and [Wic64], humans process strings more easily if they
are grouped into chunks of three characters each. Experiments showed that group-
ing into chunks of three digits is considerably superior to groups of two digits and
a little superior to groups of four or more digits. To aid the comparison pro-
cess, characters should be printed in groups of three with a hyphen separating the
groups.
With 32 different characters, each group of three characters represents 15 bit of
information.
5.4 Dispute Resolution
The goal of a cryptographic voting scheme is for the voter to be able to verify
that their vote was correctly included in the tally. If the individual verification
fails, the voter knows that this was not the case and a dispute arises. This section
discusses the dispute resolution process of Bingo Voting and proposes several solu-
tions to make Bingo Voting dispute-free. The results presented here are published
in [BHK+09].
The dispute resolution procedure should ensure two things. A voter whose vote
was manipulated by the adversary, either through a corrupted voting machine or
by a corrupted voting authority, should be able to prove that some manipulation
took place and their vote was altered. At the same time the adversary should not
be able to claim that the election was manipulated even if this is not the case.
Otherwise it would be possible for the adversary to abort an election without a
result by claiming that votes were altered even if the tally was correct. This would
be disastrous for a real-world election.
One goal of Bingo Voting is to allow voters to not only detect a manipulation of
their vote but also prove the occurrence of such manipulation should the situation
arise. During the voting process, after the voter has cast their vote they receive
a receipt encoding their vote. The voter is able to verify this inside the voting
booth as described in Section 3.4.1. During the tally phase copies of all receipts
are published and the voter is therefore able to verify the correct inclusion of their
vote in the tally. If at one point this verification fails, it is desirable that the
voter is able to prove this and contest the election. In an ideal case the voter is
able to do this without revealing their vote but unfortunately this is not always










Figure 5.4: To create forensic evidence the voter enters their choice using a paper
ballot (left). The voter then checks if the random number of the
trusted random number generator (middle) is placed correctly on the
receipt (right). If the receipt is not correct, the alignment information
printed onto the border of the ballot and the receipt enable the use
of privacy sleeves for dispute resolution without disclosing the voter’s
choice.
possible. Sometimes it is considered sufficient to prove this while revealing the
voter’s choice only to a trusted arbiter.
Section 5.4.1 looks at the dispute resolution procedure during the voting phase,
Section 5.4.2 discusses the voting procedure during the tally phase.
5.4.1 Dispute Resolution During the Voting Phase
A dispute arises during the voting phase if a voter notices in the voting booth
that their receipt is incorrect. In this case the voter should be able to prove that
the receipt does not represent their choice. An advantage of Bingo Voting is that
it works with an arbitrary user interface (cf.Section 6.4.1). This makes it possible
to add a verification mechanism to an arbitrary voting machine.
If a voter enters their choice using a touchscreen interface, there is evidence
missing if a corrupted voting machine produces an incorrect receipt. The machine
simply acts as if the voter had chosen a different party. Even if the voter no-
tices the discrepancy and alerts a representative of the voting authority to resolve
the dispute, the situation is indistinguishable from the voter having chosen this
different party in the first place.
A possible solution is to combine Bingo Voting with a scanner-based interface.
The voter first records their choice on paper that is then fed into the scanner.
The scanner keeps the paper ballot inside a special compartment until the voter
is convinced that the receipt is correct. In addition the display of the trusted
random number generator only is cleared under the same condition. This way
there is enough forensic evidence for a voter to prove that the receipt is incorrect
and does not encode the choice made on the paper ballot.
Disclosing this evidence in a naïve way, however, would violate ballot secrecy.
While it is possible to alleviate this problem by including a trusted arbiter this
may still be considered less than ideal.
Instead of involving a trusted third party, a technical solution similar to Scant-
egrity II [CCC+08] seems promising. For this, the scanner prints a random bar
code onto one margin of the paper ballot during the scanning process. This bar
code is used as alignment information in case of a dispute, the receipt contains
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an identical bar code so that the positions of candidates are identical on paper
ballot and receipt relative to this bar code. In case of a dispute, the voter puts
paper ballot and receipt inside privacy sleeves. There are two kinds of privacy
sleeves that both leave the bar code uncovered so that it is possible to align and
compare paper ballot and receipt during the dispute resolution process. The first
type of privacy sleeve reveals the candidate names in addition to the alignment
information and is used if the candidates are not placed identically in respect to
the bar code on the receipt and the paper ballot. The second type covers the
candidate list as well as everything but one row of random numbers on the receipt
and the marking area for one candidate on the paper ballot respectively together
with the corresponding part of the alignment information. The voter uses this
second type of privacy sleeves to prove a discrepancy between their choice and
the receipt if the alignment information is correct. Figure 5.5 shows both pairs of
privacy sleeves.
In case of a discrepancy, there must be either a row with the fresh random
number but without a mark of the voter or the alignment information on the ballot
and on the receipt must differ. Both discrepancies can be proven by covering up the
aligned ballot and receipt except for those places necessary to see the discrepancy.
So the proof consists either of a row containing the fresh random number but no
mark without revealing which row this is or the proof consists of the two differing
alignment bar codes without showing the mark at all.
This scheme allows the voter to prove an error or manipulation without leaking
information about the voter’s choice. To prevent anyone from learning the content
of the ballot the voter has to make the alignment without outside help. This
problem with usability is likely to decrease its applicability and acceptance.
Finding an easy to use technical solution to prove an error or a manipulation
in the voting booth remains an open problem.
5.4.2 Dispute Resolution During the Tally Phase
In the tally phase, the voting authority publishes a copy of each receipt. A
voter is able to verify that their receipt was published correctly by comparing the
published copy with their original. If they copy was altered or if their receipt is
missing altogether, this indicates that something went wrong.
To successfully contest the election the voter must be able to prove that there
is indeed a discrepancy between the receipt they were issued during the voting
process and the digital copy published afterwards. Strictly speaking, possession of
the original receipt is not sufficient for this unless the party responsible for dispute
resolution is able to verify that the receipt was indeed issued by a voting machine
during the election.
A simple approach is to include a digital signature of the voting machine on
the receipt. This method was used for the election described in Chapter 4. While
this prevents the voter from forging a receipt (under the assumption that the
signature scheme is not broken) it assumes that the voting machine is uncorrupted
and does not simply issue an invalid signature. To alleviate this problem it is
possible to introduce an additional party that produces the signature, for example
a signature card as part of the printer. This signature card would produce a digital
signature for the data the printer receives from the voting machine, i. e. the receipt
information, and the printer adds the digital signature to the printed receipt. This

















5.5.2: privacy sleeves to check the correct en-
coding of the voter’s choice
Figure 5.5: When a dispute arises during the voting process the voter may choose
one of two pairs of privacy sleeves to protect the secrecy of their ballot.
The first pair show the candidate names and alignment information
but hides the voter’s choice on the ballot as well as the random num-
bers on the receipt. The second pair displays one marking area and
the corresponding alignment information on the ballot and one random
number with the corresponding alignment information on the receipt.
Note that the privacy sleeves used to check the correct encoding of
the voter’s choice must be larger than the paper ballot and the re-
ceipt respectively to avoid that the process leaks information about
the position of the part shown (and therefore the voter’s choice).
way the voter is able to contest the election if the printer containing the signature
card is uncorrupted.
To solve the problem of contesting an election in which voting machine and
printer are corrupted, the voting authority may fall back to using physical se-
curity, for example special unforgeable paper for the receipts. There are several
approaches to unforgeable paper, many of which are used for bank notes. Since
the authenticity of a receipt is only checked in case of a dispute, other methods
that are impractical for paper bills may be used. One example is marking paper
with DNA strands that may even be unique for each voting machine. While the
verification procedure is time-consuming and requires a laboratory the application
of a DNA solution is easy and the method is established.
Having two independent ways to prove a receipt to be authentic is a big advan-
tage. If the printer were corrupted, the security would fall back to the security
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provided by the special paper. If, however, the printer works correctly, contesting
an election becomes easy as only the correctness of the signature must be verified.
One big disadvantage of all approaches described here is that the voter is not
able to immediately verify that the receipt issued during the voting phase would
later be recognized as an authentic receipt in case of a dispute. This remains an
open problem.
The procedure to contesting an election during the tally phase described here
requires the original receipt. The problem that a voter who no longer possesses
their receipt is unable to challenge manipulations is discussed in Section 5.6.
5.5 Reducing the Size of Public Data
Like most cryptographic voting schemes, Bingo Voting requires the publication
of data to allow auditors to verify the correctness of the result and to convince vot-
ers that their vote was correctly included in the tally. For Bingo Voting, the voting
authority publishes the dummy votes before the voting phase (see Section 3.3.1).
After the voting phase the voting authority publishes a copy of each receipt (see
Section 3.3.3). In addition to this the voting authority produces cryptographic
proofs for the correctness of the tally. These proofs essentially prove two things:
Each candidate has received the same number of dummy votes before the election,
and each receipt contains the correct number of dummy random numbers.
One large obstacle for the employment of Bingo Voting in real-world elections
is the size of this public data. The data published during the election described
in Section 4 was 580 MB for a single instance of the proof of equal distribution
of dummy votes for a single race with 4000 voters, 72 candidates and 9 votes
per voter. The original Bingo Voting scheme requires about 80 instances of these
proofs in order to use the Fiat-Shamir heuristic to turn it into a non-interactive
zero-knowledge proof. This would have turned the size of the public data well
above 26 GB for a small, albeit fairly complex, election. The size of the public
data increases linearly with the product of the number of voters, the number of
candidates and the number of votes per voter. This makes it obvious why the
size of the public data poses a problem for the practicality of Bingo Voting for
large-scale elections with millions of voters. The main factors for the size of the
public data are the size of each commitment and the size and numbers of the
zero-knowledge proofs proposed in the original version.
This section describes several changes to the Bingo Voting protocol in order
to reduce the size of the public data. Section 5.5.1 describes how the use of
elliptic curves reduces the size of a single commitment. Section 5.5.2 suggests
applying a different proof system, reducing the size of each zero-knowledge proof
used for Bingo Voting. Section 5.5.3 explains a change to the proof that each
candidate received the same number of dummy votes before the election, reducing
the number of proofs by proving this during the tally phase.
To demonstrate the improvements of the changes described in this section, Sec-
tion 6.4.2 presents the size of the public data for three different scenarios of real-
world elections using Bingo Voting with the changes described in this section and
compares it to Bingo Voting without these improvements.
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5.5.1 Decreasing Dummy Vote Size
As the number of dummy votes is determined by each specific election, namely
by how many candidates there are and how many votes each voter may distribute,
as well as the number of voters, optimizing the size required for a single commit-
ment is the best way to reduce the size of the published dummy votes.
Bingo Voting uses UHDLCs (see Section 3.1.2). In the original version [BMQR07a],






, the multiplicative group of units of a group of
integers modulo p with p prime. In order to be secure, p should be at least a
1024 bit prime number. As any commitment is a group element of G, this means
that every commitment requires 1024 bit to be represented despite the content
being much smaller.
Koblitz [Kob87] and Miller [Mil86] independently proposed the use of elliptic
curves over a finite field for cryptographic purpose. They offer a smaller key size
while providing a comparable security to finite fields.
Using a cyclic subgroup Ẽ of prime order p of an elliptic curve E over F2n
thus reduces the size of each commitment without reducing the security (namely
the binding property, since the commitment scheme is unconditionally hiding).
Lindell et al. [LPS08] suggest using an elliptic curve with n ≈ 256. We continue
to use the multiplicative notion to avoid confusion with previous descriptions of
UHDLCs.
To use UHDLCs the voting authority must publicly choose two generators g
and h of the subgroup (such that 〈g〉 = 〈h〉 = Ẽ). The generators g and h must
be chosen such that no party knows the discrete logarithm of g with respect to
h. Each commitment is then a point of E and can be represented with only
n+ 1 bits [Ser98]. With n = 256 this means that each commitment now only has
a quarter of the size of the commitments of the original scheme.
5.5.2 Changing the Proof Style
The proofs published for the verification process of Bingo Voting (see Sec-
tion 3.4) are all non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs of a shuffle with known
content. The prover (i. e. the voting authority) publishes a set of commitments
and a list of plaintexts, and proves that each plaintext is the content of exactly
one commitment. This means the prover shows the content of each commitment
without showing which commitment contains which plaintext.
In the original description of Bingo Voting the zero-knowledge proofs used were
randomized partial checking (RPC) proofs (see Section 2.4.4.1 for detailed presen-
tation of randomized partial checking). One disadvantage of this proof style is that
it requires many instances to use the Fiat-Shamir heuristic to turn the proof into
a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof and two rerandomizations per instance.
Each instance of these proofs allow the adversary to cheat undetected with prob-
ability 12 . This makes k instances necessary to achieve a cheating probability of
2−k, which leads to very large proofs. This section proposes employing a proof
technique described by Groth [Gro02, Gro10] and using the multiplication proof
by Damgård and Jurik [DJ01]. The proof technique was originally described for
Paillier ciphertexts. The scheme used for Bingo Voting was adapted to UHDLCs.
Before it is possible to use the proof of a shuffle of known content as proposed by
Groth, it is necessary to combine the pair of commitments that form a dummy vote
into a single commitment. This is easily done in a way that the new commitment
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verifiably contains the content of both commitments forming a dummy vote. Let
ν = dlogne
be the length of the representation of the n candidates and (Commit (r) ,Commit (Cand))
a commitment for candidate Cand with dummy random number r, then
ĉ = Commit (r)2
ν
·Commit (Cand) (5.1)
is a commitment to (r|Cand). This fact allows us to use the proof of a shuffle
of known content proposed by Groth [Gro02, Gro10]. It also means that for
opening a dummy vote it is sufficient to publish the randomness of the combined
commitment ĉ. A similar method is used by Groth when turning a proof of a shuffle
of known content into a proof of a shuffle of homomorphic encryptions. Without
combining the two commitments of a dummy vote into a single commitment the
use of the proof of a shuffle of known content would not be possible efficiently
since the association between dummy random number and candidate would be
destroyed. This association is fundamental to prove correctness of Bingo Voting.
This proof has a length of 8·n·sizeCom bits where n is the number of commitments
and plaintexts and sizeCom is the size of a single commitment, a message or a
random number used in the commitment. Compared to this the randomized
partial checking protocol used in the original Bingo Voting scheme has a length of
n · 5 · sizeCom · 80 bits (with the adversary having a chance of cheating undetected
with probability 2−80) which is significantly larger. Section 6.4.2 presents the total
amount of the reduction of the size of public proofs for a Bingo Voting election.
5.5.3 Optimizing the Proof of Correct Distribution of Dummy
Votes
During the preparation phase, the number of dummy votes generated for each
candidate must be the same. If this is not the case, the number of unused dummy
votes after the voting process (minus the number of nonvoters) do not give the
tally.
In the original version of Bingo Voting the voting authority publishes the set
of dummy votes together with a proof that each candidate has received the same
number of dummy votes (see Section 3.3.1). The size of this proof depends on
the number of dummy votes and therefore on the expected number of voters.
The change to this proof of the correct distribution of dummy votes presented
here makes the size of the proof depending on the number of voters that actually
attended the election.
The central idea of the change proposed in this section is that is it unnecessary
to include those dummy votes into the proof that are opened during the tally
phase. Those dummy votes were not used on any receipt during the voting phase.
It exploits the fact that it is actually sufficient to prove the correct distribution of
dummy votes after the voting phase.
Instead of proving before the voting phase that the published dummy votes are
equally distributed, i. e. that there is the same number of dummy votes for each
candidate, the voting authority proves after the voting phase that the number of
unused dummy votes plus the number of opened dummy votes for each candidate
is the same.
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More precisely, let d be the number of dummy votes published during the prepa-
ration phase for all n candidates, t the election turnout (with 0 ≤ t ≤ 1), and
v̂ the number of votes cast. Candidate Candi should have lost di · t − v̂i dummy
votes, with di = dn being the number of dummy votes for Candi and v̂i being the
number of votes cast for Candi. The voting authority can prove this after the
election, decreasing the number of dummy votes included in the proof from d to
d · t− c since only used dummy votes have to be included.
While the improvement of efficiency of this change itself is small, this change
makes the proof size depending on the number of actuals voters (see Section 6.4.2).
This allows the voting authority to generously prepare dummy votes without
unnecessarily increasing the size of the public data. Unused dummy votes are still
published during the preparation phase and are opened during the tally phase but
are no longer part of a proof.
5.6 Preventing the Receipt Stealing Attack
Most cryptographic voting schemes are based on the assumption that each re-
ceipt is checked or at least that enough receipts are checked so that a significantly
large manipulation is caught with high probability. The first assumption is very
strong, and the second assumption either means all but very few receipts are
checked (still a very strong assumption) or that the adversary does not know in
advance which receipts are checked.
The receipt stealing attack described in Section 5.6.1 is a simple attack de-
stroying this fundamental assumption. Section 5.6.2 proposes a method of linking
receipts together by means of a hash chain. One drawback of this method is that
the order in which receipts were issued by the voting machine becomes appar-
ent. Section 5.6.3 describes a modification of the hash chain method that avoids
this problem. Section 5.6.4 discusses the relevance of the receipt stealing attack
and the hash chain method for other cryptographic voting schemes. The results
presented in this section were published in [BHK+09].
5.6.1 Receipt Stealing Attack
Most cryptographic voting schemes offer a receipt to each voter to help them
to verify the correct inclusion of their vote into the tally. To check this, voters
compare their receipts to the data published by the voting authority.
The receipts of most voting schemes contain too much information for the voter
to memorize the complete receipt. This is especially true for random strings (truly
random or quasi-random such as hash values, signatures or serial numbers) that
are common to cryptographic voting schemes. Scantegrity II (cf. Section 2.5.8)
is probably the cryptographic voting scheme with the least information on the
receipt. The receipt consists of a three letter code and the serial number of the
ballot. While the three letter code can probably be memorized the serial number
might be challenging depending on the length. This makes Scantegrity II one of
the few (if not the only) cryptographic voting scheme in which a voter may be
able to check the correct inclusion of their vote without a receipt.
For most other voting schemes the genuine receipt or an exact copy is required
for verification. This means that once an adversary has got hold of a receipt he
can be fairly sure that the corresponding vote will not be checked if no copy exists.














h2 = h (h1 . . . 7280)
Figure 5.6: Two consecutive receipts are linked by incorporating the hash value
of the previous receipt into the hash value of the current receipt. The
so-formed hash chain is broken if only one receipt is altered.
There are several possibilities how an adversary can get hold of a receipt, some
of them have been pointed out in [Rya06], [RS07], [RP05] and [Dan08]. The
adversary can search trash bins for receipts directly in the polling station or in
the vicinity (or put one up himself), steal them, buy them or collect them ensuring
the voters that they will be checked. Independent of the exact way an adversary
acquires the receipt we call this receipt stealing.
If an adversary has not only obtained a number of receipts but also has access
to the voting machine, he can change the votes that belong to the obtained re-
ceipts. This is a problem that many cryptographic voting schemes share. Rivest
and Smith call this a collusive attack [RS07], as the adversary obtaining the re-
ceipts must collude with the voting authority, or at least with a part of the voting
authority that controls the voting machine or bulletin board. Ryan and Pea-
cock [RP05] and Karlof, Sastry and Wagner [KSW05] also identified this problem
and suggest voter education as a countermeasure. Ryan and Peacock also propose
the introduction of a VVPAT style mechanism that produces two receipts, one for
the voter and one remaining at the polling station. This allows auditors to verify
each receipt using this copy, making the verification by the voter redundant.
The education of voters is important and may help against carelessly discarded
receipts and make stealing receipts more difficult, but the success against receipt
buying is doubtful. Making the voter’s receipt redundant forces the adversary
to obtain two receipts to ensure that a manipulation is not detected. But the
knowledge that their receipt is redundant may make the voter less likely to check
it. At the same time, this measure relies on auditors checking the copies of the
receipts that remain at each polling station which requires a sufficient number of
auditors.
The hash chains proposed in the next section make retaining a copy of each
receipt unnecessary. Instead it links receipts together using a hash function. This
prevents the adversary from retroactively changing an acquired receipt, which is
necessary to change the corresponding vote, as this changes the hash value of this
receipt. But this hash value is also contained in the subsequent receipt and an
included when computing its hash value, so that checking a receipt also implicitly
checks all receipts issued previously.
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5.6.2 Hash Chains
It appears to be impractical to prevent the adversary from obtaining receipts.
Therefore the goal must be to prevent the adversary to gain an advantage from
stealing a receipt.
There are several methods to make a stolen receipt useless for the adversary.
One approach is to ensure that the receipt stolen by the adversary is not the
only copy, either by retaining one copy, as proposed by Ryan [Rya06, LR08],
or by issuing additional copies to other voters. This is an inherent property
of voting schemes based on the Farnel idea [ACvdG07]. Both methods require
additional assumptions. Retaining an additional copy of each receipt only works
if the adversary has no access to those copies. Issuing additional copies to other
voters makes it harder for the adversary to collect all copies but implicitly assumes
that the copies are unmodified.
Another approach is to immediately publish each receipt as soon as it is issued.
This is done for example by Punchscan (cf. Section 2.5.5). This method requires
a connection between the voting machine or scanner and a publishing medium,
e. g. the bulletin board used by Punchscan. In most cases, this will be done via
the Internet.
The hash chain method proposed here utilizes an idea that was proposed by
Kiayias, Korman and Walluck in [KKW06] and also used in VoteBox [SDW08].
In both cases hash chains are used to document the integrity of internal states.
The hash chain method for Bingo Voting uses a very similar technique not for
internal but for public data, i. e. to ensure receipt integrity. This section describes
the method for Bingo Voting, but it is adaptable to any cryptographic voting
scheme that uses a computer to generate receipts.
The idea is to link a receipt to each receipt that was printed out before. For this
a receipt is identified with a small value (a hash value for example) and printed
onto the subsequent receipt. It is important that the value used for identification
is depending deterministically on the content of the receipt, making the hash value
of a publicly known cryptographic hash function a good choice.
When forming a receipt, the voting machine now hashes the complete content
of the receipt and prints the hash value onto the receipt as well. To link each
receipt with its predecessor the voting machine also prints the hash value of the
previous receipt onto the current receipt and includes it into the information used
to compute the hash value (see Figure 5.6). By integrating the hash value of
the last receipt in the hashing of the new receipt the receipts form a chain. So
with each receipt not only the corresponding vote but the integrity of all previous
receipts can be verified. This prevents an adversary from manipulating a vote
even if he gets hold of the corresponding receipt.
The first approach to link consecutive receipts is by printing the hash value
of the last receipt on top of the current receipt (and include it in its hash value
and thus forming a hash chain). When all receipts are published, it can easily be
verified that for each receipt except the last there is a second one that carries its
hash value on top and thus ensures the integrity of the complete hash chain.
There are two problems with this approach: The first is that the order of receipts
becomes public, which we will discuss in Section 5.6.3. The second problem is that
there still is a time window in which an adversary can get hold of a receipt, access
the voting machine and change the vote, the corresponding receipt and its hash
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value. If this happens before the next voter has cast their vote and received their
receipt, this attack will not be noticed.
It is possible to modify the scheme so that the adversary is unable to modify
any vote without risk. For this the hash value of the receipt that was just printed
out must be fixed so that an adversary cannot modify it. One possibility is that
the printer prints the hash value of a receipt onto the bottom, gives out the receipt
and prints the same hash value on the top of the paper that will form the top
of the next receipt. The voter can now compare both values and ensure that the
next carries the correct link value. This assumes of course that the printer is not
able to draw the paper back in and overwrite the link value or simply throw out
the blank receipt with the hash value on top and start a new one after the voter
has left the booth and before the next one enters. The second possibility is a
display outside of the voting booth that displays the hash values of the last two
receipts. So when a receipt is printed the display shows the hash values of this
receipt and the one before. Both hash values are also printed on the receipt so
the voter can easily check the correctness. Both hash values are displayed until
the next receipt is printed, then the older hash value is replaced by the newer one,
and the newer is replaced by the hash value of the receipt just printed out. This is
the only time at which the display changes, any other change (which is necessary
when an adversary wants to change a vote and the corresponding receipt) can be
noticed by poll workers. This is of course a new assumption but as poll workers
are necessary for all elections to control the correct proceeding of the election we
think it is not unreasonable to assume that the display is watched with sufficiently
high probability at a given time.
5.6.3 Hidden Hash Chains
One side effect of using a simple hash chain to link receipts is that the order
in which votes are cast are published as they are required for the verification
process. This gives additional information to an adversary and may be considered
undesirable. However, as it is required that the receipts do not reveal the vote,
publishing the receipts possibly even linked to the voters seems to be acceptable.
An alternative is to use a commitment to the hash value of the previous receipt
to link receipts instead of the hash itself. During verification instead of giving
the order of the receipts the voting authority publishes a zero knowledge proof
that for each commitment on a receipt there exists another receipt with this hash
value. For this the voting authority publishes a proof of a shuffle with known
content (e. g. using the proof technique proposed in Section 5.5.2) with the set of
commitments printed onto the receipt as well as the list of the hash values of all
receipts as input.
As the commitment is included in the hash it is impossible to commit to the
hash value of the same receipt. Likewise it is impossible to break the chain or
leave out a receipt as hash values will be verified during the tally phase.
This method masks the order in which receipts are issued and the only infor-
mation that still becomes public knowledge is which receipts originate from the
same voting machine.
The major drawback of this method is that it requires an additional proof,
thereby increasing the size of the public data.
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5.6.4 Relevance for Other Schemes
The problem of receipt stealing attacks is not limited to Bingo Voting. Most
other cryptographic voting schemes are also vulnerable to this attack. A notable
exception is Scantegrity II since the receipt of a Scantegrity II election contains
only very little information so that a voter is able to remember this information
and check the correct inclusion of their vote into the tally without the receipt.
For most other voting schemes a vote corresponding to a stolen receipt will not
be checked by the voter, allowing the adversary to alter this vote without risk of
detection.
Fortunately the hash chain method described in Section 5.6 is not specific to
Bingo Voting and only requires a computer to generate the receipt. It is easy
to implement hash chains for all cryptographic voting schemes that use a voting
machine to print the receipt.
6. Analysis and Evaluation
A thorough security analysis of a cryptographic voting scheme requires a security
notion and a complete model. Unfortunately, a general model for the security
of cryptographic voting schemes is still missing. There have been attempts for
remote voting schemes [KR05, JCJ05, BHM08, Ond09, KRS10], but the results
are not transferable to presence voting schemes.
There are multiple problems that make formalizing such a model hard. One such
problem is finding the appropriate level of abstraction for real-world characteristics
like physical assumptions or behaviour of human voters. Another problem is that
it must be assumed that a human voter is unable to do anything but the most
basic tasks during the voting process. A discussion of such a general security
model for cryptographic voting schemes and its problems is out of scope of this
work.
While the lack of such a model is unsatisfactory, it should be noted that a full
formal analysis for the traditional paper election is also missing. Instead of a
formal security model the security of a (cryptographic) voting scheme is typically
evaluated considering security properties. Section 2.2 gives an overview over the
security properties used for the evaluation of Bingo Voting in this chapter.
The security of all cryptographic voting schemes is based on a number of as-
sumptions. The quality of a voting scheme is not only depending in the security it
achieves but also on the nature and quantity of the assumptions required. Often
assumptions are stated explicitly, but some assumptions are only made implicitly.
This is dangerous, as implicit assumptions make an evaluation of the quality of a
voting scheme hard. When an attack that breaks an implicit assumption is found,
it may affect the security of the voting scheme without giving users a chance to
prepare.
This chapter analyses the security properties of Bingo Voting and their relation
with the required assumptions, and discusses and evaluates the effects of the
improvements proposed in Chapter 5. For the evaluation of the improvements
we will use three scenarios taken from real-world elections. These scenarios are
described in Section 6.1. To evaluate the security properties of Bingo Voting,
Section 6.2 presents the assumptions the correctness and verifiability of Bingo
Voting are based on and assesses which are required to fulfil prevalent properties
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of cryptographic voting schemes. Section 6.3 analyses the security properties of
Bingo Voting and gives a detailed explanation which assumptions are required for
each security property. Section 6.4 deals with practical considerations including
an analysis of the usability of Bingo Voting and the size of the public data.
6.1 Scenarios for Evaluation
For the evaluation of the size reduction of the public data (cf. Section 5.5) and
the length reduction of random numbers (cf. Section 5.2) we use three scenarios
taken from three recent real-world elections:
(a) the German Bundestag election of 2009,
(b) the US presidential election of 2008, and
(c) the Indian general election of 2009.
For scenario (a) we find the following numbers in [Bun09]: v = 62 million voters,
n = 27 candidates, and a turnout of t = 0.7. For scenario (b) we take the following
numbers from [Uni08, Alb08]: number of eligible voters v = 209 million, number
of candidates n = 36 and turnout t = 0.63. For scenario (c) we have v = 714
million voters, n = 364 candidates and a turnout of t = 0.58, taken from [Sid10]
and [Tha09].
We use the scenarios to estimate the probability of a collision for different
lengths of random numbers and to assess the size of the public data required
for verification. The Indian general election in 2009 (scenario (c)) was conducted
using 1 368 430 voting machines for 714 million eligible voters [Sid10, Tha09] which
means circa 520 voters per voting machine. Using this number we estimate the
number of voting machines that would have been used for the German Bundestag
elections in 2009 (scenario (a)) with 124 000, and for the United States presidential
elections in 2008 (scenario (b)) with 418 000.
6.2 Assumptions Required for Bingo Voting
The security properties of all cryptographic voting schemes are based on a num-
ber of assumption, some of which are complexity theoretical assumptions typical
for cryptographic protocols, but many are assumptions that make theoretical con-
siderations applicable to real-world elections.
It is important to be aware of all assumptions that are required for certain
security properties of a cryptographic voting scheme. To assess the security of a
cryptographic voting scheme it is also necessary to assess the required assumption.
An implicit assumption may be the target of an attack that breaks the security
of a cryptographic voting scheme without notice.
A good example for this is the receipt stealing attack described in Section 5.6.1.
Many cryptographic voting schemes implicitly make the assumption that the ad-
versary does not know which votes are checked. This implies that the adversary
takes a certain risk for each vote that is manipulated. This makes changing a
significant number of votes apparent with high probability. The receipt stealing
attack, for which the adversary obtains receipts and is now able to predict with
high confidence that the corresponding votes will not be checked, invalidates this
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assumption. This makes additional security measures necessary to protect against
such an attack.
This section gives an extensive list of assumptions required for the security of a
Bingo Voting election. Section 6.2.1 briefly discusses assumptions that are required
for any election and are independent of the voting scheme used. The voting booth
assumption discussed in Section 6.2.2 is also essential for voter privacy in any elec-
tion, but since Bingo Voting introduces a voting machine it is discussed separately.
Section 6.2.3 discusses the assumption that voters participate in the verification
process. Section 6.2.4 presents details on the central assumption required for the
correctness of Bingo Voting, namely that the trusted random number generator
is uncorrupted. Section 6.2.5 presents the assumption that an authentic receipt is
recognizably different from a forged receipt. Section 6.2.6 describes the discrete
logarithm assumption, the only complexity-theoretical assumption required for
Bingo Voting.
6.2.1 General Assumptions
A cryptographic voting scheme typically does not specify all technical details
and tasks of a real-world election. Tasks like voter registration and authentication,
checking voter eligibility, managing candidate lists, and organizing and arranging
polling stations and poll workers are essential for an election but not part of the
specifications of a cryptographic voting scheme.
This section gives a brief overview over the technical and organizational tasks
that are required for an election in addition to the specifications given by Bingo
Voting.
Probably the most important assumption for the correctness of a Bingo Voting
election is that only eligible voters get access to a voting machine, and that each
voter only casts a single ballot. At the same time, we have to assume that no
eligible voter is prevented from participating in the election. This includes making
the date of the election public and providing a sufficient number of polling stations
for all voters. Similarly we have to assume that the candidate list is complete and
public.
The assumption that every eligible voter is able to participate in the election
also implies that each voter is able to use the interface of the voting machine
employed by Bingo Voting. One big advantage of Bingo Voting is that the voting
scheme is independent of the user interface used (see Section 6.4.1). This allows
the voting authority to choose an appropriate user interface.
Most of these concerns are independent of the voting scheme used and have to
be solved for any election. This means that these problems have already been
solved for traditional elections and an election employing Bingo Voting is able to
use the same solutions without any major modification. An important part of
this is the deployment of poll workers or auditors that represent the public (or at
least competing candidates) and supervise the correct procedure of the election.
Another method to ensure transparency is making the list of eligible voters public
and also publish the polling station records that state if an eligible voter voted.
While this helps verifying the assumption that only eligible voters voted, it still
requires the correctness of the polling station. It also decreases voter privacy since
it makes the fact whether a voter attended public.
For an election employing Bingo Voting we assume that the list of candidates
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is complete and publicly known, that each voter may choose freely to participate
or not, and that only eligible voters are able to cast at most one vote.
6.2.2 Voting Booth Assumption
In a secret election, voters fill their ballots in a designated area designed to
protect privacy during the voting process. For voter privacy it is essential that
all voters are unobserved during the voting process when they mark their ballot
or enter their choice into a voting machine. This assumption is important for all
secret elections, but it becomes stronger if the voting scheme includes a voting
machine which may leak information about the voter’s behaviour.
For Bingo Voting the assumption that the inside of the voting booth is unobserv-
able by the adversary is as essential as for other voting schemes. The assumption
that the voting machine used to record the voter’s choice and generate the receipt
does not transmit any information of the vote outside of the voting booth extends
this assumption. A voting machine may even leak such information without being
manipulated, simply due to side channels like electromagnetic radiation of the
screen. These side channels remain an open problem for all voting machines.
For Bingo Voting we assume that the voting booth assumption holds. This
means that the adversary is unable to observe a voter, the voting machine or
the trusted random number generator inside the voting booth during the voting
process, and that neither the voting machine nor the trusted random number
generator give any information (intentionally or unintentionally) to the adversary.
This does not include the information printed on the receipt that is handed to the
voter or information learned from the tally.
6.2.3 Verification Assumption
The goal of most cryptographic voting schemes is that each voter is convinced
that either the tally is correct or some verification step fails. But the goal reached
by many schemes is that each interested voter is able to check whether their vote
was included correctly in the tally. These two slightly different notions are only
equivalent if each voter checks the correctness of the tally.
For a practical application this assumption is not realistic. Many voters are
probably not able to verify the tally, especially for cryptographic voting schemes
whose verification processes often include cryptographic proofs, or may even be
not interested in doing so. This typically leads to the assumption that while not
each vote is checked, still only very few votes may be changed by the adversary
without being noticed. It is also assumed that a small number of altered votes
does not change the tally sufficiently to change the result of the election.
This assumption is based on two arguments. The first is that in traditional
paper based elections small counting errors are frequent and that to change the
result of an election typically a large change in the tally is required. The second
argument is that while not every vote is checked the adversary does not know
which voter will check their vote and that a sufficiently large number of voters
will do this. This means that for each vote the adversary changes there is a
certain risk of detection that is large enough that a significant change of the tally
is probably detected.
There are several problems with this argumentation. The biggest problem is
that many of these factors are unknown and probably very specific to each election.
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This is especially true for the number of votes that may be changed without
changing the result of the election. In a small election only one or two votes may
change the outcome, but also for large elections the result may hinge on less than
a thousand votes. Since the chance of detection only depends on the number of
changed votes and is independent from the total number of votes small elections
are more at risk. The probability that a small change in the tally changes the
result of an election is much higher for small elections than for large elections.
The fraction of voters that will check their receipts is also very hard to estimate.
Bingo Voting shares this problem with many cryptographic voting schemes. The
security of the final result depends on the assumption that an adversary changing
votes is caught with high probability. This in turn requires that all voters check
their receipts or alternatively that the adversary is unable to predict with a high
certainty which receipt will be checked. If this is the case, a verifier is convinced
that the set of receipts that is published is identical to the set of receipts issued
during the voting phase or any “large” difference is noticed and challenged. In
many cases, this assumption is made implicitly, and only few cryptographic voting
schemes are actually protected against attacks targeting this assumption. Bohli
et al. analyse the threat of this attack in [BHK+09] and find that only Scantegrity
II is inherently protected as the information that the receipt contains is so short
that a voter may remember it even when losing the receipt itself.
If the adversary does not know if a certain receipt is checked, he risks detection
with every vote changed. In most elections it is necessary to change a number
of votes to change the result (cf. Section 2.2). While the ultimate goal of each
cryptographic voting scheme is to guarantee a perfectly correct tally, this goal
is unrealistic. The fact that not each and every voter is guaranteed to check
their receipt gives the adversary a chance to change a single vote without being
detected.
The verification assumption states that for each vote manipulated the adversary
risks detection. This probability is high enough that the probability that the
adversary is able to change a sufficient number of votes to change the result of the
election is sufficiently small. This includes the assumption that small changes in
the tally do not change the result of the election and that cryptographic proofs
are checked by a capable public.
6.2.4 Random Number Generator
The original work on Bingo Voting [BMQR07a] proposes using randomness
from a mechanical source, for example a bingo cage, to generate the random
numbers necessary for the voting scheme. While this idea is alluring, there are
several problems with this. The first is that the random number generated must
be readable by the voting machine to generate the receipt. This is a technical
problem which appears to be solvable, for example by using balls with bar codes.
The second problem is that the randomness must remain random even when the
voter misbehaves, i. e. the voter must not be able to influence the result of the
process. This is necessary to ensure the coercion resistance as the voter must not
be able to generate a recognizable “random” number. This, too, is a technical
problem that appears to be solvable.
The last problem with a mechanical random number generator is the amount
of entropy that is required for the random numbers. Drawing a single ball from
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a typical bingo cage with 75 balls generates log2 75 ≈ 6.23 bits of entropy. Sec-
tion 6.3.5 argues that a real-world election requires up to 45 bits of entropy for
each random number which is hard to obtain by drawing a single ball from a bingo
cage (this would require a bingo cage with 245 ≈ 35 · 1012 different balls). The
alternative is drawing more than one ball from the cage, either with or without
putting back the ball after drawing. As the resulting random number should be
visible to the voter for the verification process (cf. Section 3.4), putting back the
balls after each drawing is probably not practical.
While drawing more than one ball greatly increases the entropy of the resulting
random number, the drawing process becomes more complex and time consuming.
To achieve more than 30 bits of entropy the random number generation process
would require drawing five balls (without putting them back) from a cage of 100
balls, each labelled with two digits from 00 to 99. This gives circa 33 bits of entropy
and would be sufficient for most real-world elections (cf. Section 6.3.5.2). Please
note that these numbers are valid only for the scheme using the improvements
described in Section 5.2. The entropy requirement becomes more demanding for
more complex elections as discussed in Section 6.3.5. Finding a mechanical device
that reliably and comprehensibly produces randomness of sufficiently high entropy
is currently an open problem. These requirements become more demanding for
complex elections in which the voter is able to distribute more than one vote. This
may be solved with one trusted random number generator for each vote the voter
distributes, however.
Electrical random number generators provide an alternative to mechanical ran-
dom number generators. They often use the randomness generated by Johnson-
Nyquist noise [Joh28, Nyq28] and provide several advantages over physical random
number generators. They offer a higher rate of entropy, often provide their data
in digital form and established implementations for smart cards (e. g. signature
cards) exist. Their main disadvantage is that the generation of randomness is not
visible to the human eye, making it hard to verify the true randomness of their
results.
The trusted random number generator assumption is central to Bingo Voting
and actually consists of two assumptions. The first is required for correctness
and states that before the publication of the dummy random numbers the voting
authority is unable to predict the random numbers drawn by the trusted ran-
dom number generator during the voting phase better than by inference from the
publicly known distribution. The assumption that the trusted random number
generator is uncorrupted and actually draws and displays a fresh random number
for each voter remains the one most important assumption for the correctness of
Bingo Voting. The second assumption is required for receipt-freeness and states
that the distributions of dummy random numbers and random numbers drawn
during the voting phase are indistinguishable.
6.2.5 Receipt Authenticity Assumption
When a dispute about a single vote arises after the voting phase, i. e. when a
voter notices that their receipt is not included correctly in the list of receipts,
the voter is asked to produce the receipt issued by the voting machine. If the
voter is able to produce an authentic receipt that was not included in the list, this
indicates that the corresponding vote was manipulated.
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The dispute resolution procedure assumes that the voting authority is able
to verifiably discern between an authentic receipt and a forgery. Measures that
support this assumption are discussed in Section 5.4.2.
6.2.6 Discrete Logarithm Assumptions
Bingo Voting requires a complexity theoretic assumption for the binding prop-
erty of the commitments used for the dummy votes and the proofs of shuffles of
known content.
The UHDLCs (see Section 2.4.2.1) use a group in which the discrete logarithm
is hard to calculate. The commitment scheme requires two generators and is
binding under the assumption that the sender is unable to compute the discrete
logarithm of one generator in respect to the other. This not only requires that
the discrete logarithm is hard to compute but also that the generators are chosen
at random. There are two approaches to choose two generators at random. One
approach is using a secure multiparty computation with at least one uncorrupted
party to choose the generators using the combined randomness, the other is using
a random beacon [Rab83, CH10] to retrieve public randomness for choosing the
generators.
The discrete logarithm assumption states that the two generators chosen for
the UHDLC scheme are chosen so that the discrete logarithm is unknown, and it
is infeasible to compute it.
6.2.7 Hash Function Assumptions
The hash chain method proposed in Section 5.6 employs a cryptographic hash
function to generate a short bit string representing the content of a receipt. By
incorporating the hash value of the last receipt two consecutive receipts are linked
and subsequently all receipts form a hash chain.
In order for this to protect the vote corresponding to the receipt from being
changed, the hash function used must have certain properties. The collision resis-
tance property guarantees that altering the content of a receipt leads to a different
hash value for the receipt. It prevents the adversary from creating two receipts
with the same hash value. One would be the receipt being printed that correctly
represents the voter’s choice, the other would be the manipulated receipt pub-
lished in case the adversary obtained the printed receipt. If the dummy votes are
prearranged as suggested in Section 5.2, the second-preimage resistance property
is probably sufficient to ensure this since the correct receipt which is issued to the
voter is determined by the cluster that is to be used and the voter’s choice.
6.3 Security Analysis of Bingo Voting
Many cryptographic voting schemes promise verifiable correctness as well as
voter privacy, even when an adversary is present. A general security model is
currently missing, most evaluations use security properties like end-to-end secu-
rity, receipt-freeness, and coercion resistance. This section analyses the security
of Bingo Voting based on the assumptions presented in Section 6.2.
Section 6.3.1 discusses how Bingo Voting protects voter privacy and how it
prevents vote buying and coercion. Section 6.3.2 evaluates the correctness and
end-to-end verifiability of Bingo Voting. Section 6.3.3 discusses the properties of
Bingo Voting in case of a dispute. Section 6.3.5 looks at the consequences of a
random number being drawn more than once for the security of Bingo Voting.
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6.3.1 Voter Privacy
For voter privacy we assume that the voting booth assumption (see Section 6.2.2)
holds, i. e. that the adversary is unable to observe the voter during the voting pro-
cess and that the voting machine does not communicate with the adversary. In
the original Bingo Voting scheme the voting machine was able to use the choice
of dummy random numbers for the receipt to leak information about the voter’s
choice. If the fresh random number for example was even and the voting machine
chose only odd dummy random numbers for the receipt, the voter’s choice would
become apparent immediately. The method of prearranging dummy votes actu-
ally provides a countermeasure against this since the voting machine is not longer
able to choose the dummy votes that are used to generate the receipt based on
the voter’s choice but is forced to use a set of dummy votes specified in advance.
The voting authority plays a prominent and important role in an election. In
most cryptographic voting schemes it possesses sufficient information to break
voter privacy and learn each voter’s choice. This is also true for Bingo Voting.
In the original paper [BMQR07a] the authors suggest to solely rely on the voting
machine for the preparation phase (cf. Section 3.3.1). This means that the voting
machine possesses all information that may break voter privacy. Implicitly, using
this approach assumes that the voting authority does not access this informa-
tion. This is probably not practical for large elections since the preparation of a
Bingo Voting election requires the generation of a large amount of randomness (to
generate dummy votes) and access to the Internet for publishing dummy votes.
The most important assumption for providing voter privacy is the voting booth
assumption (cf. Section 1). In short it states that the voter is unobserved inside the
voting booth. This assumption is necessary for all cryptographic voting schemes as
well as for a traditional election with paper ballots. But by using voting machines
an additional element is introduced that threatens the voting booth assumption.
The voting booth assumption for voting schemes that use voting machines states
that not only is the voter unobserved inside the voting booth during the voting
process. In addition it requires that the voting machine does not transmit the
voter’s choice outside the voting booth or stores it together with information that
allows the adversary to connect the choice to the voter (for which it would be
sufficient to store the time or the order in which the votes are entered).
One big problem for voting machines in general are side channels, most promi-
nently electromagnetic radiation [FDBV11]. It was shown that this side channel
is sufficient to gain information about the voter’s choice even from voting ma-
chines employed in real-world elections (in this case the national elections of the
Netherlands) which were not designed to specifically transmit the voter’s choice
to break voter privacy. Side channels are, however, a technical problem and out
of scope of this work.
From the point of view of vote secrecy or coercion resistance, a voting authority
that possesses all secrets to revoke the vote secrecy is unfavourable. The solution
of distributing the voting authority onto several parties by means of secure multi-
party computation might not completely solve the problem, because (at least for
Bingo Voting) all data must be available to the voting machine, so a corrupted
voting machine still poses a threat to secrecy.
One option to avoid an omniscient voting authority is to have the election
prepared inside the voting machine, as mentioned in the description of Bingo
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Voting in Section 3.3.1. This means that each voting machine is treated as a
separate election and produces its own result (cf. Section 5.1.4). This reduces
the amount of vote secrecy that is achievable at all. The smaller the sample of
voters the higher is the probability that information about the vote cast by a
single voter can be deduced from the result (for example if a candidate receives no
votes). This also trades the assumption that the voting authority is uncorrupted
for the assumption that the voting authority has not illegitimate access to the
voting machines. The appraisal which assumption is preferable depends on the
specifics of a real-world election and is out of scope of this work.
6.3.1.1 Receipt Freeness
In an election employing Bingo Voting each voter receives a receipt during the
voting phase (see Section 3.3.2). In order to be receipt-free, the receipt issued
by Bingo Voting must not leak any information about the voter’s choice. This
requirement is necessary in addition to voter privacy. For this reason this section
concentrates on information contained on the receipt.
For Bingo Voting the receipt consists of the list of candidates together with the
random numbers representing the voter’s choice (see Figure 3.1). The random
number that represents the voter’s choice was generated by the trusted random
number generator during the voting process, the other random numbers are from
dummy votes for the corresponding candidates. It is easy to see that if the ad-
versary is able to discern between fresh random numbers and dummy random
numbers the receipt leaks information about the voter’s choice. So for receipt
freeness the distribution of fresh random numbers and dummy random numbers
has to be indistinguishable. For this it is particularly essential that the dummy
random numbers remain secret. This means that if any party that knows the
dummy random numbers, i. e. voting authority and voting machine, is corrupted
(and able to communicate with the adversary), receipt-freeness is broken.
If the dummy votes that are used to generate the receipt are not prearranged
(see Section 5.2), a corrupted voting machine is able to choose dummy random
numbers in a recognizable way. If the dummy votes are prearranged, a corrupted
voting machine is no longer able to use this side channel without being detected.
This means that Bingo Voting is receipt-free if the adversary does not learn
which random numbers on a receipt are dummy random numbers. For this the
following requirements have to be fulfilled:
• The voting authority is uncorrupted.
• The distribution of the dummy random numbers is indistinguishable from
the distribution of the random numbers generated during the voting phase.
• The voting machine is either uncorrupted or unable to communicate with
the adversary directly and the receipt contains no side channels (because
the generation is deterministic using prearranged dummy votes).
6.3.1.2 Coercion Resistance
For coercion resistance Bingo Voting has to provide in addition to receipt free-
ness that a voter may not gain an advantage in proving their vote to the adversary
by deviating from the voting protocol. For Bingo Voting the analysis is rather
short, since the voter is not confronted with the voting scheme before the vote
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was cast. There is no way for the voter to influence the form of the receipt in a
specific way. This means that the receipt-freeness of Bingo Voting directly implies
coercion resistance.
6.3.2 Correctness and Verifiability
The correctness of Bingo Voting is based on the mechanism a Bingo Voting
election uses to keep track of the dummy votes. During each voting process,
whenever a voter casts a vote, all but one candidates lose one dummy vote. That
means that after the vote was cast, one candidate possesses one dummy vote more,
relative to all other candidates, than before. For the remainder of this section we
assume that each eligible voter has cast a vote in the election.
The individual verification of each voter’s receipt described in Section 6.3.2.1
ensures that the candidate the voter voted for does not lose a dummy vote during
the voting process. The global verification described in Section 6.3.2.2 ensures
that all candidates have received the same number of dummy votes and that for
each receipt all but one candidate lose one dummy vote. The implication is that
the number of remaining dummy votes for each candidate is equal to the number
of votes received if the number of dummy votes at the beginning of the voting
phase was equal to the number of voters.
6.3.2.1 Individual Verification
Inside the voting booth, the voter is able to verify that the random number
associated with the candidate of their choice is not a dummy random number
by checking the display of the trusted random number generator. This is only
true, however, under the assumption that the trusted random number generator is
uncorrupted and displaying a fresh random number and that no collision occurred.
Section 6.3.5 argues that the length of the random numbers have to be chosen so
that collisions are sufficiently improbable.
The second part of the individual verification is the comparison of the copy of
the receipt published by the voting authority with the original receipt. By checking
that their receipt was published without changes each voter verifies that their vote
was included in the tally and concludes the individual verification process.
The individual verification process assures the voter that during a voting process
the elected candidate does not lose a dummy vote. The required assumptions
for this are the discrete logarithm assumption, which is needed for the binding
property of the commitments forming the dummy votes and for the proofs, and
the trusted random number generator assumption.
6.3.2.2 Global Verification
The global verification consists of a number of proofs that show the correctness
of the tally. All of these proofs are essentially proofs of shuffles of known content
(see Section 1).
The first proof shows that all candidates received the same number of dummy
votes during the preparation phase. In the original Bingo Voting scheme the
voting authority proves this during the preparation phase when the dummy votes
are published. Section 5.5.3 proposes proving this after the voting phase. In
both cases the correctness of the proof is based on the binding property of the
commitment and therefore by the assumption that the discrete logarithm in the
group G used for the UHDLCs (cf. Section 3.1.2 and Section 6.2.6) is hard.
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The second proof shows that all but one random number on each receipt is a
dummy random number and that all dummy votes used are for different candidates
and that none is for the elected candidate. This means that all but one candidate
lost a dummy vote. The individual verification ensures that the elected candidate
did not lose a dummy vote, so all other candidates must have lost one. Since the
second proof is essentially the same as the first one, its security is also based on
the discrete logarithm assumption.
In an election that uses prearranged dummy votes as described in Section 5.2
the unused dummy votes are not simply opened but instead shuffled and then
opened. This includes a proof of a shuffle of known content to verify that the
unused dummy votes were used correctly. The correctness of this proof is also
based on the discrete logarithm assumption.
When the election uses hash chains as described in Section 5.6 the verification
that the hash chain was not broken is also part of the global verification. The
security of the hash chain is based on the collision resistance of the hash function
that is used.
6.3.3 Dispute Freeness
For Bingo Voting a dispute may arise at two points during the verification
process. The voter may notice that the receipt is incorrect inside the voting
booth or that the receipt was not published correctly after the voting phase. If
any part of the proof fails, this does not lead to a dispute since the data required
for the verification is public and may be checked by any auditor.
For Bingo Voting, the verification inside the voting booth is critical. The pro-
tocol presented in Section 5.4.1 offers a possibility for the voter to prove a manip-
ulation without revealing their choice. This protocol is very sensitive, however,
and may be too complicated for use in real-world elections.
If the dispute rises after the voting phase, the dispute freeness of Bingo Voting is
mostly based on the assumption that the question whether a receipt is authentic
or not can be resolved reliably (see Section 6.2.5). If this assumption is met,
Bingo Voting allows the voter to prove a manipulation without disclosing any
information about their choice.
6.3.4 Robustness and Recovery
The Bingo Voting scheme allows voters and auditors to notice manipulations
but offers no recovery mechanism without violating voter privacy. This means
that a single manipulation may force the voting authority to annul the complete
election.
6.3.5 Collisions
The random numbers used by Bingo Voting are assumed to be long enough
to avoid drawing the same random more than once during an election. We call
the occurrence of two or more identical random numbers a collision. For the
correctness it is necessary to choose the length of the random numbers sufficiently
long in order to make collisions unlikely.To understand why it is necessary to
choose the length of the random numbers of Bingo Voting accordingly and why
we want to avoid collisions we look at what happens when a collision occurs.
There are three types of collisions, collisions between dummy random numbers
that already occur during the preparation phase, collisions between fresh random
















Figure 6.1: A collision occurring during the voting process allows a corrupted vo-
ting machine to undetectably change a single vote. The figure depicts
the set of dummy votes before (top) and after (bottom left) a voter
chose candidate B. The collision between the fresh random number
displayed by the trusted random number generator (TRNG, bottom
middle) and a dummy random number for candidate B allows the cor-
rupted voting machine to count the vote cast for candidate A (A lost
no dummy vote). The TRNG displays the random number printed
next to the candidate B on the receipt (bottom right), so the voter is
(falsely) convinced that the vote was counted for candidate B.
numbers generated by the trusted random number generator during the voting
process, and collisions between a dummy random number and a random number.
Most of these collisions have not consequences for the correctness, but when a
fresh random number is identical to an unused dummy random number for the
elected candidate, a corrupted voting machine is able to change the corresponding
vote without the voter noticing.
In this section we have a close look collisions and discuss the consequences for
the security of an election using Bingo Voting. It is important to stress that a
collision only has consequences for the correctness of an election if the voting
machine is corrupted. For the remainder of this section we assume that this is
the case and show how a voting machine is able to change a single vote when a
collision occurs. We also determine the probability with which such a collision
occurs and compare the probabilities for the original version of Bingo Voting and
of the scheme using prearranged dummy votes as described in Section 5.2. This
section also presents the probabilities of collisions occurring for several lengths of
random numbers for three real-world scenarios.
6.3.5.1 Consequences of Collisions
The original description of Bingo Voting [BMQR07a] assumes that the random
numbers used are long enough and collisions are negligible. If a collision oc-
curs during the voting process, however, a corrupted voting machine potentially
changes one vote.
There are two types of collisions. A collision that happens during the prepa-















l = 15 1 431 113 1 1 378 259 1 4 694 498
l = 30 1 13 1 42 1 143
l = 45 4.014 · 10−4 4.015 · 10−4 1.283 · 10−3 1.284 · 10−3 4.363 · 10−3 4.372 · 10−3















l = 15 1 1324 1 4018 1 12 638
l = 30 3.961 · 10−2 4.042 · 10−2 0.115 0.113 0.320 0.386
l = 45 1.234 · 10−6 1.234 · 10−6 3.742 · 10−6 3.742 · 10−6 1.177 · 10−5 1.177 · 10−5
6.2.2: improved Bingo Voting scheme
Figure 6.2: Probabilities of at least one collision occurring during an election for
different random number lengths k and different election scenarios: (a)
German Federal elections, 2009, (b) USA presidential election, 2008,
and (c) Indian general election, 2009.
ration phase has no consequences. A collision that happens during the voting
process only affects the election if the fresh random number is identical to an un-
used dummy random number of a dummy vote for the elected candidate. But if
this is the case, the voting machine may count this vote for any other candidate.
Figure 6.1 visualizes the consequences of a collision occurring during the voting
process. If the trusted random number generator draws a fresh random number
matching the dummy random number of an unused dummy vote for the elected
candidate, the voting machine is able to use this dummy vote for receipt and to
count this vote for any other candidate without the voter noticing the manipu-
lation. The voting machine generates the receipt using the dummy vote for the
elected candidate and a new random number, drawn by the voting machine, for
a candidate of the voting machine’s choice. The voter will be convinced that the
vote was counted correctly as the trusted random number generator displays the
random number written next to the candidate elected by the voter.
This problem is impossible to detect or prevent. It is thus essential to make
sure that such collisions occur only with very small probability. To alleviate this
problem we propose to prearrange dummy votes as described in Section 5.2.
6.3.5.2 Probability of Collisions
In this section we discuss the length of the random numbers that is required
to avoid collisions with a certain probability. To compare our changes to the
original Bingo Voting protocol and to assess the length requirements, we calculate
the probability of collisions for elections employing the original and the improved
scheme for the scenarios presented in Section 6.1. We state the probabilities
relative to random numbers with a length of l bits.
For the original scheme, the probability of a collision occurring during a single






where d̂ is the number of remaining dummy votes for the candidate of the voter’s
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choice. Since the number of remaining dummy votes for any candidate changes
during the voting phase (whenever a candidate is chose all other candidates lose
a dummy vote) we give a lower bound for the probability for a collision occurring
during an election on a single voting machine. This number depends on the
elected candidate and the number of voters that have cast their votes for the same
candidate before. This makes it impossible to give an exact probability of an
collision occurring for the original version of Bingo Voting. In order to have an
estimation for the probability of a collision for the original Bingo Voting scheme,
we estimate the probability as follows.
When the ith voter votes, there are at least v− (i−1) dummy votes left for any







1− (vmax − (i− 1))2l (6.2)
is an upper bound for the probability that no collision occurred on a voting ma-
chine that was prepared for v voters after v · t voters voted (0 ≤ t ≤ 1 being the
turnout of the election). The expected value of the number of collisions occurring
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using the same simplifications. Again, this is an upper bound for the expected











and the expected number of collisions is
E
old
Elec = m ·EoldVM (6.5)
during a complete election. Both the probability and value for the expected num-
ber of collisions are probably lower bounds, but the exact values are hard to
determine since they depend on the number of voters per voting machine, the
voters’ choices (and the order in which the votes were cast) and the distribution
of voters to voting machines. For our analysis we used the estimates presented here
and assumed that the voters were evenly distributed among the voting machines.









for v ·t votes cast. Note that the probability is independent of the number of voters
the election was prepared for and of the number of voting machines or distribution
of voters to voting machines. The reason for this is that each cluster of dummy
votes may be treated as a single election since a collision is only relevant if it
occurs between the fresh random number and the dummy random number of the
candidate the voter chose and that is part of the cluster the voting machine has
to use for this voter’s receipt. Consequently, the expected number of collisions for
the improved scheme is
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Figure 6.2 lists the probabilities and expected number of collisions for the three
scenarios taken from real-world elections (see Section 6.1). It shows that our
suggestions greatly decrease the probability of a collision occurring. It also shows
that a length of 30 bits for the random numbers is sufficient for very large elections
with hundreds of millions of voters since the expected number of collisions is less
than one for the complete election.
6.4 Practical Considerations
In addition to the security properties of Bingo Voting, several additional prop-
erties are important to consider to assess the applicability of Bingo Voting for
real-world elections. Chapter 5 has presented several methods to improve the
practicability of Bingo Voting by increasing usability and reducing the size of
public data.
This section discusses these properties which are not directly security related
but are essential for a large-scale deployment of Bingo Voting. Section 6.4.1 dis-
cusses the usability of Bingo Voting and compares it to the usability of several
other cryptographic voting schemes. Section 6.4.2 analyses the size of the public
data required for the verification of a Bingo Voting election and evaluates the im-
provements proposed in Section 5.5. A very important aspect of applicability are
the legal requirements for cryptographic voting schemes. Section 6.4.3 presents
and discusses the ruling of the German Federal Constitutional Court on the use
of voting machines for the German Federal Election in 2005. This ruling makes a
clear statement on the legal requirements for election schemes to be allowed to be
employed in political elections in Germany.
6.4.1 A Comparison of Usability
The usability of a cryptographic voting scheme is important for the acceptance.
The equality of all votes also demands that no voter may be influenced (by being
confused by the voting scheme) or even deterred from voting. This implies a high
hurdle for the usability of which the details are unfortunately unclear. Defining
the exact requirements for usability of a cryptographic voting scheme is out of
scope of this work.
This section will instead present a comparison of three verifiable voting schemes,
Prêt à Voter, Punchscan and the scheme by Moran and Naor, to Bingo Voting,
focusing on usability under realistic conditions. One aspect is the effort needed for
the actual voting process, the other is the additional cost for the voter to ensure
correctness.
One important question is at which point of the voting process the voter first
gets into contact with the cryptographic mechanisms, i. e. when does the voter
first experience a difference to the “normal” voting. There are studies that hint
that voters may be influenced by the voting procedure, and that this influence
is bigger if the voting scheme is more complicated [BLS+03, THP+05, HNH+07].
The results presented in this section are published in [BHMQ+08]
6.4.1.1 Prêt à Voter
As Prêt à Voter, like Punchscan, is a paper based system, the voter will not vote
at a computer but cast a paper ballot. But in both cases this paper ballot looks
different than the traditional paper ballot (see Sections 2.5.4). Both schemes use
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a permutation to encrypt the votes on the receipt and both must mark the ballot
in a way that the permutation can be inverted and the vote can be reconstructed.
Prêt à Voter uses a special paper ballot on which the candidates are printed in a
random order. In contrast, normal paper ballots have a fixed order of candidates.
This is a change to the normal paper ballot for which the order in which the
candidates appear is fixed. This may also pose a conflict with election laws that
regulate the order of appearance of the candidates on the paper ballot.
For Prêt à Voter the voter has to verify that this ballot is authentic and “cor-
rect”, i. e. the encrypted permutation printed on the ballot corresponds to the per-
mutation used for the candidates so that the vote can be correctly reconstructed.
This is normally done by presenting two ballots to the voter, who chooses one that
is to be verified and uses the other for voting. It is possible to do this by handing
out two paper ballots to the voter (to prevent attacks the ID and permutation are
hidden either by a scratch field or simply by showing the ballots upside-down), the
voter chooses one and for this the correctness of the ballot is proven by opening
the permutation.
This cut-and-choose approach catches a manipulation of n ballots with proba-
bility 1− 2−n, making an undetected change of a large number of votes unlikely.
There are two problems with this approach: First the number of paper ballots
needed is doubled, and second the proof is either time-consuming or requires trust
into an independent computer which may or may not be corrupted.
Filling out the Prêt à Voter ballot may be more time consuming than it is for
a normal paper ballot, as the order of appearance is random so the voter has
to spend some time to find their candidate. This is especially true for ballots
containing many candidates, for elections in which the voter distributes several
votes to more than one candidate and for elections with a ranking of candidates.
When the voter has completed the voting process they go to a poll worker and
hand over the ballot upside-down without showing their vote. The poll worker
removes the part with the names of the candidates and destroys it, e. g. using a
shredder. The remaining part is scanned (for electronic counting) and signed with
a digital signature.
If the ballot ID is protected by a scratch field, it must be removed before scan-
ning, but after shredding the part with the names of the candidates. This poses
some practical problems as the poll worker assisting in shredding and scanning
must verify that the scratch field is intact without seeing the whole ballot as this
would reveal the vote.
6.4.1.2 Punchscan
Punchscan also uses a paper ballot consisting of two parts. Here the voter has
to find their candidate (order of appearance may be random or fixed), read a
character printed next to it and find the same character in the marking area. The
top layer has holes through which the second layer, lying underneath, displays
the same characters that appear next to the candidates in a random order (one
character per hole). The voter now marks the hole which shows the character
corresponding to the candidate of their choice. This results in a clear mark on both
the upper and lower layer of the ballot. The procedure of finding the candidate,
reading the character and then again finding the character may be challenging
and time-consuming for some voters. The time needed increases significantly if
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there is a large number of candidates or if more than one vote can be distributed.
Also the error rate of the voting procedure is probably affected.
After the voter has marked their ballot, they will go to a shredder, destroy one
of the two layers and scan the other. If the ID of the ballot is protected by a
scratch field for security reasons then this results in similar problems as Prêt à
Voter.
6.4.1.3 Voting Scheme by Moran and Naor
Both Bingo Voting and the scheme by Moran and Naor use a computer to cast
the vote. So naturally both schemes show significant difference to a traditional
paper and ballot voting.
However, compared to other voting machines the differences only become ap-
parent to the voter after they have finished entering their vote into the computer.
This might be realized using a touchscreen and perhaps a special pen to reproduce
the pen-and-paper voting procedure.
After the voter has entered their vote Bingo Voting and the Moran-Naor scheme
begin to differ. To produce a receipt the Moran-Naor scheme needs randomness
for each entry which must be entered by the voter. Also the scheme only allows for
one vote per receipt, so if a voter can distribute more than one vote for each one
a receipt is required. Combined with the fact that for each receipt the voter has
to enter sufficient randomness for each candidate this makes the voting process
(actually the receipt generation) very time consuming and will probably lead to
a low acceptance. Another problem is that the voter might enter low entropy
randomness when asked for many random numbers. This could compromise the
security of the voting scheme. Of course a trusted random number generator could
be used to generate the required randomness, but this results in other problems.
A short description of this idea is found in [BMQR07a].
6.4.1.4 Bingo Voting
Like the scheme by Moran and Naor, Bingo Voting requires no special actions
performed by the voter prior to the voting process, except that the voter gains
access to a voting machine instead of receiving a paper ballot. The computer
used by the Bingo Voting scheme to cast the vote will, after the vote was entered
and confirmed by the voter, call a trusted random number generator and receives
a random number for each vote of the voter. Then a receipt is printed and the
voter has to compare the random numbers on the display of the trusted random
number generator with the random numbers printed next to their choice(s) on the
receipt. For each possible choice there must be a random number on the receipt
which limits the size of the election realizable with a reasonable paper and font
size for the receipt. For each vote the voter has to make one comparison which
also limits the elections as each vote increases the time needed for comparison.
6.4.1.5 Comparison
In comparison to Prêt à Voter and Punchscan the voting scheme by Moran and
Naor and Bingo Voting have one big advantage as they force the voter to interact
with the cryptographic mechanisms of the voting scheme only after they have
made their choice. For Bingo Voting the additional steps after the vote was cast
are only necessary to ensure correctness of the vote. The scheme by Moran and
Naor needs randomness as input from the voter which makes the voting process
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more time consuming. As mentioned above this can be bypassed by using a
random number generator as a source. In this case the minimal effort required for
voting is the same as for Bingo Voting. Prêt à Voter and Punchscan both interfere
with the voting process as both require special paper ballots. The voting process
of Prêt à Voter requires the voter to find the candidate of their choice and mark
the adjacent field. For Punchscan the voter has to find their candidate, find and
remember the corresponding letter and finally find this letter and mark it with a
marker.
For a voter who is concerned about correctness of the election all four voting
schemes provide means to ensure correctness with additional effort. For the scheme
by Moran and Naor this effort is actual part of the voting process (if randomness
is entered by the voter) or optional (if a random number generator is used).
The big advantage of Moran and Naor is that their voting scheme does not need
a preparation phase. Unfortunately this is bought by a cumbersome and time con-
suming receipt generation. Bingo Voting has the advantage that the voter only
has to compare random numbers in the voting booth. The main disadvantage of
Prêt à Voter and Punchscan is that both use special ballots that normal voters
are not used to, may conflict with existing legal requirements and require special
handling during the shredding process. Besides the random order of the candi-
dates, Prêt à Voter is the voting scheme with the most similarities to traditional
voting with paper ballots and the most flexible one.
After receiving the receipt and leaving the voting booth, the voter may check
whether their receipt was published correctly. In addition to this, each voter and
all auditors are able to check whether the published proofs are valid. These checks
after the voting process are very similar for all four voting schemes and have been
omitted in the comparison.
6.4.2 Size of Public Data
Section 5.5 describes several changes to the original Bingo Voting scheme that
decrease the size of the public data.
To compare the improved scheme of Bingo Voting with the original scheme, this
section gives the formulas for the size of the public data for the original scheme
and the improved scheme. For the sake of completeness the increase of the size of
the public data caused by prearranging dummy votes as proposed in Section 5.2
are also included in the calculations. To evaluate the improvement achieved this
section also presents the size of the public data for the three scenarios described
in Section 6.1.
6.4.2.1 Published Data Size of the Original Version
Bingo Voting requires one dummy vote per candidate and per voter. If a voter
has more than one vote and can give more than one vote to one candidate, this
increases the number of required dummy votes.
Let v be the number of voters, n the number of candidates without absten-
tion and void, s the number of votes a single voter can distribute, and smax the
maximum number of votes each vote may cast for a single candidate. Then
dr = n · smax + 2 · s
gives the number of random numbers on each receipt. Note that this includes the
random numbers required for the ‘invalid’ and ‘abstention’ candidates. As each
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random number on a receipt might be a dummy random number there, must be
dt = v · dr
dummy random numbers (and therefore the same number of dummy votes) in
total. If sizeoldCom is the size of a single commitment then
told1 = dt · 2 · sizeoldCom
is the total size of all commitments that must be published before the election.
Remember that a dummy vote consists of two commitments, one containing the
dummy random number and one containing the candidate.
In the original paper of Bingo Voting the voting authority proves that each
candidate has the same number of dummy votes using RPC before the election.
With k iterations of these proofs probability of an incorrect proof that was not
detected is 2−k. For each iteration, each commitment of the candidate names
is rerandomized and then the rerandomized commitments are either opened or
the randomness is published. For this, the new commitments plus the opening
information or the rerandomization information must be published. So for each
original commitment we publish one new plus one randomization factor or opening
information per iteration of the RPC proof.
The total amount of published data for the RPC proof before the election there-
fore is
told2 = dr · v ·
(
2 · sizeoldCom · k + 2 · sizeoldCom
)
(6.8)
where k is the number of parallel instances for the Fiat-Shamir heuristic. The
original version of Bingo Voting recommends k = 80.
After the election the voting authority publishes one proof for each receipt
that it is well-formed. For this the voting authority proves that there are dr − s
dummy random numbers on the receipt, that at all dummy random numbers on
the receipt originate from a dummy vote for the candidate the dummy random
number is associated with on the receipt. For this the voting authority proves
that the content of the receipt corresponds to the content of the dr − s dummy
votes used to form the receipt plus s new commitments for the fresh random
numbers and the elected candidates. The total size of the proofs that each receipt
is well-formed is
told3 = dr · v · t · 2 ·
(
2 · sizeoldCom · k + 2 · sizeoldCom
)
(6.9)
where t is the turnout of the election (so v · t is the number of votes cast during
the election).
The last part of the published data is the opening information for the unused
dummy votes. In the original scheme, the size of the data is
told4 = dr · v · (1− t) · 2 · sizeoldCom + s · v · t · 2 · sizeoldCom. (6.10)
The total size of the public data for an election using the original version of
Bingo Voting is
told = told1 + told2 + told3 + told4 . (6.11)
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6.4.2.2 Published Data Size of the Improved Version
Let v be the number of voters, n the number of candidates without abstention
and void, s the number of votes a single voter can distribute, smax the maximum
number of votes each vote may cast for a single candidate, and t the turnout of
the election. As in the previous section, with
dr = n · smax + 2 · s
we denote the number of random numbers on each receipt and with
dt = v · dr
the number of dummy votes in total. The size of the first part for the improved
scheme,
tnew1 = n · v · 2 · sizenewCom, (6.12)
is almost identical to the size of the dummy votes for the original scheme except
for the smaller commitment size sizenewCom.
In contrast to the original scheme, the improved scheme proves that all can-
didates received the same number of dummy votes during the preparation phase
after the voting phase. Consequently, the proof only includes the content of the
candidate part of the dummy votes actually used in the election, reducing the size
tnew2 = v · t · (dr − s) · 8 · sizenewCom (6.13)
substantially in comparison to the proofs of the original scheme. The exact ad-
vantage depends on the turnout, as the size of this proof if no longer depending
on the number of total voters but on the number of voters that actually voted,
and the number of candidates. The lower the turnout and the fewer candidates
there are the larger the portion of prepared dummy votes that remain unused and
are opened instead of included in the proof of equal distribution of dummy votes.
In the improved scheme, the proof that each receipt is well-formed is of size
tnew3 = dr · v · t · 8 · sizenewCom, (6.14)
which is significantly smaller than the proofs for each receipt in the original
scheme, as only a single instance of the proof is required. The fact that each
dummy vote is combined into a single commitment as described in Section 5.5.2
decreases the number of commitments as input for the proof also decrease the size.
For the improved scheme using prearranged dummy votes the opening of unused
dummy votes of used clusters is more complicated, so the total size is
tnew4 = n · v · (1− t) · sizenewCom + v · t · 8 · sizenewCom. (6.15)
Since this includes the size of the proofs that are required when prearranging
dummy votes, this part may even be bigger than just the decommit information
for the original version. Prearranging dummy votes is not required to use the
optimized proofs, but the resulting increase of the public data was included to
demonstrate that the negative impact of prearranging dummy votes on the size
of the public data is not significant.
The total size of the public data for an election using the improved version of
Bingo Voting is
tnew = tnew1 + tnew2 + tnew3 + tnew4 . (6.16)
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(a) (b) (c)
told 83 877 GB 355 272 GB 11 735 262 GB
tnew 723 GB 2997 GB 97 305 GB
Figure 6.3: Size of the public data for three scenarios for the original and the
improved Bingo Voting scheme: (a) German Bundestag elections 2009,
(b) US presidential elections 2008, (c) Indian general election 2009.
This data does not include the receipts which is identical for both
systems and small compared to the proofs.
6.4.2.3 Size Improvement
Figure 6.3 presents the total size of the public data of a Bingo Voting election
for the three scenarios described in 6.1 and both the original an the improved
scheme.
The results show that the public data of the improved scheme is about one
hundred times smaller than what the original scheme would have had to publish.
This improvement increases with lower turnout and fewer candidates (as only
dummy votes used on a receipt are included in the proofs for the correct number
of dummy votes). While the public data required for the verification of a Bingo
Voting election remains large, the examples show that it is not impossible to handle
the data of a Bingo Voting election with several hundred millions of voters.
6.4.3 Legal Considerations
A thorough analysis of the legal requirements for the deployment of Bingo Vo-
ting in a real-world political election is not only very specific to the country and
the electoral legislation but also very hard due to a generally unclear legal situa-
tion concerning cryptographic voting schemes. Cryptographic voting schemes are
normally not considered explicitly in legislation and interpreting a law is out of
scope of this work.
This section briefly discusses the decision of the German Federal Constitutional
Court about the deployment of voting machines during the German Federal Elec-
tions in 2005.
On March 3, 2009 the German Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfas-
sungsgericht) ruled that the employment of voting machines during the German
Federal Election in 2005 was unconstitutional. The ruling also stated that the
German Federal regulation for voting devices (Bundeswahlgeräteverordnung) was
insufficient to ensure elections in accordance with the German Constitution.
The press release [off09] summarizes the ruling as follows:
“[T]he use of electronic voting machines requires that the essential
steps of the voting and of the determination of the result can be ex-
amined by the citizen reliably and without any specialist knowledge of
the subject.”
The argumentation of the court was in short that a democratic election must
be public and that using a voting device is allowed only if this requirement of
publicity is met. The ruling stressed that even a voter without special knowledge
must be able to verify the compliance with the principle of a democratic election.
106 6. Analysis and Evaluation
In the wake of the ruling several European countries abandoned the use of voting
devices for political elections, including the Netherlands which almost exclusively
used voting machines very similar to those used in the German Federal Elections
in 2005.
The open question for cryptographic voting schemes remains whether or not
the cryptographic and mathematical knowledge required to verify the proofs most
such schemes use is considered a “special skill”. On the one hand, this knowledge
is definitely not part of the everyday life of a typical voter. On the other hand,
the methods used to allocate seats according to the tally in a proportional repre-
sentation election is special knowledge as well. Nevertheless it is required for the
verification of the result of the election.
Until a new regulation for the use of voting devices in political elections in
Germany is adopted, the requirements for such devices are unclear.
7. Conclusion
The original Bingo Voting scheme possesses several weaknesses and lacks some
details that have to be addressed to make it feasible and attractive for real-world
elections. This work has presented several improvements and extensions to the
original protocol that turn it into a practical protocol for large and complex real-
world elections.
The extensions described in Section 5.1 allows voters to abstain from an election
or cast invalid votes, and enable Bingo Voting to be used in elections with multiple
votes per voter and several voting machines which is important for larger elections.
The improvements described in Section 5.2 reduce the probability that a cor-
rupted voting machine is able to change a vote when a random number is drawn
for a second time during an election. This allows for shorter random numbers to be
used for an election and thus improves usability. Using the suggested presentation
of random numbers presented in Section 5.3, the evaluation of real-world scenar-
ios in Section 6.3.5.2 shows that random numbers represented by three groups of
three characters each are sufficient for even the largest democratic election in the
world.
Section 5.4 describes a possible dispute resolution procedure for a Bingo Voting
election. Such a procedure is essential for real-world elections to give not only the
ability to detect manipulations but also to prove them.
Section 5.5 proposes several changes to the original Bingo Voting protocol that
reduce the size of the data that is published for the verification of the tally of the
election. The analysis of the size of public data for different real-world scenarios
presented in Section 6.4.2 shows that these changes decrease the size of the public
data by a factor of more than one hundred.
Section 5.6 presents the receipt-stealing attack, an attack on almost all cryp-
tographic voting schemes. It also presents a countermeasure that makes such an
attack much harder. This countermeasure is not only applicable to Bingo Voting
but to all cryptographic voting schemes that use computers to create and print
the receipts.
The security analysis in Section 6.3 shows which assumptions are necessary to
achieve the different properties of Bingo Voting. Section 6.4 discusses the practical
aspects of the Bingo Voting scheme and shows that the size of the public data and
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the length of the random numbers are both practical even for very large elections.
The question which voting scheme should be used for elections must at least
partly be addressed by a political discussion. In order to be able to lead such
a discussion a listing of the properties of each voting scheme as well as the as-
sumptions required for those properties is indispensable. This work answers these
questions for the case of Bingo Voting. This does not only include the security
properties but also practical requirements. This work gives several improvements
for usability and the size of the public data, and gives a thorough analysis for
both the required length of random numbers as well as the expected size of the of
the data published for the verification of the tally.
There still remain some problems and open questions that have to be addressed
before Bingo Voting may be employed in a real-world election.
The most important assumption for Bingo Voting is that the trusted random
number generator draws fresh numbers truly at random. Currently, the ran-
domness is generated by a digital trusted random number generator for practical
reasons, which is not convincing. A method to quickly, reliably, and, most im-
portantly, convincingly generate randomness, display it and make it computer
readable would greatly increase the verifiability of Bingo Voting.
In a complex election in which a voter has more than a single vote another
problem of Bingo Voting appears. The current proofs do not address the problem
that a corrupted voting machine in cooperation with a corrupted voter is able to
cast a partially invalid vote. The proof for each receipt that it is well-formed does
not prove that either all votes were for the invalid candidate or none was. This is
an inherent property of the Bingo Voting protocol but may be fixed using the same
method that allows for the ranking of candidates as described in Section 5.1.3.
This method increases the size of the public data and may make Bingo Voting
impractical. On the other hand, the consequences of such a behaviour may be
considered non-critical. While a partially invalid ballots is impossible to generate
in a paper-based election, it may also be considered a valid alternative way of
voting.
Another disadvantage of using Bingo Voting for complex elections is that the
receipts quickly grow large. The number of random numbers on a receipt is the
number of votes a voter has, times the number of candidates. This also makes
verifying the correctness of the receipt inside the voting booth laborious and time-
consuming. For each vote the voter distributed they must find a specific random
number on the receipt and compare it to the display of the trusted random number
generator. The fact that a receipt becomes larger for more complex elections may
pose a problem for all cryptographic voting schemes. The exact complexity for
which a cryptographic voting scheme is practical may differ, however. A usability
study to determine the maximal number of candidates and votes per voter for
which Bingo Voting is still practical is currently missing.
The improvements in this work are a big and important step towards a practical
application for Bingo Voting.
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